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ABSTRACT 
DOUBLING NATO: 
FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE 
Erdogan Kurt 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp 
This dissertation studies NATO expansion as institutional adaptation. More 
specifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographical 
enlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between NATO's new 
functions and its enlargement. Over time, NATO evolved from a collective defence 
alliance to a comprehensive security organization. As NATO undertook new functions, 
its capabilities no longer matched the requirements of the new functions. The 
geographical enlargement, in fact, constitutes a vehicle for the fulfilment of the capability 
shortfall. 
Furthermore, this dissertation asserts that the new security environment will force 
NATO to focus on the regions at a strategic distance. More specifically, the Black Sea 
corridor will be the next area for NATO engagement. New functions such as energy 
security may bring new members from the wider Black Sea region into the club. 
The case studies offer a detailed analysis of NATO's post Cold War functional 
and geographical enlargement. The second case study also highlights the fact that there is 
no an automatic geographical enlargement as a result of new NATO functions. 
The timing of dissertation coincides with a significant transformation in NATO's 
structure and core tasks. 2010 will be the year of a NEW NATO with a new peace 
establishment and strategic concept. NATO will still be a relevant Euro-Atlantic 
organization with a global area of responsibility in the twenty-first century security 
environment for as long as it continues to protect the vital interests of its members. 
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Do we still need NATO? The question has been discussed extensively in the past 
two decades and at the dawn of the new millennium; there is a near consensus throughout 
the political spectrum that NATO still matters for international security. Considering the 
Soviet threat was eliminated successfully, it might have been costly to continue on the 
commitments of NATO when there is no any threat to the members. Even more, 
engaging additional commitments by accepting new members can be seen as a huge 
policy error within and outside of the alliance. Why is NATO enlarging continuously? 
This dissertation aims to provide a new perspective on NATO enlargement. As explained 
below, NATO's geographical enlargement is explicitly tied to the alliance's functional 
enlargement. When the alliance develops new functions to cope with the new challenges 
in the security environment, the new capabilities are required to satisfy the functions. 
NATO accepts new nations only when the required capabilities cannot be developed 
internally among the members. Though NATO expansion can be explained by other 
means such as alliance formation, hegemonic interests and cultural affiliation of the new 
and existing members, no study highlights the common characteristics of NATO 
enlargements throughout its history. Rather, the existing literature explains each 
enlargement round as a separate case, thus not providing a consistent answer to the 
enlargement phenomenon. 
This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition by University of 
Chicago Press. 
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Alliances typically cease to exist when the threat disappears. Having existed as a 
security organization of the last 60 years, NATO has not just surpassed the expectations 
of its most severe critics, but has also evolved into one of the core organizations of the 
twenty-first century. Today, there is no other international organization that can enforce 
peace and security in any part of the globe. The deficiencies of United Nations, OSCE 
and other similar organizations were underscored with the ethnic violence in ex-
Yugoslavia in 1990s. 
In the last twenty years, NATO underwent a huge transformation: New functions, 
new capabilities and new members. We are witnessing a new power shift in the 
international structure. Asia is rising as a power center in the new world order. NATO 
needs to continue to transform itself to cope with the new challenges. 
What makes NATO's unique integrated military structure is the most important 
element that distinguish it from other organizations . NATO is the most successful 
political and military alliance of the history. The cold war ended peacefully without a 
bullet shot and Europe became one of the most prosperous regions of the world. 
Ironically, the success of NATO became also a question mark for the alliance's own 
existence. In spite of the cold war's peaceful resolution, discussions of NATO's future 
have not ended. Those who believe NATO will be dissolved prove redundant.1 NATO 
managed to adapt and transform itself throughout the years. The adaptation of NATO has 
been twofold. First, it has expanded the functions it performs and second, it has accepted 
new members in the east. 
1
 "There's no need for an acrimonious divorce, but perhaps NATO at 60 can look forward to NATO at 75 
enjoying a quiet and well-deserved retirement - still alive, but a lot less active." Stephan Walt, CFR 
Symposium on NATO at 60, http://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.html 
The current debate on NATO's future is focused on NATO's effectiveness in the 
future international order. Especially, the war in Afghanistan is seen as a test case for 
NATO's future. The rise of death toll in the alliance's first Article-5 operation and the 
ever-increasing cost of the war has forced many countries in Europe to question NATO's 
roles and capabilities. Those who raise concerns about the war in Afghanistan state that 
NATO should act in accordance with its original mandate and just ensure the defense of 
the alliance territory. Out of area operations, like Afghanistan, can jeopardize the 
credibility of the alliance. 
NATO enlargement is not a post cold war policy. In fact enlargement is a 
continuation of a NATO policy based on Article 10 of the Washington Treaty: 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 
NATO enlargement was widely discussed both in political and academic circles 
in the 1990s. NATO countries expressed their consensus and desire for accepting new 
members to the alliance in 1995 by publishing the study on NATO enlargement. The 
study underlines how NATO sees the enlargement issue and what it expects from the 
aspiring countries to be a member. 
In principle, NATO countries propose membership to any Euro-Atlantic country 
having a market oriented democratic regime. The decision to admit a new country is 
2
 NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, 
(accessed May 13, 2009). 
3
 NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," http:// www.fas.org/man/natodoc/enl-9502.htm, (accessed April 
14, 2009). 
4 
taken solely on consensus bases. There is no any automated procedure to accept new 
countries which meets the criteria of the membership. Rather, NATO evaluates every 
case separately. 
NATO AT 60 
NATO is not merely an alliance of the cold war. In fact NATO has become a 
security community with an embedded network of political and military structures. The 
alliance triumphed in the cold war without any tragedy. In the aftermath of the Soviet 
collapse, instead of becoming obsolete, NATO deepened and widened its structure. 
Nearly half of the current NATO members joined the club after the end of cold war. 
Today, NATO involves all kind of operations besides the conventional task of 
territorial defense. As seen in the figure 1, NATO operations increased in complexity and 
range in time. As of 2009, NATO involved in one major operation in Afghanistan and 
five small operations across the globe: 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN 
Established in 2001, ISAF operations in Afghanistan are lead by NATO since 
2003. More than 42 nations contribute over 67.000 personnel for NATO operation in 
Afghanistan.4 NATO's mission in Afghanistan is to "extend the authority of the Afghan 
central government" and to foster the reconstruction efforts through 26 Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 
4
 NATO, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures," 
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1989 1996 2002 2009 
Fig. 1. NATO Operations 
KOSOVO OPERATION 
NATO's presence in Kosovo goes back to 1999 when NATO conducted military 
operations in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster against ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo. Today, 15.000 NATO troops operate under the UN Security Council resolution 
1244 to maintain security in Kosovo.5 
NATO TRAINING MISSION IN IRAQ (NTM-I) 
NATO engaged in Iraq after the Istanbul Summit in 2004. NATO's involvement 




OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO initiated a number of counter terrorism 
operations. OAE is a maritime operation in order to deprive terrorists from using 
Mediterranean Sea. 
SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION 
NATO supported the African Union in Somalia and Sudan by providing air lift 
capability. 
COUNTER PIRACY OPERA TION 
In 2009 NATO launched Operation Allied Protector to protect the sea lines of 
commerce in the horn of Africa.6 
NATO'S PERSISTENCE 
There are many explanations for NATO's persistence after the cold war. First of all, 
NATO is a highly institutionalized alliance. Most institutions outlive the initial purpose 
of their establishment. Once established, every institution will carry a sunk cost. 
Institutions will most likely survive by adapting to the new structure even when their 
rationale fades away "because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain."7 
Second, NATO is too valuable to forgo. It is valuable for the US because through NATO, 
the US can legitimize its worldwide security policies. NATO is the symbol of American 




 Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," International 
Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705. 
7 
institutional design of the US. The structure of US state apparatus is reflected worldwide 
o 
through institutions such as NATO. Furthermore, the US feels more comfortable in an 
institutional environment than bilateral relations. Thus the demise of a highly popular 
organization will signal unintended messages about US power in the post cold war. 
Third, NATO guarantees the peace and stabilization for European countries. Especially 
for Germany, NATO means to mitigate the security concerns of other European powers. 
For Eastern European countries, NATO is the ultimate security guarantee for their 
survival. 
To sum up, NATO survives as long as the members see themselves better off in the 
club.9 Especially in a time of multidimensional risks and threats, NATO will lengthen the 
shadow of the future. Before exploring NATO's double enlargement, it is important to 
determine when and how NATO did the right thing. 
THE GOLDEN DA YS OF NA TO 
Needless to say, the cold war was a NATO era. The West recovered economically 
under the NATO's security umbrella. The consolidation of Europe was another 
achievement of the alliance. NATO exploited the opportunity to democratize the Central 
and Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Berlin wall. NATO 
membership provided the conditions to foster the democratic reforms, tamper the security 
competition and enabled the denationalization of the defense in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The new members were able to reform their political and economic systems and 
8
 Michael W. Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions," Survival 41, no. 4 (1999): 63. 
9
 Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival. 39, no. 1 (1997): 156. 
8 
resolve disputes with neighboring countries peacefully. 10For the first time in the history, 
Europe is close to becoming an island of peace. To quote Brzezinski, 
NATO enlargement was historically timely and also the right thing to do. By 
the early years of the twenty-first century, the almost total geopolitical overlap 
between membership in NATO and membership in the EU made it clear that 
Europe was finally both secure and united. 11 
NATO'S FAILURES 
The late reaction to the Yugoslavia conflict was one of the crucial mistakes for 
NATO. The war showed how the security of neighboring regions is linked to the Euro-
Atlantic security. The spillover of conflict in Yugoslavia would have undermined the 
basic norms of the alliance if it had not intervened. The lessons of the Bosnian War 
helped NATO to prevent another regional crisis in Kosovo. Although Russians were 
alienated in the Kosovo intervention, the relative peace in Kosovo proves to be a positive 
mark for NATO. 
THE ENLARGEMENT ISSUE 
Looking at the NATO's achievements and faults, it is fair to say that enlargement 
issue is one of the most debated issue in NATO's history. To some it is the "centerpiece 
10
 Philip H. Gordon, "NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness." Brookings Institution, 23, 
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/031 l_nato_gordon.aspx (accessed November 21, 2009). 
" Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An Agenda for NATO : Toward a Global Security Web," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 
5 (2009): 6. 
9 
of a strategy to make NATO effective in meeting the challenges of the future"12 and for 
others it is "a policy error of historic importance."13 
The alliance has long been discussing the geographical scope of the enlargement. 
Which countries should be invited and which should be out of the club is a big question 
to be addressed by the allies. NATO successfully survived four rounds of enlargement in 
the post cold era. There was a consensus on the post cold war enlargement. Baltic States 
and Central and Eastern European countries joined the club smoothly. But, the Ukraine 
and Georgia membership revealed the transatlantic rift for the NATO expansion. 
Although the Bucharest Summit Declaration states that these countries will be NATO 
members one day, France's and Germany's opposition to further NATO enlargement is 
publicized by their leaders.14 The opponents of enlargement believe that any future 
expansion should bring the suppliers of the security not the consumer ones. 
In fact, NATO does not have a long term strategy for enlargement. Changing 
international structure brings the question of what kind of security approach is useful to 
cope with the future challenges: A functional approach or a geographical security 
approach. Should NATO be satisfied with the current zone of security or extend its 
coverage to new functions and territories? In this dissertation, I put forward an 
alternative explanation for NATO's expansion. The study explores how open NATO's 
door is and what influences NATO's decision for enlargement. In other words, the 
following questions will be at the centerpiece of the study. 
l2Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), xxiv. 
13
 Michael McCgwire, "NATO Expansion: 'a Policy Error of Historic Importance'," Review of International 
Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 23-42. 
14
 Reuters, "After Balkans duo, NATO enlargement to slow," para. 6, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE5304ZU20090401 (accessed November 21,2009) . 
10 
Should NATO be only a Euro-Atlantic collective security organization or reach to 
the areas traditionally beyond Europe? Does NATO need new functions or new territories 
or both? Is there a causal relation between functional and geographical enlargement? If 
yes, how is the functional enlargement related to geographical enlargement? 
In order to explore the above unknowns, we need to take a close look at the 
security environment and NATO's tasks to cope with the challenges. 
21 s t CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The security environment has substantially changed in the last decade. The new 
threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, threats to Information 
networks, and insecurity of energy sources demand common commitment by the 
international community. No individual country is able to respond the above threats 
alone. 
THREATS TO VALUES AND PEOPLE 
NATO is not just an interest dominated organization. The democratic values and 
norms constitute the mere intra-alliance function. Any threat to the values and people is 
perceived a common security concern. As stated in the latest NATO Multiple Future 
Study, "the Alliance will face rivals for strategic influence, values and ideas; its 
vulnerabilities will be exploited on and beyond Alliance territory; and its populations and 
forces attacked in unexpected ways."15 
15
 NATO, "Multiple Future Study," 4, 
http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_findings.pdf (accessed November 17, 
2009). 
11 
THREATS TO TERRITORY 
The collective defense is the glue of the alliance. Although rare, there is still a 
residual conventional threat to the alliance. The stability in Balkans and Caucasus is 
volatile and the spread of any conflict can undermine the Euro-Atlantic Security. 
THREATS FROM FRAGILE OR FAILED STATES 
NATO will have to engage intra state conflicts in the future. The instability 
caused by failed states can negatively affect the alliance security in terms of immigration 
and spill over of the conflict to the NATO territory. Thus, NATO might increasingly 
conduct peace keeping operations in areas at strategic distance. 
WMD THREAT 
Both state and non-state actors can easily develop or access to the WMD 
capabilities in the coming decades. In particular, terrorist access to the WMD can be 
catastrophic for the alliance security. 
TERRORISM 
Terrorism is one of the major threats to the alliance in the 21st century. As stated 
in the Declaration on Terrorism by NATO Foreign Ministers: 
Defence against terrorism may include activities by NATO's military forces, 
based on decisions by the North Atlantic Council, to help deter, defend, disrupt 
and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad, 
against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any member state, 
12 
including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them. Any 
operations undertaken in the defence against terrorism will have a sound legal 
basis and fully conform with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter 
and all relevant international norms and standards.16 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change might cause societal unrest in the near future. NATO, as being the 
only institutions that can provide security, may need to conduct humanitarian operations 
in order to assist national and international organization as it did in "the Asia Tsunami, 
the 2006 United States Hurricane season and the Kashmiri earthquake."17 
ENERGY SECURITY 
The disruption of gas to Europe in 2007 demonstrated the vulnerability of allies in 
the energy sector. In the 1980s, NATO protected the tanker traffic during the Iran-Iraq 
war. Today, the energy security may necessitate a wide variety of actions including 
protecting the infrastructure, providing security to energy producer countries and to call 
for collective response in the face of a threat to the flow of energy. 
In the Energy Security, NATO might have a role for "information and intelligence 
fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; 
16
 NATO, "Declaration on Terrorism," para. 3, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21031 .htm (accessed November 21, 2009). 
17
 NATO, "Future security Environment," 58, 
http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf (accessed 
November 21, 2009). 
13 




The coordinated cyber attacks to Estonia in 2007 raised the security of the 
alliance information networks. As Estonian Defense Minister put it correctly, " at present, 
NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that the 
provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words collective self-
defense, will not automatically be extended to the attacked country. Not a single NATO 
defense minister would define a cyber-attack as a clear military action at present. 
However, this matter needs to be resolved in the near future."19 
To sum up, the world in the next 20 years will be more globalized and 
00 
unpredictable. NATO can not solve all kind of global problems, however NATO should 
be a part of network of organizations which will address the global threats and risks. The 
new threats "to vital interests will challenge the strategic unity, and solidarity within the 
• • • 21 
alliance as well the common understanding of what constitutes an article 5 attack." 
NATO IN THE 21 s t CENTURY 
Recent studies questions the relevance of NATO in the face of new challenges. 
Although politicians often refer to NATO as the most successful alliance in history, it is 
18
 NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration," article 48, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed November 23, 2009). 
19Ian Traynor, "Russia accused of unleashing cyber war to disable Estonia," Guardian, May 17, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia (accessed November 23, 2009). 
20




not uncommon to see the remarks of NATO being "insufficient to the agenda."22 A new 
NATO should clarify the NATO's roles and missions and find a balance between its core 
functions. To do that, NATO should reach a consensus on the future challenges 
especially regarding Russia. 
Common sense requires that states in a collective security organization may have 
similar threat perceptions if the aggressor has a substantial aggregate economic, military 
and human resources. However, different perceptions of threats are not rare in the 
alliances. As claimed by Stephen M . Walt, the level of threats depends on the 
aggressor's aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions.23 
Thus, states close to the aggressor feel more threatened compared to the other states in a 
collective security organization. States having historical or territorial problems with the 
aggressor will assess the threat seriously. 
The danger with the divergent threat perception is that it can jeopardize the 
effectiveness of the alliance. When we look at NATO, it is easy to discover that some 
NATO members want reassurance against Russian aggression which became evident 
after the Russia-Georgia conflict. The Western European countries, however, see Russia 
as a partner rather than a threat. In the last Munich security conference, Sarkozy stated 
that he does not" believe that modern Russia constitutes a military threat to the European 
Union and NATO."24 The below visions of NATO help understanding NATO in the new 
century. 
22
 Daniel Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," (Washington, DC: 
Atlantic Council of the United States, 2009). 
2 3
 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 
(1985): 9. 
24
 Craig Whitlock, "'Reset' Sought on Relations With Russia, Biden Says," The Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020700756.html (accessed 
November 23, 2009). 
15 
MINIMALIST NATO 
With the resurgence of Russia, some NATO nations felt the urgency of focusing 
on home missions instead of away missions. Mainly, the east European countries believe 
that NATO can be relevant only if it provides the core function of collective defense 
against the NATO territory. Even some old NATO members such as Norway, want "the 
need for renewed focus on security challenges on NATO territory and in our immediate 
neighborhood."25 
EXPEDITIONARY NATO 
Those who support an expeditionary NATO emphasize that a large scale military 
aggression against the alliance territory is very unlikely. The most formidable form of 
threat will likely originate far from the alliance territory. NATO needs to have the 
deployable capabilities to conduct expeditionary operations across the globe. Even the 
article 5 missions might be expeditionary type. The NATO Response Force (NRF) can be 
used in the full range of expeditionary operations in strategic distance. 
GLOBAL NATO 
Although not as powerful as the above voices, there are proposals to expand the 
alliance globally by including countries with the similar democratic values and culture, 
such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Globalists believe that NATO should be the 
ultimate security institution of the all democratic countries: 
25
 Espen Barth Eide, "Norway's security outlook - strengthening the relevance of NATO," Ministry of 
Defense, Government of Norway, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fdyaktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/ 
2009/norways-security-outlook-.html?id=562975 (accessed November 23, 2009). 
16 
NATO's next move must be to open its membership to any democratic state in the 
world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new 
responsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of 
the day.26 
NEW FUNCTIONS 
NATO is the fundamental organization that ties both sides of the Atlantic. NATO 
will maintain its relevance as long as it guarantees the members' sovereignty. Past NATO 
enlargements have contributed enormously to the European pacification. However there 
is still work to be done in the Balkans, Black Sea and Caucasus. While NATO is the 
legitimate vehicle of the international community to handle global security concerns, it 
should not be expected to find solutions to all global problems. Instead, NATO should be 
a stage setter. It should serve as "a training tool, as a tool of assistance for other regional 
bodies."27 NATO should match its capabilities with its ambitions to remain credible. The 
following functions are indispensable for a future NATO: 
DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 
Article 5 is and should remain the core theme of the alliance. However, it needs to 
be reassessed to better reflect what it does and does not cover. On one hand, a large scale 
military aggression against NATO territory is unlikely. On the other hand, 
unconventional threats will be most likely. Therefore, NATO should decide whether 
26
 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 106. 
27
 Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO At 60 Symposium: Session I: NATO in the International System," 
Council On Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.html 
(accessed November 23, 2009). 
17 
these new threats warrant the implementation of the article 5 or not. NATO should 
effectively demonstrate its solidarity and will in the face of any threat to its territory and 
people. If NATO fails to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of its members, the 
renationalization of the defense in Europe will cause the old rivalries to resurface. 
CONFLICT RESOL UTION 
NATO will probably engage in a regional crisis beyond its territory in the coming 
decades. NATO will have to use its political and military assets to prevent any conflict 
that jeopardizes its security. 
ENERGY SECURITY 
NATO might have to ensure the undisrupted flow of oil and gas to the western 
markets. The stability of the energy producer countries is important for the alliance in this 
respect. 
CYBER DEFENSE 
NATO should have a capability to ensure the safety of not just the physical but 
also the virtual commons. 
PREVENTION OF THE PROLIFERATION OF WMD 
The worst scenario that can happen in today's globalized world is terrorist access 
to WMD. NATO needs to develop new instruments to prevent proliferation as 
highlighted in the latest comprehensive Counter-WMD policy: 
the spread of WMD and their means of delivery and the possibility that terrorists 
will acquire them are the principal threats facing the Alliance over the next 10-15 
years. Therefore, the Alliance seeks to prevent their proliferation through an 
active political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as 
well as by developing and harmonising defence capabilities, and, when necessary, 
employing these capabilities consistent with political decisions in support of non-
proliferation objectives. 
TRANSA TLANTIC LINK 
NATO is the main platform for Euro-Atlantic Security. Any transatlantic rift will 
only contribute to the ineffectiveness of the alliance. In NATO's history, it is not 
uncommon to find examples of US-Europe disagreement. However in the past decade, 
the mutual blow to the alliance solidarity was a concern for every politician. One of the 
biggest tests of NATO's credibility occurred before the Iraq war. Based on the article 
four of the Washington treaty, Turkey requested NATO's assistance because it feared 
being drawn a big conflict with Iraq. Surprisingly, France and Germany resisted the 
request and caused a crisis in NATO. Although the decision to aid Turkey was taken late, 
the stalemate had already rung the alarm bells for NATO solidarity. As the NATO 
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secretary asserts "the alliance has been damaged but it is not broken." Similarly, US 
reluctance on calling NATO help for the conduct of Afghanistan and Iraq war was a big 
28
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disappointment for the allies. The US missed an unprecedented opportunity to transform 
the transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iraq war. To quote Asmus, 
"for the first time ever, NATO invoked the defense clause enshrined in Article V 
of its charter, and U.S. allies offered to join the fight in Afghanistan. But the 
opportunity was then squandered. Instead, the decision to make Iraq the next 
target in the war on terrorism—and the manner in which the administration chose 
to topple Saddam Hussein—led to a spectacular political train wreck across the 
Atlantic."30 
PARTNERSHIP NETWORKS 
NATO should continue to enhance the partnership programs with other 
international organizations and countries. NATO should be able to access the civilian 
capabilities of the other organizations in any operations. NATO needs to develop a new 
partnership program with the neighboring regions of Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Middle East in order to secure the people and territory of the alliance. 
THE MAIN ARGUMENT 
The fast pace of globalization, the source of new threats and their asymmetric nature 
all forced NATO to change its security approach from a geographical to functional one. 
NATO's future missions and open door policy will depend on the consequences of the 
functional approach to security. In the past, NATO expansion was explained by the 
interest accumulation of several key nations. There is no study which looks at the 
30
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implementation of NATO's new functions, however. Functional enlargement is a vehicle 
of NATO's adaptation to new security environment. 
This study examines whether there is a linkage between NATO's functional and 
geographical enlargement. The main argument of the study is that NATO's functional 
enlargement requires new capabilities which in turn could result in geographical 
enlargement. A New Security Environment brings new challenges which in turns demand 
NATO adaptation. NATO functions are a part of the adaptation process. Required 
capabilities are derived from the NATO functions. Capabilities can be acquired by 
developing within NATO, cooperating with partners or importing from new members. 
The figure 2 depicts the main argument. 
NATO has transformed itself from a cold war alliance to a more complex 
institution in the last two decades. During this period, NATO both widened and deepened 
in contrary to the expectations. My research shows that NATO's geographical widening 
is closely related to functional deepening. Indeed, NATO geographical enlargement is 
a capability aggregation process. NATO enlargement can be explained in two 
dimensions: Functional and Geographical enlargement. 
The central hypothesis is that NATO's new functions drive the geographical 
enlargement. In other words, NATO enlarges geographically unless the capabilities 
needed to satisfy the new NATO functions can be developed by existing structure. Any 





Fig. 2. A Model for NATO Transformation 
Without supplying a new capability, the geographical enlargement is to be 
unlikely and if it happens it will make NATO incapable of meeting its commitments. Not 
all functions require new membership. As long as NATO is able to perform its core 
functions, the geographical enlargement will more probably bring consumer rather than 
producer of security. 
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THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRY 
There is an emerging discussion on NATO's effectiveness and functionality due to the 
war in Afghanistan. It is highly believed that a failure in Afghanistan will undermine 
NATO's credibility. This study examines how NATO's new functions affect the 
geographical enlargement. The theoretical and case studies provide answers for why the 
functional and geographical enlargement did not occur at the same time. The study 
examines the consequences of the NATO's involvement in the Wider Black Sea region as 
well. 
THE IMPACT OF AFGHANISTAN 
With the global war on terror, NATO's security paradigm has changed 
considerably. The allies' response to the 9/11 was quick and decisive. On September 12, 
2001, NAC declared the implementation of the article-5 of the Washington treaty. The 
political contribution of NATO's decision was much more important than the military 
one. Although NATO did not join the Afghanistan operation initially, by 2003, 
Afghanistan becomes one of the most important NATO operations. 
Afghanistan operation is important in two ways. First it is the first article-5 
operation in NATO's history. NATO used its military muscle for the first time, which 
proves its capability and solidarity in the post cold war. Secondly, Afghanistan operation 
is the first full-scale out of area operation NATO is undertaking. So far all the operations 
were in Europe, thus governments could easily explain the rational to the public. 
Afghanistan operation can not be explained with the old rationale of collective defense 
and European security. In fact, it is the new security paradigm that produced the 
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consensus: territorial security is no longer adequate to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century. 
Afghanistan is seen by many as a test case for the alliance future. NATO has 
never been engaged in armed conflict before. It is the first time that NATO will prove its 
value as being the most powerful military alliance. A failure in Afghanistan would result 
in a paramount effect on Alliance credibility.31 In fact, policy makers across the alliance 
have begun to raise dissatisfaction on the way the NATO does its job in the region. Allies 
contribution to ISAF operation bring the issue of NATO's becoming a two-tiered 
alliance.32 
RENEWED INTEREST ON NATO 
In the last three months there have been over 50 studies regarding the NATO's 
future roles and enlargement. This dissertation will add to the discussions on NATO's 
relevance in the 21st century. 
A NEW NATO 
A study on NATO is meaningful due to the emerging of a NEW NATO. NATO is 
new because of changing international security environment and its impact on NATO. As 
of 2010, NATO modified its military structure to accommodate the reentry of France and 
to better meet the new challenges. 
31
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France's Reentry to Military Structure 
France reintegrated to the military structure in 2009. As a result of the 
reintegration, France assumed the one of the top military posts in the alliance: Supreme 
Allied Transformation Commander. 
Global Economic Crisis 
The global economic crisis forced the NATO countries to further narrow their 
defense budget and contributions. The resource constraints will have a huge impact in 
NATO's functions and accessions of new members. 
Renewed Transatlantic Focus on NATO 
With the new US administration, NATO regained the transatlantic focus. There is 
a consensus that NATO should retain its position as the sole security platform in Euro-
Atlantic region. 
New Secretary General 
For the first time, an ex- prime minister assumed the position of Secretary 
General. Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen brought a fresh voice to the alliance. 
New Strategic Concept 
In 2010, NATO will decide on its new strategy which will guide the alliance in 
the next decade. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This study is a qualitative analysis of NATO's functional and geographical 
enlargement focusing especially on the post cold war era expansion. The two case studies 
explore the validity of the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between NATO's 
functional and geographical enlargement. Functional enlargement is tending to drive the 
geographical enlargement. In figure 3, the conceptual framework of the dissertation is 
depicted. 





Fig. 3. Conceptual Framework 
The level of functional enlargement is the independent variable while the level of 
geographical enlargement is the dependent variable. The capability shortfall ties the two 
variables. 
Each Case Study will be analyzed in terms of the Security Environment, changes 
to the NATO functions and capability Development. The goal of the case studies is to 
determine whether the new functions resulted in new members or not. 
MILESTONES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
There are three milestones in NATO's enlargement. The first milestone is the 
1950 Korean War. The war reveals the dimensions of the Soviet threat. NATO 
recognized that Soviet ideological and territorial expansion threatened the Western 
Security. 
The second milestone is the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990 NATO gave a 
warm welcome to the developments in the communist world. NATO mentioned that there 
would be no security at the expense of any country. NATO changed its security approach 
dramatically with the end of the cold war. The change could be seen in the classification 
and preparation of the allies' top strategic document. NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept 
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has been driven by the political authorities and allowed for public access. 
The third milestone is the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. The 
developments in the aftermath of the attack revealed the necessity for considering 
security not only conventional territorial defense but also new threats far away from 
NATO territory. The new motto is that Euro-Atlantic security starts from Hindu-Kush 
Mountains. 
IMPORTANCE 
This research enhances the empirical development of the existing literature in 
several ways. First, the current literature explains the NATO enlargement in only one 
dimension, accession of new members. This study looks at both functional and territorial 
dimension. The chapters explain why NATO enlarges functionally and geographically. 
Second, the existing literature explains NATO's expansion, by the interaction of 
major powers. This research contributes to the expansion literature by explaining an 
untouched phenomenon: New NATO functions. The research also makes predictions 
33
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about the direction of future NATO expansion by examining the new NATO tasks and 
missions. In particular, the energy security and stability in the wider Black Sea has been 
extensively covered in the research. My research provides a new understanding of the 
NATO's role in the Caucasus corridor. 
Third, the study contributes to the discussions of the NATO' adaptation to the 
new security environment. The enlargement is the centerpiece for the persistence of 
NATO in the post cold era. Here, my research brings the functional enlargement at the 
center of the discussion. The dissertation states that NATO enlargement is an institutional 
adaptation which should be " built on the logic of relative costs and the functions of 
3 4 institutions. 
NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE LITERATURE 
NATO enlargement is heavily discussed from a territorial expansion point of view 
in 1990s. The studies can be categorized in three groups. In the first group, there are 
scholars who believe that with the demise of Soviet threat, NATO does not have a future 
and it will lose its significance. Thus NATO enlargement does not make sense since it 
does not have a future. Even if it can survive artificially for some time, it is destined to 
fade away. The above argument is modified in later years by suggesting that as long as 
the US has an interest to keep NATO to interfere in European Defense and Foreign 
Policy, NATO's will continue to exist. 
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In the second category, there are opponents of the expansion. The opponents 
claim that NATO enlargement will not help secure the Euro-Atlantic region. On the 
contrary, such a move will jeopardize the democratization of Russia and divide Europe 
with new lines. The countries who remain outside the line will feel insecure with 
NATO's enlargement. Moreover, the opponents claim that the cost of enlargement will 
outweigh the benefits of having new members. It will be difficult to reach consensus 
when the number of countries continue to rise. 
In the last category of literature, there are the advocates of NATO enlargement. 
Mainly neoliberals and constructivists scholars support the NATO enlargement in that 
NATO will help the democratization of the Central and East Europe. By joining the club, 
the aspiring countries will forgo the security competition with their neighbors. There will 
be spillover effect in economic and social areas. The aspiring countries can focus on 
domestic reforms and democratization. The rationale behind the tampering security 
competition is that Article 5 of the Washington treaty provides ultimate security warranty 
for the new members. Not all the advocates have reached a consensus on the limits of the 
NATO enlargement. While some support only a European enlargement, others like 
Nicholas Burns support the idea of a more global NATO reaching Central Asia and the 
Middle East.37 
There are valuable studies on NATO functions in the literature as well. The 
central theme of these studies is the transformation of the alliance from "a predominantly 
defense-based military Alliance into a comprehensive political and military security 
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community."38 Especially Emanuel Adler argues that NATO enlargement is an example 
of the spread of security communities. Adler believes that NATO's enlargement was a 
cooperative security enlargement to develop a common identity. The diffusion of NATO 
practices in the 1990s brought the geographical enlargement.39 The Partnership for Peace 
Program (PfP) is the most important NATO practice after the cold war. The PfP practice 
cause the spread of NATO's background knowledge which in turns socialize the PfP 
countries.40 The enlargement studies done by Allied Command Transformation do not 
give a bright picture for the future of NATO's expansion. The future world scenarios 
study articulates four scenarios of which only the last one result in enlargement:41 
THE STRONG TOOLBOX 
This future represents a strong US and a fragmented European commitment. 
There is a common threat perception among the allies. NATO is seen as the main vehicle 
for global security. 
THE SHARED PARTNERSHIP 
The future represents a strong US and European commitment. NATO is highly 
capable of conducting any operations globally. The capability gap is reduced between the 
allies. There is division in functional and geographical lines between EU and NATO. 
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While NATO conducts high intensity collective defense operations, theEU conducts low 
intensity peace keeping operations. 
THE FRAGMENTED TOOLBOX 
The US and European commitments are weak. There is no consensus on the 
threat. NATO can still have all kinds of operations. However, there is a transatlantic rift 
on the use of political and military assets. 
EURO-CENTRIC TOOLBOX 
This vision represents a weakened transatlantic link. NATO operates only at the 
region around Europe and US continue act unilaterally.42 The US engagement in NATO 
is very limited and there is no consensus on the threat perception. NATO conducts only 
low intensity operations. New European countries join the club. 
As aforementioned, almost all of the studies examine only one dimension of 
NATO expansion: either NATO functions or the geographical enlargement. No 
connection between functions and membership has been offered yet 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Although the aim of the study is not to test any theory, but rather to highlight 
NATO's double enlargement, it is worth explaining the major theoretical approaches on 
NATO enlargement. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the enlargement theories. 
42
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It is necessary to mention that this dissertation focuses on how structural factors 
shape the institutional design of NATO. Although the actors' choices are important, they 
do not provide an adequate explanation for the NATO enlargement. 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
The dissertation is divided into 7 chapters. The first three chapters explain the 
theoretical background and the process of functional and geographical enlargement. Two 
case studies analyze the relation between functional and geographical enlargement. The 
case selections are motivated with three criteria. First whether there is a major shift in 
international structure, second whether NATO has adapted new functions and third 
whether these functions lead a geographical enlargement or not. The last chapter lays out 
the findings and conclusions. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an outline of the study and highlights the debate on 
enlargement. In the aftermath of the WWII, Europe was in a fragmented and devastated 
position. The economic recovery of Europe was not fast enough to bring stability due to 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union. NATO came to life in the context of a weak Europe 
and a strong Soviet Union. It was aimed to secure the European revival. Indeed, NATO's 
primary function was to "offset the shadow cast by Soviet Military power, thereby 
allowing recovery to go forward."43 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
This study borrows mostly from the theories of institutional expansion, a term 
which refers to the process and practices of the organization rather than the structure of 
the international system that trigger the NATO's geographical enlargement. 
CHAPTER 3: NATO'S FUNCTIONAL ENLARGEMENT 
This chapter underscores the evolution of NATO's security approach from a 
collective defense to comprehensive security. In the last 60 years, NATO's core functions 
expanded dramatically. Having a Deterrence and Defense function in the early years of 
the alliance, NATO, today, has a wide variety of functions ranging from crisis 
management to high intensity operations. In order to satisfy these functions, NATO had 
to acquire the required capabilities. In some cases the capabilities are developed within 
the alliance with its own resources, in other cases they are developed by cooperating 
partners and in some cases new members are accepted to import the capabilities. 
There are three critical thresholds in the NATO's post cold war functional 
enlargement: 1990 London Summit, 1994 Brussels Summit and 2004 Istanbul Summit. 
NATO countries agreed on the new directions for the Euro-Atlantic security in these 
summits. 
CHAPTER 4: NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT 
There were 12 members originally in the alliance. In the next 60 years, the 
alliance enlarged to 28 members. The geographical enlargement took place in 6 rounds. 
The bulk of enlargement took place in the post-cold era. I categorized the geographical 
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enlargement in three waves. The first wave enlargement consist of 1952 accession of 
Greece and Turkey, 1955 accession of Germany and 1982 accession of Spain. The first 
wave enlargement aimed at filling the gap in the western security and containing Soviet's 
threat. The geostrategic position of the new members was as important as their military 
contribution to the alliance security. The European Security would have been endangered 
if the first wave never had happened. 
The second wave of enlargement occurred after the cold war and aimed to 
enhance dialogue and cooperation with the former eastern bloc. Initially the enlargement 
was not on the agenda. In fact, NATO had been an identity crisis. Many scholars claimed 
that the days of NATO were numbered. It was until the Bosnian war, that NATO realized 
that its post cold war security approach needed to be modified radically to better cope 
with the post cold war threats. 
From 1997 until now, 12 central and Eastern European countries joined the 
alliance in the second wave. The membership of the CEEC helped the stabilization of all 
Europe. Furthermore it did not produce much resistance from Russians. The NATO 
membership was important for the CEEC since it is the ultimate warranty of their 
independence. Without NATO membership, the nationalization of the defense was 
probable. 
The last round of enlargement occurred in 2009 with the accession of Albania and 
Croatia. This round is crucial for the "greater stability in southeastern Europe, especially 
given the independence of Kosovo and the enduring hostility to NATO of important 
political factions in Serbia."44 
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What I called as the third wave of enlargement consists of the future NATO 
enlargement. Ukraine and Georgia with some other countries are in the list of candidates 
for the third wave of the enlargement. Though, the past enlargement has been successful 
in terms of the desired outcome, there is a huge rift among the allies for the future 
candidates. Especially, regarding Ukraine and Georgia memberships, European allies 
have been more reluctant than the Americans. The characteristics of the third wave are 
that the future members may not be necessarily in traditional European territories. The 
boundary of the Europe is contested among scholars. Some includes Russia in Europe 
while some draws the line from the western frontier of Russia to Mediterranean. It is 
more likely that NATO will focus on the Black Sea and Caucasus regions for the next 
wave of enlargement. 
CHAPTER 5: KOREAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT 
The Korean War was a huge blow to the alliance security. Until the Korean War, 
the politicians in the west did not worry about an immediate war with the Soviets.45 The 
Korean War, though, demonstrated the weakness of the US and Allies military power. 
North Koreans easily overthrew the South Korean forces in a short time 46 
NATO fully realized the Soviets both ideological and material threat to the 
international peace. After the Korean War, Alliance transformed its institutional 
structure, force levels and membership structure. NATO international civilian and 
military staff, integrated military command and office of the Secretary General were 
introduced as a result of the Korean war. Allies increased their defense budgets and troop 
45Thies, Why NATO Endures, 106. 
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levels in Europe. NATO accepted Greece, Turkey and Germany to the club in order to 
match the Soviets' Military capabilities. 
CHAPTER 6: BOSNIAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT 
The case study highlights the volatility of the stability in Eastern Europe with the 
end of cold war. The honeymoon of the early 1990s ended with the tragic events of the 
Bosnia war. NATO was the only military power to be able to end the war. The 
vulnerability of new democracies in Europe was a concern for the west. As Crawford 
asserts Bosnian War provides NATO " a renewed legitimacy that it needed to expand 
eastward".47 
The Bosnian War horrified the Central and East European countries (CEEC) as 
well. Therefore, the second wave of enlargement was driven not by NATO alone but the 
aspiring countries as well. The CEEC urgently requested to be a part of the alliance. 
These countries see the ineffectiveness of the EU in the Bosnian war. They do not want a 
victim of Russian hegemony anymore. The CEEC counts on Americans more than 
Europeans for their security. The new motto for these countries is Americans in, Russian 
AQ 
Out and Europe down. 
As long as Balkans and Eastern Europe remains the source of instability, the 
Europe will not be secure. The second wave of the enlargement is still underway. It will 
come to an end when the Balkan countries have been stabilized. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research concludes that NATO's enlargement is two fold. The geographical 
enlargement is a continuation of the functional enlargement. The time lag between these 
two enlargement process is a result of the alliance's adaptation to the new function. New 
functions do not always result in new members. But the allies' options are either gaining 
new capabilities within the existing membership structure, cooperating with other 
international actors or importing the new capabilities by inviting new members. The 
future geographical enlargement will depend on how effectively NATO can undertake 
the new functions. The research shows that stabilization of the wider Black Sea region is 
vital for energy security in the next decades. The black sea corridor constitutes a security 
black hole in the near future for the alliance. The area that stretches from Europe to 
Central Asia between Middle East and Soviet Union is the energy route of the NATO. 
Instability in this region will harm the vital security interests of the alliance. Therefore, it 
is important for the alliance to extend the security umbrella to the black sea 
region.49Although it is constantly denied by NATO members, Russian reaction is a major 
factor on NATO's decision to enlarge. 
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The goal of Chapter II is to identify the major explanations of NATO 
geographical enlargement. As examined in this chapter, scholars have different 
approaches to understanding the phenomenon of NATO enlargement. Although all the 
theories make significant contributions to the evolution of the field, the link between 
horizontal and vertical enlargement of NATO has not been identified yet. 
In the past, NATO enlargement was explained mostly through international 
relations theories. Realist and Liberalist perspectives were offered to understand the 
expansion phenomenon. This chapter give an overview of not only the IR theories but 
also Comparative Politics theories on NATO enlargement. IR Theorists, Comparative 
Politic Theorists and Historians see the NATO expansion from different perspectives. 
Although individual actors' positions are important in NATO's decision to accept new 
members, this study suggests that a theory of institutional expansion can better explain 
NATO's enlargement. 
POWER BASED THEORIES 
Power based theories focus on the structure of the system and interest 
accumulation of the actors. Neo-realism has a negative view of the international 
cooperation while liberalism believes that cooperation will take place through the 
institutions. Both theories explain the expansion of NATO in terms of rational decision 
making of the states. 
NEOREALISM 
According to Neorealism, NATO is a product of a bipolar international system. In 
the absence of a main threat, the alliance sooner or later will dissolve. It is just a matter of 
time. Suspicion will arise as a result of relative gain problems in the new structure. 
Balance of Threat theory suggests that "states prefer to join the less threatening side, 
where a perceived aggressive intention is one component of threat. Eastern European 
states, still feeling a potential threat from the East, turn to a less threatening alliance for 
shelter."1 
As Walt argues, "states form alliances to balance against threats rather than 
bandwagon with them."2 Alliance requires the coordination of efforts to dismiss the 
external threats. Member countries are expected to share the costs of alliance. A 
considerable amount of resources are put aside for force developments. The military is 
the most common vehicle by which alliances meet their goals. NATO can only survive 
and grow when facing a substantial threat to its existence. In other words, NATO will 
eventually break down in the absence of the main adversary. The existence of a credible 
threat provides the venue of cooperation and makes free riding costly. Cooperation is 
more efficient and cost saving. Exclusion from the club makes punishment effective. 
Likewise, when the outside threat vanishes, the alliance may lose the glue that holds it 
together. In the absence of a common threat, a relative-gains problem among the 
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members will make cooperation difficult.3 The Allies' cooperation during the WWII 
might be a good example of the need for a common threat. After the removal of Hitler, 
the West and Soviet Union began to see each other as a threat rather than allies. 
States in a security organization may have similar threat perceptions if the 
aggressor has substantial aggregate economic, military and human resources. The 
offensive capability of an aggressor also leads to successful collective action. On the 
other hand, proximity and offensive intentions of an aggressor are subjective. States close 
to the threat feel more threatened compared to the other states in a collective security 
organization. States having historical or territorial problems with the aggressor will assess 
the threat seriously. Therefore, when the main threat vanishes, the collective action is 
difficult to achieve. 
Additionally, the unipolar international structure will force the NATO countries 
to balance the remaining superpower. Thus, internal balancing will bring an end to 
NATO. Neorealism has the best explanatory power for Cold War enlargement when the 
Soviet Union was the main threat to the alliance. 
Some scholars also highlight the disengagement of the US from Europe. Waltz 
states that NATO is not a military treaty. It is more like a treaty of guarantee.4 The US 
guaranteed the security of Europe in exchange for preserving the balance with Soviets. 
After the cold war, the US may not be willing to share the huge portion of the cost. 
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ALLIANCE THEORY 
Alliance Theory suggests that NATO expansion is a product of the alliance 
formation. Waltz argues that "an alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security 
cooperation between two or more states."5 The main purpose of an alliance is to 
aggregate power in order to achieve a common objective. NATO is a highly 
institutionalized defensive alliance with asymmetrical membership.6 As the most 
powerful member, the US is both a leader and carrier of the alliance's greatest burdens. 
NATO enlargement is driven by countries outside NATO in order to reduce the 
vulnerability of their geographical locations. Germany was an especially strong and eager 
supporter of the enlargement.7 The alternative to the enlargement was a power vacuum in 
the region, which would be filled either by a security alliance of the regional countries or 
an anarchic environment in which all Central and European Countries would form ad hoc 
o 
alliances to balance each other. Furthermore, the Bosnian war demonstrated the 
resurfacing of historical tensions in the region. 
LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Keohane defines an institution as a "related complex of rules and norms, 
identifiable in space and time."9 Liberal institutionalism suggests that alliances can still 
exist even after the threat has faded. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons explain how 
5
 Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 157. 
6
 Ibid. 
Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," International Affairs 73, no. 4 (1997): 
714. 
8
 Ibid.: 705. 
9Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power : Essays in International Relations Theory 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 163. 
institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics.10 States 
choose institutions because of self-interest. After institutions are established, they shape 
the behavior of the state. Institutions can help collective security by resolving 
distributional problems. Although NATO's original raison d'etre no longer exists, the 
reduced transaction costs and the costliness of the alternatives increase the value of the 
existing form of cooperation. It is easier to maintain international institutions than to 
creating them. Thus, states have incentives to value institutions even after they appear to 
be obsolete. According to institutional theorists, NATO is not merely an alliance. Its 
highly institutionalized structure is the core reason for its adaptation to the new security 
environment." NATO enlargement can be seen as an institutional adaptation practice. To 
maintain NATO as a viable security organization, NATO members are to: 
Utilize existing norms and procedures within NATO to deal with new 
problems rather than create new one, 
Modify NATO as necessary, possibly including cuts and downsizing, to 
deal with problems that existing structures cannot, 
Use the regime as the basis for ties to other actors, state and nonstate in pursuit of 
12 regime goals. 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Constructivism underscores the formation of values and norms in an alliance. 
These values and norms provide the momentum for the persistence of the alliance even 
10
 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, International Institutions : An International Organization Reader, 
International Organization Readers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 729. 
11





without a credible threat. Constructivism states that it is the evolution of cooperative 
security approach that enables NATO's existence and enlargement in the 21st century. It 
is also worth mentioning that when shared interests are sufficient, international regimes 
are easier to maintain. 
EXPANSION OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES 
To some scholars, NATO is a security community. Karl Deutsch popularized the 
sense of community in the international system by claiming that peaceful change is 
possible among the sovereign states as the transactions among the states increases.13 
When states join an organization, the common values of the organization result in a 
mutual identity and sense of community. The shared environment in the organization 
generates shared perceptions of common threats and opportunities. Security 
communities survive and expand because they share common values.14 
According to Emanuel Adler, NATO is more than a mere alliance. It has evolved 
into a security community over time. Adler suggests that the spread of security 
communities across functional and geographical boundaries can be explained by practices 
not by the actions of individual states.15 
The political actors make their rational calculation on the institutional expansion 
in an environment whose background knowledge is provided by the institution itself.16 
NATO expansion can bring peaceful change in the problematic regions. 
13
 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in 
the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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Relations, 62 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 59. 
15
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Acharya asserts that NATO enlargement is a norm diffusion process. He points out 
that local actors promote the transnational norm diffusion, which in turn gives birth to 
new tasks for the existing institution.17 Henceforth, the diffusion brings institutional 
change and expansion. 
SOCIALIZATION 
Socialization theory claims that NATO enlargement is a process of exporting 
Western values of democracy, accountability and transparency to unstable regions. The 
Western Countries believe that democratic norms and values bring stability and security. 
Therefore, NATO's eastern expansion was in fact a socialization process of Central and 
1 R 
Eastern Europe. Checkel states that "in adopting community rules, socialization implies 
that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness."19 The socialization can be achieved either by "teaching and 
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persuasion" approach or by a "rational approach." The aspiring countries' decision 
depends on the cost and benefits of the compliance to the enlargement criteria enforced 
by NATO. According to Schimmelfennig, "in the constructivist perspective, the 
nAmitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change 
in Asian Regionalism," International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 247. 
18
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International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 821. 
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21
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enlargement of an international organization is primarily conceived of as a process of 
international socialization."23 
CULTURAL APPROACH 
According to advocates of the cultural approach, NATO enlargement is a 
cultural expression of security. In his review article, Simon Dalby asserts that, after the 
cold war, NATO became a "civilisational entity." 24 Similarly, Merje Kuus proclaims that 
the conception of Europeanness affects the discourse of the enlargement.25 NATO 
enlargement is essential for the full Europeanization of the "not-yet -fully Europeans."26 
INTEGRATION BASED THEORIES 
Integration based theories highlights the deepening of the institutions over time. 
Especially it is useful to explain the evolution of the European Union and other post 
WWII institutions by these theories. Among these theories, the intergovernmentalism has 
the most merit to understand the structure and functions of NATO. 
FUNCTIONALISM 
Functionalism states that "forms follows functions."27 International institutions 
perform the functions that are identified objectively and rationally by the people. In other 
23
 , "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation," Security Studies 8, no. 2/3 (1999): 211. 
24Simon Dalby, "World Politics, Security and Culture: Critical Connections," Geopolitics 14, no. 2 (2009): 
405. 
25
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Progress in Human Geography 28, no. 4 (2004): 473. 
26
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27Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, The European Union Series (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2000), 34-35. 
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words, functions serve the actors' needs. Institutional change and expansion is a means 
of institutions' functions. 
TRANSACTIONALISM 
Transactionalism admits that international conflict can be reduced when states are 
integrated in a sense of community. New members of an existing security organization 
will increase their level of communication, and thus reduce the level of violence. 
NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
Neofunctionalism highlights the spillover effect of the integration. The integration 
in one issue area will "create pressure for further integration beyond that sector."29 
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
According to the intergovenrmentalism theory, the state is the main actor for 
integration.30 In order to provide collective goods through institutions, sovereign states 
bargain their preferences in an institutional environment. Societal demands and 
interdependence will require more deepening and widening of integration. 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
The New Institutionalism of Comparative Politics also offers useful insight into 
how institutions expand. The emergence of institutions is a response to the problem of 
28Ibid., 42-48. 
29
 Ibid., 51-52. 
30
 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 18-86. 
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trust and protection from aggression.31 As the shadow of the future shortens and 
reciprocity diminishes, institutions are needed to solve the collective problems. 
Rational Choice of New Institutionalism states that institutions affect the strategic 
interactions by providing information, policing, and putting alternatives on the table. 
Institutions will change in accordance with actors' preferences about collective gains. 
NATO enlargement is a rationalistic approach of the leading parties to pursue their 
interests. When there is a convergence of interests the expansion occurs. 
As proponents of a second type of new institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalists believe that institutions change or develop not to have a more efficiency 
but rather to enhance the social legitimacy of the organization. 
New Institutionalism rejects the aggregation of interests. The sum of all 
individuals' interest is not equal to the common interests. In fact, the aggregation process 
affects the interests. In other words there is an institution bias that affects some 
34 
interests. 
Institutional expansion can be explained by human learning.35 Individuals' 
communication with each other results in the formation of shared mental models, "which 
provide the framework for a common interpretation of reality and give rise to collective 
solutions to the problems arising in the environment."36 Learning first takes place in the 
family and neighborhood and forms the basic element of knowledge exchange. 
31
 C. Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North, and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic 
Performance," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1 (2004): 75-84. 
32
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ENLARGEMENT AS ADAPTATION 
NATO expansion is also viewed from the mutual defense benefits and cost 
savings perspective. According to Todd Sandler, 
The expansion issue is related to alliance formation (i.e., an expansion from zero 
allies), which hinges on whether prospective allies view their membership as 
providing a net gain after associated costs are covered. These net gains are 
dependent on alliance size and composition, which can affect benefits (e.g., cost 
reductions, enhanced deterrence) and costs (e.g., decision making, joint 
maneuvers).37 
Sandler asserts that expansion is driven by "spatial" location considerations. The 
geographical location and the size of a country determine its benefit from the expansion. 
The interior location causes less defense burden, thus decreasing cost to the members. 
Therefore, members in the outer circle of an alliance are eager to expand the alliance to 
friendly countries. 
THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND RUSSIA 
NATO enlargement can be seen as resolving the security dilemma in Euro-
Atlantic area. Trust and mistrust are at the core of the NATO enlargement dilemma—the 
goal of enlargement is to foster trust among the new allies, and the unwanted side effect 
is to lessen trust with Russia. On the one hand, newly accepted members will acquire a 
security guarantee against any aggression, and on the other hand, the expansion itself can 
37
 Todd Sandler, "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution 
43, no. 6(1999): 727. 
become a threat for the outsiders.38 In fact, the Russian position is the single most 
important factor in the future of NATO expansion. In spite of countless statements by 
NATO countries that NATO enlargement is not against Russian interests, Russia still 
sees the enlargement as a zero-sum game. Enlargement threatens Russian Security 
39 interests. 
AGENT-BASED EXPLANATIONS 
In contrast to the structural explanation, agent-based theories look at the 
individual nations to explain NATO enlargement. For the most part, geopoliticians treat 
NATO enlargement as a spatial extension of the US, which is intended to help keep its 
world power status. 
In that sense, enlargement of a community is "the diffusion of democracy and 
free-market principles through the guise of paninstitutions, in which those that are 
incorporated will not wage war one another and thus, in the case of NATO, will 
stabilize Europe from violent conflict that might otherwise erupt and disrupt the world 
order."40 
According to Ian Oas, NATO is "a hegemonic institution of extraterritoriality."41 
Henceforth, NATO expansion is a tool for forging US hegemonic order. New markets are 
needed to maintain US hegemonic status. NATO is the major vehicle to integrate the ex-
rival markets into the US-led global economy. Institutionalization is the most successful 
38
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39
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method for enhancing hegemonic control globally.42 With the help of NATO, the US is 
able to exert its power without the use of force. 
The expansion is a proof of "the surrender of the socialist modernity as global 
competitor to the west."43Thus it is no coincidence that the US and Germany are the main 
enforcers of NATO enlargement.44 However, the decline of US hegemonic power 
complicates the NATO expansion. On the one hand, the leader promotes expansion of the 
organization since it is the biggest benefiter of the cooperation. On the other hand, 
during the descent of the leader, the organization needs to expand to fulfill the capability 
gap. The hegemon has the ability to share the bulk of defense costs, which in turn 
enables the successful implementation of an arms control regime for the rest of the club. 
Although individual nations are always important, no agent-based theory would be 
adequate to explain the NATO enlargement in general. Any argument based on the 
interest of individual nations provide only one dimension of the NATO expansion. 
To summarize, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism generally support the 
enlargement of NATO while Neorealism opposes an eastern expansion. Neorealism 
proclaims that expansion will cause a security dilemma and in fact will make the Euro-
Atlantic region more insecure by allowing an assertive Russia to gain strength. 
42Ibid., 400. 
43
 Ibid., 396. 
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CHAPTER III 
NATO'S FUNCTIONAL ENLARGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the first stage setter chapters of the dissertation. Here, NATO's 
functional evolution is examined thoroughly. As stated in the main argument, NATO 
adapted its main functions along with the changes in the security environments. The new 
functions necessitate new capabilities that are either fulfilled internally within NATO or 
imported from outside of the organization. 
Over the years, NATO transformed from a Collective Defence organization to a 
Comprehensive Security organization. Throughout the past 60 years, NATO's functions 
increased in number and complexity. Today, NATO undertakes responsibilities which are 
beyond the military realm. During the Cold War, NATO was purely a collective defence 
organization which used mainly defensive military capabilities. With the fall of Iron 
curtain, NATO engaged with ex-communist countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO 
used an active political approach during the 1990s. The rising new threats in the second 
millennium forced NATO to be proactive and use both political and military resources to 
meet its members' security needs. Today, NATO has become a comprehensive security 
organization engaging multiple partners globally. Figure 4 depicts NATO's functional 
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COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 
The main goal of a collective defense organization is to defend its members' 
territorial integrity. The source of the threat is generally military. Non geographical 
threats are not considered to be of paramount importance. Threats against stability of the 
non-members are not a concern for the alliance. Nations are strongly affected by whether 
they join or remain outside the alliance. NATO practices are targeted to achieve 
deterrence and intra-club political military cooperation. The security policy is state-
centered, and the alliance takes action when there is a threat to any individual state's 
sovereignty. 
COOPERA TIVE SECURITY ORGANIZA TION 
Cooperative security is a practice of building trust and cooperation not just among 
the members, but also with non-members. The purpose of a cooperative security 
approach is to foster regional stability. The norms and values are the glue of the club. 
There is no a substantial difference between being a member and partner. In fact, the club 
acts as a magnet of peace and security, engaging in multi dimensional partnerships with 
the neighboring regions. Through partnership, NATO teaches partners that sharing a 
common identity will bring peace and security to all parties.1 Cooperative security 
practices entail political, military and institutional cooperation with the partners. Both 
state and individual rights are linked to the new security perception. Even when there is 
no obvious threat to the alliances' interest or territory, the alliance still takes actions when 
there is aggression against civilians outside of its territory. As Lloyd Axworthy noted, 
1
 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-
Cold War Transformation," 215-16. 
"the Kosovo crisis shows how individuals are increasingly the main victims and targets 
of state-sponsored aggression. It also demonstrates the human security dynamic at work, 
in that it was the humanitarian imperative that triggered the Allied intervention."2 
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ORGANIZA TION 
What this study names a comprehensive security is defined as a system of 
globalized cooperative security practices. The vision of the club is not regional but 
global, so that the instability in any region is a concern for the entire club. There is a new 
understanding of the security. Security is not just about territorial integrity. Threats 
against norms and people are also treated as a security concern. Global cooperation and 
peace is the main purpose of the organization. Comprehensive security practices entail 
cooperation with international organizations in a wide range of issue areas, and an 
understanding that states, Individuals and values are a all an integral part of security. The 
difference between cooperative and comprehensive security is that the latter is global, 
and therefore broader in the scale. 
NATO's evolution can be seen clearly in the NATO summit declarations and 
strategies. 
NATO SUMMITS ON ENLARGEMENT 
Although not all summit declarations touch on the enlargement issue, after the 
Prague summit in 2002, there is a strong emphasize on NATO's expectations and goals 
from the future enlargement. 
2
 Lloyd Axworthy, "NATO's New Security Vocation," NATO Review 47(1999): 8-11. 
STRASBOURG - KEHL SUMMIT, 2009 
Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance. NATO's open door policy is reaffirmed. 
NATO also launched an initiative to identify the alliance's new Strategic Concept. 
During the summit the leaders expressed their determination to secure Afghanistan. The 
alliance stated that "security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan's 
security and stability." In the 2009 summit, the France reintegrated NATO's military 
structure. 
BUCHAREST SUMMIT, 2007 
Albania and Croatia started the accession process. NATO declared that Ukraine 
and Georgia would each become a NATO member in the future. 
ISTANBUL SUMMIT 2004 
NATO invented new mechanisms to reach out to Mediterranean countries, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. The alliance aimed to establish new bilateral security 
relations in the above regions. These partnerships reveal the alliance's goal of promoting 
security to the world's problematic region. The Istanbul summit is a breakthrough in 
NATO's outreach to the south and east. The theme of the summit, "Projecting stability," 
reveals NATO's new strategy. NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to 
cooperate with the countries in the Middle East. 
3
 NATO, "Strasbourg - Kehl Summit strengthens Transatlantic Link and looks at NATO's future 
challenges ," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52845.htm (accessed November 24, 2009). 
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PRAGUE SUMMIT, 2002 
The Prague Summit was an enlargement summit. NATO expanded to an alliance 
of 26 nations as a result of the decision taken at the summit. NATO capability 
development was also a key item on the summit agenda. In order to function effectively, 
NATO established the NATO Response Force and declared the Prague Capability 
Commitments. 
MADRID SUMMIT 1997 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland began accession talks with NATO. A 
partnership charter was signed between NATO and Ukraine as well. 
BRUSSELS SUMMIT, 1994 
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was launched. NATO decided to take 
serious action in regard to the Bosnian conflict. 
ROME SUMMIT, 1991 
The Alliance's new Strategic Concept was signed. NATO expressed its readiness 
for peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
LONDON SUMMIT, 1990 
The London Declaration was announced. NATO underscored that the Soviet 
Union was no longer an adversary to NATO. The declaration highlights NATO's desire 
to cooperate in political and military areas with Central and Eastern Europe countries. 
NATO STRATEGIES 
NATO strategies are perfect example of the adaptation of NATO's to the new 
security environment. The evolution of NATO function can easily be seen in these 
strategies. 
FORWARD DEFENSE 
The Forward Defense strategy was accepted in the early 1950s as a result of the 
Korean War. It resulted from a perception of NATO's being inferior to Soviet military 
capabilities. The strategy called for defending Europe as far forward as possible. By 
holding the Soviets as far east as possible, the allies assumed to utilize the strategic air 
campaign and to gain time for a major offensive operation against the enemy.4 Moreover, 
NATO understood clearly that if any country was occupied by the Soviets, it would be 
much more difficult to liberate that country afterwards. In other words, there might not be 
another D-Day.5 NATO would use all available weapons including atomic bomb to 
destroy the Soviets. 
MASSIVE RETALIA TION 
NATO adopted a massive retaliation strategy during the mid 1950s. According to 
the strategy, NATO would respond with its all strength including nuclear arsenal to 
defend the Allied territory. The nuclear monopoly of the US was seen the only way to be 
successful. The rationale behind the massive retaliation was that NATO forces were 
4
 Gregory W. Pedlow, "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969." (NATO, 1998), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf. 
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outnumbered by the Soviets in Europe, thereby leaving the option of a massive use of 
nuclear weapons to eliminate the threat. According to the estimates, NATO had around 
twenty divisions in Germany to confront the Soviets' 175 divisions.6 The deployment of 
the intercontinental ballistic missile complicated NATO's ability to defend both Europe 
and US soil as well. Under a massive retaliation strategy, the nuclear weapons would be 
the first resort to enable an effective deterrence. 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 
NATO's massive retaliations strategy became obsolete when the Soviets 
developed capability of a nuclear strike. The magnitude of the Soviet capability was 
visible with the launch of Sputnik. The reliance on nuclear weapons at the first stage 
would cause an all-out war even in small scale contingencies. Thus, NATO agreed to 
follow a flexible approach in its handling a possible conflict with the Soviets. Any 
conventional attack would be countered with the same level and type of defense.7 
However, NATO could increase the magnitude of defense including an offensive nuclear 
capability to make the conflict very costly for the aggressor. Nuclear weapons were 
thought of more as a last resort than a primary source of deterrence. A gradual escalation 
concept with heavy reliance on the use of technology was more appropriate to defend the 
alliance territory. The flexible response strategy remained effective until the end of the 
Cold War. 
6
 Thies, Why NATO Endures, 147. 
7
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THE CASE FOR NEW FUNCTIONS 
The anarchic and self help structure of the international system forces the states to 
take measures that will help cope with the security threats to their existence. These 
threats might be direct or potential. Direct threats involve deliberate threats to a state and 
oftentimes lead to military conflicts. Potential threats are the risk perception of the 
international system. When states see themselves in an instable region, or when there is 
• 8 
mistrust between neighbors, states may engage in threat mitigation policies. In either 
case, alliances have different functions to eliminate the perceived threats. Although the 
threat perception of an alliance is not an aggregate of its members' threat perceptions, an 
alliance deals with the core threats that every member has consensus on. Thus, functions 
are the core purposes of an organization. NATO's functions increased from only a few in 
1949 to tens in the twenty-first century. Functional enlargement is an adaptation process 
of the enlargement as the new challenges force the security organizations to add new 
functions in order to survive. Alliances survive when they are flexible and can therefore 
develop new capabilities to face the new challenges. Highly institutionalized alliances, 
like NATO, have a great advantage in the adaptation process. NATO's civilian-military 
bureaucracy has a personal interest in the continuation of the alliance. Their career 
development is tied to the existence of the alliance. That is why NATO civilians are the 
driving force behind the functional enlargement of the alliance. 
The sunk cost of a highly institutionalized alliance is also another factor that will 
help it survive. It will be always costly to establish a new alliance at the same level of 
institutionalization. 
8
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NATO's new functions are driven by the development of practices in the new 
security environment. As Aybet suggests, "NATO's new missions developed out of 
practice rather than a pre-conceived plan of agreement by its members."9 The success of 
NATO as an institution depends on the reciprocity.10 NATO functions are the source of 
reciprocal relationships among the members. Members do not want to defect, because 
they fear retaliation in another functional domain. McCallas suggest that an 
organization's priority is not adherence to its norms and values, but survival: 
When an organization's central task is accomplished or not needed, new tasks will 
be sought and eventually valued—the process of goal succession. The 
organization's existing tasks will be defended, but not to the point where the 
organization itself is endangered. Eventually the organization will incorporate 
new tasks and goals as its core mission, with resulting changes in policies and 
practices.11 
NEW CAPABILITIES 
Capabilities stem from NATO's functions. Every new function requires a new 
capability. As NATO functions evolve, so do the capabilities that are required. NATO 
needs new capabilities to match the new NATO functions. NATO has developed 'general 
12 
and specific capabilities' to conduct each function. 
9
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There are three methods of capability accumulation. One method, Capability 
Development, occurs within NATO and it is the most costly one. Nations increase their 
defense spending to satisfy the new functions if a long term capability is required in areas 
where NATO plays a leading role. NATO may engage in partnership in areas where 
NATO plays a supporting role. When NATO cannot develop a capability or cooperate 
with partners, the burden is transferred to the new member. Such a transfer occurs for 
long term capabilities in areas where NATO plays a direct role. 
The enlargement cannot be understood without considering NATO's capability 
requirements. As Marc Grossman offers, "NATO enlargement is a means of achieving 
NATO's core purposes, and will contribute to NATO's continuing dynamism as the core 
security."13 NATO makes its decision based on the "capabilities and contributions 
potential new members will bring to the Alliance institution in the Euro-Atlantic area."14 
That is why the theme of the NATO enlargement summit in 2002 was "new members, 
new capabilities, and new relationships."15 
GEOSTRATEGIC CAPABILITIES 
NATO's Cold War enlargement was generally aimed at acquiring geostrategic 
capability against the Soviet Union. Germany, Turkey, Greece and Spain provided such 
an advantage to contain the enemy. Even the enlargement during the post Cold War era 
stemmed from gaining geostrategic capabilities. Romania and Bulgaria both enabled 
NATO to reach the Black Sea region, as did Turkey. Moldovan, Pantev, and Rhodes state 
13
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15
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that Romania and Bulgaria were good candidates for NATO since "their strategic 
location within the Balkan and Black Sea areas and in close proximity to the Greater 
Middle East made them advantageous sites from which to address core post-9/11 security 
issues such as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, transnational organized 
crime, weak states and 'frozen conflicts,' and energy security."16 
POLITICAL CAPABILITIES 
NATO's political capability is its ability to talk with one voice about international 
security issues. The consensus-based decision policy at the North Atlantic Council 
enables the members to make their voices heard. Thus, the resulting decision becomes a 
public good. Besides military capabilities, the new nations increase the 'soft power' of 
NATO. Being a representative of 28 nations helps legitimize NATO's actions. 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
NATO's military capability is its unique feature that distinguishes NATO from 
other international organizations. NATO both uses its own institutional assets and 
national contributions. The Command, Control, Communication, Consultation and 
Information systems are generally NATO's common funded assets. NATO's common 
funding mechanism is used to provide resources for the common infrastructure and C4I 
investments. National contributions are the forces and equipment that each ally commits 
16
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for NATO use. Aside from the above capabilities, NATO has two distinctive military 
capabilities. 
The Integrated Military Command structure is a very important military 
capability, which allows NATO countries to operate under a unified command structure. 
The effectiveness of such an integrated command was proved in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
The interoperability of NATO forces is another remarkable military capability as well. 
NATO ensures that 28 different military forces can operate smoothly in all kind of 
missions. 
NATO FUNCTIONS DURING THE COLD WAR 
Although NATO was a political military alliance, the military pillar of NATO 
was at the centerpiece during the Cold War. The critical question during the Cold War 
was whether NATO can fulfill its primary function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory 
from aggression. 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
In the 1950s, due to the Soviet rapid rearmament program, the military balance 
tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. Allies had to take dramatic measures, including a 
massive buildup and rearmament of Germany in order to deter the Soviets. With the 
military buildup, NATO achieved strategic superiority over Russia after the early 1960s. 
The turning point in the NATO-Soviet power struggle was inl962. The Soviets' attempt 
to install ballistic missiles in 1962 failed in the face of a clear determination of the 
Alliance to resort to the force. The crisis revealed the Soviets weaknesses and 
capabilities. Another important development was the Moscow-Peking conflict. The rift in 
the Communist bloc put the Soviets in a defensive position until the Union's demise. 
CORE FUNCTIONS 
From the outset of NATO until 1989, the main function of NATO was the 
protection of the alliance territory from aggression. Territorial defense was dominant, 
especially in light of rising Soviet ideological and military aggression. The weakness of 
European powers due to the devastation of the World War II necessitated US military 
involvement in Europe. Without the security umbrella of the US, it would have been 
nearly impossible to establish a safe area for the recovery of West European democracies. 
By 1967, NATO declared that it had already achieved one of its main goals. The Soviet 
Union had to accept "peaceful co-existence" with the democratic countries.17 However, 
NATO made it clear that, unless the German problem was solved, there would never be 
real cooperation with the east bloc. 
Collective Defense 
The Korean War was a key turning point during the Cold War era. Allied 
countries realized that an integrated military was necessary to effectively deter Soviet 
aggression. NATO's Cold War strategy was based on the goal of protecting the status 
quo in Europe. That is why NATO developed defensive capabilities at the beginning. 
Indeed, the first strategic concept, approved in January 1950 by the NAC, recalls the 
17
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primary function of NATO as deterring aggression. A revisionist Russia could not be 
deterred by defensive strategies alone. 
Containment 
After the Korean War, the containment of the Soviet Union became an 
indispensable function of NATO and the US. The Euro-Atlantic partners agreed that the 
containment of the Soviets was mandatory to prevent a catastrophic war. However, it is 
worth mentioning that NATO insisted not to engage with the Soviets on territory outside 
NATO. NATO did not pursue global containment of the Soviets. Indeed, there was an 
increasing resistance to US proposals for a global NATO role in the international order.19 
Thus, Europe and neighboring regions of the Middle East and North Africa constituted 
NATO's area of containment. 
Although containment continued until the collapse of the soviet union, the 
developments in the international arena during the 1960s fostered a calming down of the 
East-West relations. Both NATO and the Soviets initiated policies to relax the tensions. 
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Intra Alliance Functions 
Beside securing its members from external threat, NATO also help reduces the 
internal tensions among its members. The internal functions are as important as the 
external core functions in providing security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
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Tampering Security Dilemma 
As Karl Deutsch theorized in "Security Communities,"21 in the 1960s, states were 
integrated in a security formation which became, at some point, a community. Violence 
was no longer an option among the members of the security community. The norms of 
the community reduced the insecurity among the states. Hence, NATO began to focus on 
trust-building among the members. NATO evolved into a community over time due to 
the "common values, expectation of economic gain, a wide range of mutual transactions, 
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broad elite networks and high levels of social communication." 
NATO provides transparency about the military capabilities of the member states. 
Members can access information about each others' military assets through the NATO 
Defense Planning process. The chances of intra-alliance conflict would be reduced as a 
result of increased internal information exchange.23 
Additionally, the alliance pressured its members not to pursue provocative policy 
that might endanger peace, as a mistake made by an individual member could cause a 
total war with the adversary. In other words, being in the alliance means tying one's own 
security to the actions of another country.24 
To sum up, NATO satisfied the security concerns of the old rivals in Western 
Europe. Without the security guarantee of NATO, geopolitical rivalry would have been 
inevitable between UK, France and Germany. 
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Interoperability 
NATO ensures that the allied forces will communicate and work with each other. 
Interoperability is probably the most important military function of the alliance in an era 
•yc 
when multinational and expeditionary operations are imperative. 
Denationalization of Defense 
NATO enabled the member countries to denationalize their defense policies. 
NATO force planning provided transparency among the allies regarding each other's 
intentions and capabilities. 
Transatlantic Link 
NATO has always remained the primary security platform between North 
America and Europe. The consultation process enabled a common security policy for 
Euro-Atlantic region. 
CAPABILITY ACCUMULA TION 
NATO aimed to acquire military capabilities during the Cold War. The force 
levels and the nuclear weapons were the two pillars of NATO's defense posture. Due to 
the rapid economic and technological developments in Western Europe, NATO achieved 
strategic superiority by 1970. 
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Capability Development 
During the cold war, NATO's capability development was concentrated on the 
modification of the military structure and acquiring new defense assets. 
Integration of the military 
Integration of the allies' military forces was a mean of achieving greater benefits 
from cooperation. Allies would not have to duplicate each other's capabilities. The 
pooling of their capabilities enabled the allies use their limited resources in the most 
efficient way possible. 
New Institutional Bodies 
To utilize the collective action, the alliance established a strategic command, 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (known as SHAPE), in Europe. General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as the commander in 1951. He was to be supported 
by an international military staff in the planning and execution of the operation plans for 
European Defense. Similarly, the Atlantic Command was established in January, 1952, at 
the west side of the Atlantic. 
On the civilian side, new organizations were established as well. On 12th March, 
1952, the North Atlantic Council appointed Lord Ismay to be Secretary General of 
NATO. To assist the Secretary General in conducting NATO business, an International 
Staff/Secretariat was drawn from the member countries. 
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Military Buildup 
With the shock of Soviet aggression in Southeast Asia, the Allies agreed to build 
up their force levels significantly. In December 1949, NATO had 12 divisions, 400 
aircraft and some naval vessels at its disposal to defend Europe. However, one year later, 
by December 1951, NATO increased its troops to 35 divisions, about 3000 aircraft and 
700 naval vessels.26 
Capability Importation 
When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, neither Greece nor Turkey or 
Germany was considered a candidate for NATO membership. Indeed, to consider 
Turkey's membership, the wording of article six would have to be changed to cover 
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Turkey's territory under the article 5 commitment. 
Geostrategic Considerations 
The Korean war was a turning point for NATO's assessment of the threat. The 
allies realized that "a 'forward strategy' should be adopted in Europe, i.e. that any 
aggression should be resisted as far to the east as possible, in order to ensure the defense 
j a 
of all NATO European countries." Therefore, German accession to the alliance was a 
necessity of the NATO's geostrategic considerations. To quote, Ismay, "German 
participation in Western defense had been mooted several times in the preceding months, 
90 and the anxiety caused by the Korean War had brought the question to a head." 
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Greece and Turkey were as important as Germany for a successful forward 
strategy. They represented the south flank of NATO. According to Smith, Turkey played 
a key role in the NATO assault: ".. .from both an air and a naval perspective, that Turkey 
should enter an East-West War from the start."30 
Indeed, it was these two countries that opened the path for the Truman doctrine, 
which called for active US involvement in Europe. The US feared Soviet access to 
Middle East petrol and the Mediterranean if Greece and Turkey left outside of the club. 
Therefore, in the context of the Cold War environment, no country had the option of 
remaining neutral. 
Military Contributions 
NATO had serious discussions about the value of Turkey's and Greece's 
accession to NATO. In Lord Ismay's view, "on the one hand, that the addition of these 
countries to the coalition would carry obvious advantages; on the other hand, that it 
would involve extending NATO's strategic commitments as far east as the Caucasus."31 
NATO FUNCTIONS IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO had to change its core functions to 
adapt the new security environment. There was no more a direct threat to NATO 
members. 
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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
With the end of the Cold War, the security environment changed substantially. 
The Soviet Union collapsed, leaving behind a security gap in Eastern Europe. Russia's 
orientation towards democracy was not smooth. The West had to calculate its every 
security policy in order not to further estrange Russia. 
German unification was a key success for NATO, but that success also resurfaced 
the old concerns among the allies. UK and France fiercely opposed the unification of the 
Germany. It was American pressure combined with a weak Soviet Union that ultimately 
led to the accomplishment of the long time German dream. Paradoxically, German 
unification also set the stage for later NATO enlargement. As Asmus states, the German 
unification became a model for the NATO enlargement in 1990s. Indeed, he believes 
that 1989 unification is the first NATO enlargement in the post Cold War era. Those 
observations point out that NATO's focus during the 1990s was more political than 
military. 
By the early 1990s, Ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe revealed that there could 
be no security in Europe without Europe-wide democratization and stability. Human 
security became a hot item on NATO's agenda. NATO could no longer turn a blind eye 
to the humanitarian disaster in the neighboring regions. As Nye suggests, the "CNN 
Effect" puts a tremendous pressure on the alliance to take action on the human rights 
violations.33 
NATO's 1990 London Summit was a key event in NATO's future role in the 
new security environment. NATO declared the end of adversarial relations with the east. 
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The cooperation and dialogue becomes the most important issue on NATO's agenda. The 
1991 Strategic Concept highlights changing face of the threat and new roles for NATO: 
Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against 
the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities 
that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, 
including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many 
countries in central and eastern Europe.34 
CORE FUNCTIONS 
The 1990s marked the effect of globalization in every domain of societies. As 
British Prime minister Tony Blair articulates, NATO's actions are shaped by this new 
phenomenon: 
Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have 
turned our backs on it. The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide range 
of changes - the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread of 
democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the world has changed in a more 
fundamental way. Globalization has transformed our economies and our working 
practices. But globalization is not just economic - it is also a political and security 
phenomenon.35 
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In contrast to the Cold War era, NATO adopted a political-military 
function as the main NATO function: a Whole and Free Europe. Yet, the 
collective defense is still seen as the glue of the alliance. Practically speaking, 
NATO capabilities are diverted to satisfy the new main function. The shift in 
NATO's main function originated from the tectonic changes in the security 
environment after the Cold War. 
Human Security 
During the 1990s, NATO added new functions to overcome the new challenges. 
The state-centric security functions were no longer satisfactory for the alliance societies. 
Functions that focused on human security became the primary tasks of the alliance. 
However, these human security functions would still be Euro-centric until the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. 
A Whole and Free Europe 
Securing a whole and free Europe became a top function for the alliance. This 
function has two dimensions: political and military. The political dimension is the 
establishment of Western style democracies throughout Europe. And the military 
dimension consists of establishing a stable Europe wide security system. NATO invented 
partnership mechanisms to satisfy the political dimension first. The NACC in 1991 was 
aimed at reducing tensions peacefully in Europe. The crisis management program was 
targeted to achieve the military pillar of a whole and free Europe. 
Yet, NATO was not prepared for a crisis operation. The introduction of the 
Combined Joint Task Force was a first step in preparing NATO's military. Despite 
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partnership mechanisms and increased NATO's capability of crisis management, NATO 
could not prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia sounded the alarm for a new approach to meeting 
NATO's new functions. During this era NATO pursued, in Gheciusn terms, an inside 
mode of security which is promoting "stable, and peaceful institutions within states."36 
After the fall of the iron curtain, although triumphant and jubilant, NATO found 
itself in a very dynamic environment. The foremost new task was to preserve stability. 
The other important task was to secure the victory. In other words, it was to eliminate the 
threats against the alliance security. To do so, the promotion of democracy and ensuring 
the new countries' commitment to the Euro-Atlantic security was vital. Thus the whole 
and free Europe was the translation of the above considerations into reality. The 
conditions and timing were so appropriate that if not now, Europe might never be free 
again. Therefore, NATO's actions in the 1990s should be understood in the very unique 
context of the time. 
By 1994, NATO realized that without tackling the sources of instability in the 
neighboring region, there would be no sustainable security in Europe. The political and 
military assets of the Central and Eastern Europe countries were vital resources for a 
secure Europe. Indeed, there was no other alternative than enlargement to achieve 
NATO's primary function of a whole and free Europe in 1990s. Initially, NATO asserted 
that the whole and free Europe can and should be achieved by the combination of efforts 
of European Union, CSCE and NATO.37 But later developments in Yugoslavia 
demonstrated that NATO was the only show in the town. To conclude, the following 
36
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functions were prominent in the post Cold War security environment as identified by 
NATO itself: 
To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable 
security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic 
institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in 
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European 
nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 
To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital 
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and 
for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. 
To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory 
of any NATO member state. 
To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.38 
CAPABILITY ACCUMULA TION 
Two issues dominated the capability discussions in NATO during the post cold 
war era.. The first is the ever increasing capability between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
And the second is NATO's capability requirements. As a result of the diminished 
conventional threat in the continental Europe, most of the European countries reduced 
their defense spending in the 1990s. However, the peace dividend in the NATO allies' 
defense budgets put the burden mostly on a few allies in NATO. When the capability gap 
38
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threatened the effectiveness of the alliance, NATO launched some initiatives to alleviate 
the gap. 
The capability gap among the allies was no more evident than the Kosovo war. 
The European allies did not have the capability to match their American counterparts. In 
the 1999 Washington summit, the allies agreed on taking some measures in the following 
fields to alleviate the capability gap: 
• Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly 
• Effective engagement: improving forces' cutting edge capacity 
• Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness 
and control 
• Survivability: protecting forces 
• Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field 
Capability Development 
Having deployable multinational forces was the central effort in NATO's post 
cold war capability development. In that, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Combined 
Joint Task Force are the two most important new capabilities for NATO in 1990s. 
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 
NATO's force planning evolves in accordance with its functions. During the Cold 
War, NATO had allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to deter Soviet Union. 
The US reinforced its troop level to contribute to the AMF. There was no standing 
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multinational military force. The AMF was a formation of national contributions in war 
time. The AMF was suitable for a conventional military conflict in the continental Europe 
however it can not be deployed to strategic distances. Thus when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, NATO introduced Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The new ARRC was 
more flexible and capable. It was used in a wide spectrum of operations; peace 
enforcement operations in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina and conventional military operations 
against Serbia in Kosovo.40 
Combined Joint Task Force 
NATO introduced the concept of CJTF in 1993. The main purpose of the JCTF 
was to provide flexible multinational and multiservice force for the new type missions 
especially to be used in crisis response operations 41 The first JCTF was implemented in 
1999 after the lessons from Bosnian Conflict were incorporated. The JCTF can be 
tailored to the needs of any specific operation. The new NATO functions necessitated a 
deployable, rapid reaction force. 
Capability Cooperation 
In tandem with capability developments, NATO actively started cooperation 
initiatives with ex-communist states to secure a lasting peace in Europe. Some of the 
below initiatives were not as useful as was hoped, but they fostered further cooperation in 
international arena. 
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North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
The NACC was established in 1991 to incorporate the ex-Warsaw pact countries 
into the Euro-Atlantic security framework. The NACC was a political platform for 
cooperation and dialogue. The tensions and conflicts could be reduced by political 
cooperation. Although the NACC provided a venue for consultation in defense and 
security issues it did not have the operational cooperation to provide the desired results. 
Partnership For Peace (PfP) 
PfP was introduced in 1994 to fill the security gap in Central and Eastern 
Europe. NATO's core function of Whole and Free Europe was thought to be achieved by 
the PfP. The PfP is a bilateral cooperation of a non-NATO member with NATO. The 
goal of the PfP is to reinforce the stability and build trust among the parties. PfP is not a 
substitute for the enlargement, nor is it aimed at keeping the aspiring nations on the 
outside. 
The PFP is a process of teaching NATO's norms and practices. PFP is a 
valuable mechanism for NATO to develop capabilities less costly. NATO does not need 
to invest huge resources to achieve stability in the neighboring countries. The only 
difference between a PfP and full membership is the article 5 commitment.42 
The PfP provided important training initiatives for the former communist 
countries. Educating the top officials, military exercises were fundamental to socialize 
the PfP countries. The purpose of the PfP is explained as "to increase stability, diminish 
threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner 
42
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countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries."43 The PfP was favored 
initially since it did not necessarily exclude any country from partnering with NATO. If 
NATO was able to achieve its main function with PfP, the enlargement agenda would not 
be on the table considering the domestic and external pressures. Through the PfP, NATO 
was able to promote both its values and practices to partners. The partners' military 
members and defense civilians were socialized through courses, exercises, formal and 
informal meetings. In 2008 nearly six thousand students were trained in the fifteen 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training and Education Centers.44 
The PfP is a political and military instrument to produce security without much 
NATO contribution. Although it was approached skeptically initially, its success in 
Bosnia conflict revealed its value in the crisis management and peace keeping operations. 
The PfP softened the relations among the old enemies as well. Public opinion in the 
partner countries tilted in favor of the NATO in the coming years. 
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) 
NATO initiated Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in 1994 to enhance the security 
and stability in the Mediterranean region. The dialogue reflects NATO's ongoing efforts 
in providing security in the neighboring regions. Seven nations signed the dialogue 
agreement including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. 
This initiative became a model for the future cooperation attempts in the region.The 
dialogue areas cover public diplomacy civil emergency planning, crisis management, 
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border security, small arms & light weapons, defense reform, consultations on terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.45 
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
In 1997, the EAPC was established to replace the NACC. As of 2009, twenty-two 
non-NATO countries had joined the EAPC to cooperate in security related issues 46 The 
EAPC serves as the 'political framework' for NATO's partnership programs.47 The 
partners consult on a wide variety of issues such as "crisis-management and peace-
support operations; regional issues; arms control and issues related to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; defense issues such as planning, 
budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness; 
armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic 
management; and scientific cooperation."48 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
The NATO-Russia council was established in 2002 as a follow up of Permanent 
Joint Council between Russia and NATO. The NRC brings 28 NATO nations together 
with Russia to the same table. The goal of the council is to encourage cooperation in 
areas such as " the fight against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms 
control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, logistics, military-to-
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military cooperation, defense reform and civil emergencies. New areas may be added to 
the NRC's agenda by the mutual consent of its."49 NRC meetings were halted after the 
Russian-Georgia conflict. But the work of council revitalized in 2009. In fact, NATO 
saw Russia as the indispensable partner for global security. NATO Secretary Rasmussen 
reiterated the importance of cooperation in his recent visit to Moscow: Rasmussen said 
that: 
NATO will never attack Russia. Never. And we do not think Russia will attack 
NATO. We have stopped worrying about that and Russia should stop worrying 
about that as well.50 
NATO-Ukraine Commission 
NATO-Ukraine Commission was established in 1997 to foster the relationship. 
Currently, NATO has an increasing footprint in Ukraine ranging from scientific 
cooperation to military assistance. 
Force Reductions 
After 1990, NATO revised its flexible response strategy. The allies have reduced 
their troop levels across the Europe: 
The principal characteristics of the changes introduced to NATO's military forces 
structures since the end of the Cold War are reductions in size and readiness and 
increases in flexibility, mobility and multinationality... Ground forces committed 
49
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to the Alliance by member nations through NATO's integrated defense and force 
planning processes have been cut by 35 percent. Major naval vessels have been 
reduced by over 30 percent and air force combat squadrons by some 40 percent 
since the beginning of the 1990s.51 
New Command Structure 
In 1994, NATO revised its command structure and reduced its three commands to 
two commands. 
Capability Importation 
The rationale for accepting new nations can be varied, but the core capabilities the 
new members bring are the basic argument for NATO enlargement. The enlargement 
process is one of the options for NATO to achieve a lasting peace in Europe. The 
enlargement is not the only vehicle used by the alliance to promote democratization in 
Europe. NATO cooperated with the other international institutions to secure 
democratization in Europe. The incapacity of the European Union to provide enough 
momentum for the CEEC forced NATO to develop partnership relations with these 
countries. However, the Partnership program was a loose relationship and it did not solve 
the security concerns of the partner nations. Thus the membership option has been the 
last resort to achieve the NATO's Whole and Free Europe function. As NATO's 
Secretary General Lord Robertson states NATO enlargement is "about fulfilling the 
promise of building a stable, secure, democratic Europe - something that benefits all its 
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inhabitants and all its neighbors."52 Enlargement has a large impact on the domestic 
political reforms in the aspiring countries.53 As Epstein suggests, "NATO has in fact 
contributed to democratization, as well as to other positive trends among its member 
states. NATO has significantly denationalized defense strategies and thereby stabilized 
relations among states."54 
NATO enlargement increased the regional cooperation and supported the resolve 
of territorial disputes peacefully. According to the enlargement study, "states which have 
ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal 
jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with 
OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether 
to invite a state to join the Alliance."55 As a result of the above criteria many disputes are 
resolved peacefully such as the Hungarian minority problem in Romania and Slovakia, 
and Poland's border disputes with Ukraine.56 Brzezinski asserts that NATO played an 
important role in resolving the many disputes among both nations and candidates: 
Basic lesson of the last five decades is that European security is the basis for 
European reconciliation. Without NATO, France would not have felt secure 
enough to reconcile with Germany, and both France and Britain would have even 
more actively opposed Germany's reunification... Similarly, the ongoing 
reconciliation between Germany and Poland would not have been possible 
without the American presence in Germany and the related sense of security that 
52
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Poland's prospective membership in NATO has fostered in Poland. The same is 
true of the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Romania, Romania and 
Ukraine; and the desire to get into NATO is also having a similar influence on 
Slovenia's attitude toward Italy and Lithuania's toward Poland.57 
NATO FUNCTIONS IN THE POST 9/11 ERA 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 opened a new chapter in NATO's functional 
evolution. The alliance implemented the article-5 of the Washington Treaty for the first 
time only one day after the attacks. NATO decided to operate out of NATO territory to 
prevent complex new threats towards Euro-Atlantic security such as terrorism, ethnic 
conflicts, WMD and economic meltdown. 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
After 9/11, NATO changed its geographical security approach to functional 
security approach. The security of the alliance is not geographically bound any more. 
The elimination of any kind of threat against the people and values of the alliance is 
incorporated into the NATO's to-do-list. Today, NATO functions are less Euro-Centric. 
NATO's main operation is in the heart of Asia. NATO is partnering with Middle East 
Countries and supporting African Union in its operations. 
Apart from the previous decade, NATO aimed at pacifying not just the European 
continent but Central Asia as well. In 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO took new initiatives 
to reach out the countries at Central Asia and Middle East. 
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CORE FUNCTIONS 
Though according to the 1999 Strategic concept NATO officially performs the 
functions of Security, Consultation, Deterrence and Defense, Crisis Management and 
Partnership, Counter-terrorism has become the main function in the last decade.58 The 
Istanbul summit was a milestone in NATO's functional enlargement. Allies expressed 
their willingness to address any threats against NATO's territory, and people regardless 
of the origin of the threat.59 NATO adopted a military solution to meet the new 
challenges. The Afghanistan operation is the clear example of NATO's new focus after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Security 
NATO's functional approach to security demands cooperative strategy against 
the asymmetric and interdependent threats such as Counter-terrorism has became a major 
task for NATO after the 9/11 attacks. 
Consultation 
Consultation is a unique political asset in NATO. As the alliance enlarged to 28 
nations, it became important to consult on wide array of topics regarding the alliance's 
security. In particular, through the consultation mechanism, NATO can develop common 
understanding of the threats and necessary commitments. 
58
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Deterrence and Defense 
Deterrence and Defense is no doubt the core of the alliance. It is also the Achilles' 
heel of NATO. Under what conditions the article 5 would be invoked is blurred in the 
past decade due to the new threats. NATO needs to address the article 5 issue in the new 
strategic concept. 
Crisis Management 
NATO's post 9/11 experiences underscored the significance of reconstruction and 
stabilization operations. In particular, Afghanistan operation revealed that military 
solution is not satisfactory in the modern conflicts. A comprehensive approach merging 
civilian and military capabilities is needed to succeed. 
Partnership 
NATO does not and will not have all the required assets to realize its aspirations. 
In an increasingly interdependent world, NATO needs to engage with other institutions 
and countries. The current outreach initiatives should be reinforced with more carrot to 
tie the partners to the west. Without effective measures, the entire outreach program will 
be hollow and remain in the paper. As Chris Donnelly suggests, "the divide between 
'Allies' and 'Partners' needs to close rapidly. Allies' security can only be assured by 
close collaboration with Partners in Central and Eastern Europe and the Greater Middle 
East as well as with each other."60 
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The benefit of partnership can be seen clearly during the Afghanistan operation. 
NATO and US had enormous help from the Central Asia countries in the war against 
terrorism. As Moore asserts, "the cooperation that the United States and NATO enjoyed 
in the region after September 11, 2001, was made possible by political and military ties to 
the region during the 1990s through NATO's PfP."61 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan provided either basing, refueling or over flight 
permissions to the US and Allies. 
Overall, the contribution of non NATO members to the alliance operations is 
significant. NATO highlights that, "as of September 2008, approximately 62,500 NATO 
personnel were deployed in five NATO-led operations. These forces are provided by the 
26 NATO Allies (about 58,200) and 16 NNCNs (about 4,300)."63 Due to the ongoing 
outreach programs, NATO is now acting as a hub for international cooperation in the 
security field. 
It is important to highlight that all non-NATO members must have the approval of 
NATO to contribute to an ongoing operation. The contributions of partner countries 
"speed achievement of the overall objective, lessen the burden on NATO members, and 
provide a visible demonstration of the broad international consensus that exists on the 
importance of NATO's role in contributing to crisis resolution and preventing the spread 
of instability."64 Partnership efforts are a chance for NATO to export its norms and 
values to the partner countries as well. 
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CAPABILITY ACCUMULA TION 
New members are expected to contribute political, military and economic 
capabilities to fulfill NATO functions. As NATO's Prague summit declaration 
emphasizes, " Alliance enlargement will strengthen NATO in several ways making it 
more able to handle both its traditional and more recent security missions. Politically, the 
new members will see the extension of a zone of security over more of the Euro-Atlantic 
area. Militarily, they will be able to provide specific, niche capabilities as well as a 
general defense contribution appropriate to their means."65 
Capability Development 
NATO initiated ambitious projects to satisfy the new functions. Especially 
reducing the capability gap between the Europe and US was addressed by these 
initiatives. 
The Prague Capabilities Commitment 
In the following four areas, nations agreed to improve their capabilities: 
• defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
attacks 
• ensuring command, communications and information superiority 
• improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of 
combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and 
sustainability of combat forces66 
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High Readiness Force (HRF) 
In 2003, NATO agreed on a new command structure that can conduct any type of 
operations in any part of the world. Current deployable HRF headquarters are: 
• The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) HQ in Rheindalen, Germany 
• The Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps HQ in 
Munster, Germany 
• The Rapid Deployable Italian Corps HQ in Olona, Italy 
• The Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps HQ in Valencia, 
Spain 
• The Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps HQ in Istanbul, 
Turkey 
• The EUROCORPS HQ in Strasbourg, France, sponsored 
by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain67 
NATO Response Force (NRF) 
Apart from the HRF, NATO introduced a new rapid reaction force which has a 
standing headquarter and multinational force. The new NATO Response Forces consist 
of land, maritime, air and special operations units that can be deployed in a short time and 
conduct all kinds of article 5 and non-article 5 operations. NRF is the engine of the 
transformation. The nations use NRF as a model for their militaries adaptation to the new 
concepts and technologies. Other than that, if used effectively, NRF can provide an early 
67
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stronghold during a conflict. Lord Robertson asserts that "another major breakthrough in 
the capability area was the agreement reached in Prague on the creation of a NATO 
Response Force (NRF). This state-of-the-art force will give the Alliance the capacity to 
respond quickly and effectively to new threats." 
The following NRF Missions demonstrates that NATO is aiming for 
military capability to meet its functions: Crisis Response (including 
Peacekeeping), Support Counter Terrorism operations, Consequence 
Management (including CBRN events and humanitarian crises), Peace 
Enforcement, Embargo operations - maritime, initial land, and no-fly zone, 
Initial Entry Force.. .or enabling force, Demonstrative Force Package, Quick 
response operations and Non-combatant Evacuation.59 
Capability Cooperation 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was the main vehicle for the cooperation 
during this era. The goal of the ICI is to enhance security in the region through bilateral 
relations.70 Until now, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates joined the 
ICI. NATO is seeking practical cooperation through ICI in the areas of defense reform, 
interoperability of forces , education and training activities, cooperation in the fight 
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against terrorism and prevent of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
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Capability Importation 
NATO enlargement during the last decade was a continuation of the previous 
post-Cold War enlargement. Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia joined the club in 2004. With the accession of Albania and Croatia in March 
2009, Europe is almost consolidated. But, there is still a potential conflict in Balkans due 
to the tensions between non-NATO members. 
FUTURE NATO 
NATO's future tasks will involve protecting not the NATO territory but the 
common values and peoples from any aggression. 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The latest upset in the Afghanistan war demonstrates the lack of consensus on the 
main threat among the alliance. While the eastern European members worry on a 
resurgent Russia, the rest of the alliance worry more about unconventional threats such as 
terrorism, climate change etc. 
The future security environment will be complex and unpredictable with many 
state and nonstate actors affecting the global security. The likelihood of an open military 
aggression against the alliance territory will not be paramount. In fact in the twenty-first 
century, the threat will be in the form of network wars: Terrorist networks, drug 
networks, organized crime networks, hackers etc. These are the "networks that prey on 
other networks- the interconnected arteries and nodes of vulnerability that accompany the 
free flow of people, ideas, energy, money, goods and services, and the complex 
interdependent systems on which free societies depend."72 
NATO, itself, identifies the future threats as being hybrid: 
Threats will come in hybrid form, as adversaries integrate conventional, irregular, 
terrorist and criminal assets operationally and tactically at the lowest possible 
level.73 
In order to address these hybrid threats, NATO needs to work with other 
institutions and develop niche capabilities. The Alliance might have to conduct a wide 
variety of operations near the borders of the alliance or at a strategic distance. In either 
case, the alliance needs deployable and flexible capabilities. NATO's new roles should 
address the emerging global threats against the values, people and forces as well. 
Therefore the following roles which are identified by a large group of experts in the 
Multiple Future Study are likely to be adapted by the alliance in the new strategic 
concept. 
CORE FUNCTIONS 
Although NATO's future functions will be addressed in the new strategic concept, 
NATO will likely focus on the following functions which is derived from numerous 
NATO documents such as Multiple Future Projects and Future Security Environment 
study. 
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Deterrence and Collective Defense 
The collective defense will remain at the core of the alliance functions. The 
commitment to defend collectively gives the best message to any kind of aggression 
against the alliance. Although NATO should retain the traditional nuclear and 
conventional capabilities, the article 5 should also be reevaluated to cover the virtual 
commons of the alliance. Deterrence can be achieved only when the alliance shows its 
unity and solidarity in a timely manner. Therefore, the alliance will need to revise its 
decision making and commitment procedures. 
Transatlantic Link 
NATO provides a strategic forum for 28 developed countries. It is " the 
institutional expression of the transatlantic link."74 If used effectively, most of the global 
risks can be addressed collectively by the alliance. 
Energy Security 
Energy Security will be an important role for the NATO in the next decade. 
NATO members might need to address the issue before 'extending invitations of 
membership to new countries "particularly if they are vulnerable to Russian pressure."75 
Cyber Defense 
NATO's capabilities in the virtual common is very limited. Heavy dependence on 
the cyber networks requires common action by NATO allies. 
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Piracy 
The safety of land, sea and air transportation lines is to be ensured by the 
international community. However, it is only NATO that can deliver effective military 
protection in case of any threat. 
Countering Hybrid Threats 
New threats can be against both physical and virtual commons. NATO will have 
to conduct activities well beyond its territory. NATO should contribute the global 
security by engaging other institutions and countries. 
Conflict Resolution 
NATO will conduct the Crisis Response Operations in increasing numbers due to 
its unique military capabilities. NATO needs to utilize its material asset in the case of any 
humanitarian crises. 
Counter Proliferation of WMD 
2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance highlights terrorism and the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction as the principal threats in the next two decades. NATO 
might need to develop new capabilities such as missile defense systems to protect its 
territory and people. 
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Strategic Communication 
The battle of Narrative becomes one of the NATO's priority in the new security 
environment.77 Without explaining NATO actions and purposes to the people, NATO 
will lose its political assets to perform its core functions. The strategic communication 
should be a part of NATO capabilities in the information age. As stated in the Multiple 
Future Study: 
NATO will need to communicate effectively the inter-relationship between security 
and defense, which includes the role of NATO in relation to other governance 
bodies, both internal and external to the Alliance.78 
The lack of an effective strategic communication can be understood 
diminished public support for the alliance in the last decade. A recent study by 
German Marshall Fund shows that although the NATO support "has been 
rebounding in a number of countries" it is still far from the previous heights.79 
Anchoring Caucasus to the West 
OA 
NATO needs to, "enhance stability and security on Europe's periphery." 
Caucasus is a conflict-ridden region due to the enormous territorial disputes. The 
instability in Caucasus affects the energy security of the alliance. NATO should involve 
constructive dialogue with Caucasus countries. As Asmus highlights, NATO can no 
77
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longer turn his back on the region. NATO needs "a more coherent strategy toward the 
Black Sea region and those countries lying further east ward around the Caspian."81 
European Pacification 
Europe is not safe and totally free today. Although there is a remarkable 
achievement on the integration of the continent the insecurity in Balkans can initiate 
conflict Europe-Wide. NATO's first and foremost task is to preserve the peace in Europe. 
Partnership 
NATO is partnering many countries since the early 1990s. Through partnership, 
NATO is able to achieve its security functions at lower costs. In particular the stability 
and security in Europe and periphery can be strengthened only with the cooperation of 
partners. NATO can use the capabilities of the partner countries to fight terrorism and to 
manage the crisis. 
FUTURE CAPABILITIES 
NATO's capabilities need to match the NATO functions. NATO will be a viable 
security organization in the eyes of its members only if it can perform the core functions. 
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If the capabilities do not match the functions, NATO will become "a hollow alliance." 
NATO will lose its credibility and political assets to shape the crisis before escalating to 
conflict. On the other hand, if NATO breaks away from its commitments, the members 
whose security is at risk will be alienated. The NATO's value will be zeroed. Countries at 
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risk will increase their security either by renationalizing their defenses or with new 
alliances. In either case, NATO will be a dead alliance. 
NATO should have a leading, partner or supporter role for the above roles.83 
Depending on the roles it plays NATO needs a flexible force structure. The deployable 
forces are essential in meeting the required capabilities. Afghanistan missions showed the 
NATO's awkward command and control processes. Without the deployable capabilities, 
NATO will not perform its functions. Thus the capabilities are essential for NATO's 
credibility. NATO Secretary General put it in a very clear way: 
The Alliance needs capabilities for the future, not for the past. We need more 
wide-bodied aircraft, and fewer heavy tanks. We need more precision-guided 
weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground-surveillance systems, and 
protection against chemical and biological weapons. We need forces that are 
slimmer, tougher and faster, forces that reach further, and can stay in the field 
longer. Such capabilities cost.84 
Joint Intelligent Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) 
NATO needs a well coordinated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
data collection and analysis capability. AGS is a milestone in the JISR capability. 
Command Control and Communication Systems 
Without a C3 capability, the forces from 28 different nations and military cultures 
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Strategic Lift 
Most of the NATO nations do not have the strategic lift capability. Considering 
the future home away missions, Strategic Lift capability is essential for the deployable 
forces. 
Missile Defense 
In the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO decided to acquire a comprehensive missile 
defense capability due to the risk of WMD attack by terrorist groups or hostile countries. 
The interim capability is planned to be achieved by early 2010 covering the forces on 
theater.85 NATO's Missile defense Capability links national missile defense system with 
NATO's command and control assets. 
CONCLUSION 
NATO enlargement poses no threat to any country. The goal of the enlargement is 
to establish a whole and free Europe. NATO promotes the democratic values to enhance 
the global security. NATO enlargement reinforces the European integration by helping 
the new members to cooperate in one of the most problematic issue area. The enhanced 
cooperation in the defense area spilled over to the other issue areas. Hence it will be 
much easier to cooperate in economic or technological platforms. 
NATO's overall goal is to safeguard the territory and people of the member 
countries from any kind of aggression. NATO adopts new functions to increase the 
interdependence among member and non-member nations to resolve the problems 
85NATO, "Missile Defense," http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html (accessed November 
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peacefully. NATO's internal functioning is mostly aimed to increase the interdependence 
among members. Common defense planning, research and development, new concepts 




NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, NATO's geographical enlargement will be analyzed with regard to 
the NATO's functional evolution. In accordance with the main argument, the chapter 
identifies the background information about the second pillar of NATO expansion. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the Cold War 
era enlargement (the first wave): Why and How did NATO enlarge? The second section 
explains the post Cold War era enlargement (the second wave). Why did the enlargement 
take place after the Brussels Summit in 1994? Are there any differences between the first 
and second wave of enlargement? The impact of new democratic countries in the central 
and eastern Europe on NATO was examined in detail in order to understand the later 
enlargement rounds. The new members will be assessed according their contribution to 
required capabilities. The conclusion section highlights the linkage between the 
capability requirements and the new members. 
Having been founded by 12 countries in 1949, the alliance enlarged to 28 
members in the next 60 years. As seen in Figure 5, the geographical enlargement took 
place in six rounds. NATO's geographical enlargement is based on Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty: 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become 
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a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the 
Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United 
States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession.1 
• # of Countries 
1949 1952 1955 1982 1999 2004 2009 
Fig. 5. NATO's Six Rounds of Enlargement 
The Cold War era enlargement is the first wave of NATO expansion which 
included the accession of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain. In the first round Greece 
and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952. Germany's accession could only be realized in 
1955 after overcoming the French opposition. In the third round, Spain became a member 
of the alliance in 1982. The Geostrategic and military capabilities of the aspiring nations 
' NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty." 
were important criteria for being admitted to the club. NATO's primary goal for the 
enlargement was to deter and contain Soviet Union by incorporating new capabilities. 
Especially after the North Korean Attack in 1950, NATO allies realized that there 
would be no cheap collective defense of the Europe. A credible deterrence necessitated 
new capabilities, forces, fixed infrastructure and the defense of allied territories as far 
east as possible. By mid 1950, NATO was behind the Soviet Union in military 
capabilities. In order to have a balance of power in Europe, NATO had to increase 
overall defense level. However, a defense buildup was NATO's biggest dilemma. On the 
one hand, the defense buildup would secure NATO countries militarily; on the other 
hand, an increase in defense budgets would jeopardize the economic reconstruction of 
Europe. Only the new accession could effectively fulfill the capability gap without 
disrupting economic recovery. The fierce opposition to Turkish membership was 
overcome when NATO military authorities underscored that Turkey in NATO could tie 
up a large amount of Soviets troops in the Caucasus. Similarly, German membership was 
no longer deferred as the Soviets had improved their conventional and nuclear forces. 
Since Germany would be the main battle field in a future war, German industrial and 
military potential was vital for NATO. 
NATO's biggest enlargement took place after the Cold War. An alliance of 16 
members enlarged to a 28 nations alliance as of 2009. The second wave of NATO 
expansion occurred in three rounds since 1999. Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic 
were invited to the alliance in 1997 and they signed the accession protocol in 1999. Later, 
in 2004 Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined 
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NATO. The last round of enlargement was in 2009. Albania and Croatia became full 
member of the alliance at NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. 
NATO's second wave of enlargement differed from the previous enlargement in 
purpose and scope. NATO's main function became achieving a whole and free Europe 
after 1990. Only expansion could bring lasting peace to Europe by reducing tensions at 
the hotspots of the Balkan, Central European and Baltic regions. Henceforth, the new 
members were required contribute to NATO's new focus. 
What I called the third wave of enlargement consists of the future NATO 
enlargement. Ukraine and Georgia with some other countries are on the list of candidates 
for the third wave of the enlargement. The characteristics of the third wave are that the 
future members may not be necessarily in traditional European territories. NATO's future 
expansion will be discussed more in the last chapter. 
In evaluating each round of enlargement, it is important to distinguish the 
different capabilities new members contribute. In the remaining of the chapter, each 
country will be assessed by its value to the NATO from geostrategic, political and 
military capabilities. While geostrategic and military capabilities were sufficient enough 
to be accepted during the Cold War, the political and to some degree the specialized 
military capabilities became prominent for NATO's invitation to the aspiring countries. 
COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT 
Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain joined NATO during the Cold War. With the 
exception of Spain, the other three countries' membership to the alliance is closely 
related. All three countries' membership candidacy became serious after the magnitude of 
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the Soviet threat was well perceived. In that perceived threat, Korean War played a major 
role. NATO was the unique security arrangement for the defense of Europe. However, 
open conflict in Korea worried the allies in terms of NATO's ability to provide security 
during a total war with the Soviets. Thus, containment of the Soviets led to the 
enlargement of NATO within three years of its foundation. 
NATO's first wave of enlargement differs from the second wave in several ways. 
First, the decision maker for NATO enlargement in the 1950s was the big three of the 
alliance. Although consensus was sought in North Atlantic Council, the views of the 
standing group , US, UK and France was not opposed by any other members. Hence the 
enlargement was a product of the compromises of UK, France and US. Second, the 
enlargement had caused a reciprocal relation between NATO functions and new 
members. On the one hand, NATO's new functions, as a result of a changing security 
environment in 1950, brought the option of enlargement; on the other hand the accession 
of new members changed the basic characteristics of the alliance: NATO became more 
than an Atlantic alliance. The US presence in Europe was institutionalized. Third, NATO 
enlargement necessitated a dramatic institutional change in the first two rounds of the 
enlargement. NATO had to establish new commands to integrate the new members' 
militaries. In fact, the integrated military structure was able only to become effective after 
German accession. 
Lastly, the Cold War enlargement was aimed at increasing the military potential 
of the alliance and hence the goal was to satisfy the military functions of NATO. 
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MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA 
The membership issue was a key concern during the establishment of the alliance. 
The geographic criteria were proposed by the US to be the sole criteria for NATO 
membership. Any country located at the two coasts of the Atlantic could join NATO.2 
The criteria were aimed not to provoke the Soviets by including Italy and other centrally 
located European states. The rationale behind the criteria was that NATO was to be a 
defensive alliance of the North Atlantic countries. The countries outside of the Atlantic 
region would be excluded from the club regardless of their geostrategic position. In other 
words, membership was tied to the main function of the organization. The relaxation of 
the criteria came during the heyday of Korean War. First, the accession of Greece and 
Turkey, then Germany was at the center of discussions in North Atlantic Council. 
The Greek and Turkish membership option was realized after the failure of the 
association relation. NATO offered a partnership relation in order not to bear the cost of 
commitments towards these countries. However, strong opposition from Greece and 
Turkey and the threat of going neutral left no alternative but the enlargement option. 
THE ACCESSION OF GREECE 
Greece was invaded during the Cold War, and the post war years were as terrible 
as the invasion years due to a civil war between communist guerillas and monarchists. 
Smith says that Greece reflects the two pillar divide of the Europe at the time.3 The civil 
war ended with the victory of the right wing groups in Greece. Nevertheless, the 
communist threat was still looming. In such a context, NATO membership was a big help 
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for the domestic stabilization of the country.The NATO membership of Greece was more 
a geostrategic necessity than its political or military contribution to the alliance. If Greece 
were to fall to communism, NATO's Southern Flank would have been in great danger. 
The Soviets could have accessed the Mediterranean without the Turkish straits. 
Therefore, Greece's inclusion into NATO would secure Greece's political orientation to 
the West. 
THE ACCESSION OF TURKEY 
According to Melvyn P. Leffler, NATO's decision to accept Turkey as a full 
member was based on the US calculations that if the relations were not institutionalized 
and Turkey were not tied to the West via a formal structure, a golden opportunity from 
Turkish Geostrategic location and the military capability would be missed.4 Furthermore, 
Turkey was indispensable for Europe's defense, the protection of oil transportation from 
Middle East and NATO's communication lines in Mediterranean. Turkey's main driver 
for NATO membership was its ambition for the westernization. NATO was seen as a 
firm proof of westernization for Turkish policy makers. The Soviet Threat catalyzed her 
desire to be embedded to the West. Turkish contribution to the alliance was significant in 
all three capability areas. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Turkey's accession to NATO was a gradual policy beginning from the end of 
WWII. Turkey is located in the middle of Soviets, Middle East and Europe. The two 
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straits were the only sea passage for any naval power from the black sea to Mediterranean 
or vice versa. 
Turkish geostrategic location was important in that Turkey could block the 
Soviets' invasion of the Middle East. Without Turkish support, any US strategic assault 
from Egypt was infeasible. Moreover, Turkish armed forces could prevent the advance of 
the Red Army in a possible conflict and gaining the much needed time to be ready for a 
Strategic Air assault from the Suez area. NATO estimated a conventional Soviet 
superiority in Europe. Without US strategic air offensive, Soviets could easily invade the 
West Europe. Thus, Turkey was the key for distracting Soviets troops from the European 
Flank. In fact in 1950, Turkey acquired the offensive air capability to Southern Soviet 
forces. 
Political Capabilities 
Turkish neutrality was another concern for NATO. In a Cold War context, 
neutrality meant being on the other side of the curtain. If Turkey were not given security 
guarantees, it was almost certain that Turkey would remain neutral considering Soviets 
refrain from open threat to Turkey.5 A neutral Turkey would ease Soviet security 
concerns and risk NATO's offensive against the Soviets. 
Military Capabilities 
With the Truman doctrine, the US started huge military assistance between 1946 
and 1950 that enabled a well qualified Turkish Armed forces at the time. Turkish Army 
had the logistics, transportation system and communication systems were upgraded 
5
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making the army a mobile force. The Turkish Air Force acquired offensive capability 
against any aggression. The airfields were modernized to allow strategic bombardment 
aircraft. The Turkish Navy received considerable aid from the US as well, and thus 
gained the capability to stop a Soviet submarine passage from the straits. 
THE A CCESSION OF GERMANY 
After becoming a unified state in 1871, Germany had always been a major 
European power. The German question was the central issue of the intra-European 
struggle for a century. Germany was defeated in WWII, and its hegemonic ambitions and 
capabilities were thus destroyed well beyond expectations. Furthermore, Germany was at 
the center of bipolar division during the Cold War. NATO's acceptance of Germany as a 
full member was based on two different factors. First NATO would achieve a military 
balance with Soviets when Germany's contribution was guaranteed. And second, the 
German question would be settled forever by tying it to a supranational institution. 
Henceforth, Germany's accession enabled NATO to achieve its new function of 
deterrence and containment. The enlargement also satisfied a secondary function of 
eliminating the security dilemma among its members. NATO expansion to Germany was 
probably the most important enlargement round in the alliance history. In other words, a 
new stable European security system could only be developed by including Germany. 
NATO membership was important for Germany although it might mean deferral 
of German Unification for the time.6 German politicians knew that Germany needed to 
join all the economic, political and military organizations in Europe to legitimize 
Germany's international outlook. Without NATO, Germany could not play its role in the 
6
 John A. Reed, Germany and NATO (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 31. 
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bipolar system. Economic reconciliation had another factor for German desire in NATO. 
Moreover, NATO membership was to offset the domestic neutralization tendencies in 
n 
German society. Germany's capability contribution to NATO are as follows: 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Germany's central location in Europe made it indispensable for a successful 
forward strategy. NATO was expecting a conventional Soviet attack if a conflict arouse 
with Soviets. NATO strategy was based on slowing and blocking Soviets through as 
forward as possible to gain time for a counter-offensive under US strategic air 
bombardment. Henceforth, the German soil would be the main battle ground to stop the 
Soviet troops in a future war. 
Political Capabilities 
Germany's political contribution to NATO was much more important than its 
geostrategic and military contribution. The German question was much older than a 
Soviet question. And it needed to be addressed urgently. Smith suggests that 'German 
incorporation into the West European state system' could be achieved in an institutional Q 
environment. Allies were aware that Germany could become a trustable partner if her 
power and ambitions were checked by a hegemon. The US existence guaranteed an 
assurance for Germany's peaceful co-existence with other European states. 
7Smith, NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance, 125. 
8
 Ibid., 120. 
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Military Capabilities 
German armament and military contribution was imperative for the alliance's 
overall military capabilities. Considering the limited defense spending of the Europeans 
in 1950, the burden sharing by Germany was a much needed relief for NATO's European 
members recovery. Without German forces, NATO would be far from balancing Soviet 
power in Europe. 
THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN 
Spain's NATO endeavor was ambiguous in that Spain had a different historic 
experience than other European powers. Spain never had a problem either Soviets or 
Germans. Instead, Gil and Tulchin claims that "Spain is deeply concerned with a threat 
from the south, from the Maghreb."9 Having located in the southwest part of Europe, 
Spain developed a unique national identity which kept itself intact from European power 
struggles. 
Spain's entry to NATO was about when instead of whether. Although Spain had 
been the candidate for membership from the outset of NATO, Spain was a source of 
division at NATO at the heights of the Korean war. On one side, Americans were 
insisting to Spanish membership for NATO in order to use naval and air bases. On the 
other side, UK and France were strictly against the Spanish bid for NATO.10 The rift 
could not be resolved. The Spanish regime's ideological hostility to the West had 
thwarted the accession decision until the removal of the Franco regime. 
9
 Federico Guillermo Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry into NATO: Conflicting Political and 
Strategic Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 3. 
10
 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power : National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War, Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 417. 
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In the late 1970s, as Spanish democracy flourished, its NATO bid was revived as 
well. NATO accepted Spain mostly to secure its internal cohesion and solidarity. Hence, 
Spain membership was to satisfy NATO's internal functions. In fact, Spain was tied to 
the Western alliance with bilateral treaties. Spain signed a military agreement with the 
US known as 'Madrid Pacts. The pact enabled US forces stationed in Spain and thus 
securing Spain as a partner rather than adversary. Therefore, Spain's entry into NATO 
did not contribute too much from a military perspective.11 It is difficult to make a 
counterfactual argument here but one can easily expect that if the Franco Regime were 
not incorporated to the West through bilateral security relations with US, it might become 
a NATO member long before 1982. From Spain's perspective, joining NATO meant a 
precursor to bein embedded with the European Web of Institutions. Spain's security 
concern might have played a secondary role in her decision to be a NATO member, but 
the primary reason was more her fear of "decoupling from the North Atlantic strategic 
system."12 As a late comer, Spain did not have a chance to shape the organization. 
Therefore, Spain's entry to NATO was a clear political choice rather. NATO had its 
cheapest expansion with Spanish accession. Without no extra commitments, NATO 
secured the continuation of Spanish capability contribution to the alliance. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
The geostrategic value of Spain was evident for the alliance. She was located in a 
region that can control the crossroad of Mediterranean and the Atlantic. If a conflict arose 
11
 Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO, Strategic Facts and Political Realities " in 
Spain's Entry into NATO : Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives, ed. Federico Guillermo Gil and 
Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988). 
12
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with the Soviets, NATO could prevent Soviet naval forces use of Mediterranean, thus 
securing the south flank of the alliance. Spain territory provides a strategic depth to 
NATO's Central Europe flank. Reserve forces and logistic support units could be safely 
stationed in Spain. Meanwhile, transatlantic reinforcement of forces and equipment could 
be easily done via Spanish ports.Spain was a Euro- Atlantic nation and her presence in 
the alliance would be less controversial than any previous accession. 
Political Capabilities 
Smith suggests that Spain's real contribution to NATO was neither geostrategic 
nor military but political.13 The cohesion of NATO was in jeopardy as the European side 
of the alliance flourished and questioned the value of American leadership. Spain's 
accession provided fresh blood to the alliance. NATO showed its being the legitimate 
security organization by attracting new democracies. 
Military Capabilities 
Spain's military contribution to NATO stems from the air and naval base 
opportunities for NATO forces. Rota, Torrejon, Zaragoza and Moron hosted nearly 
1200 American personnel.14 However, it is worth it to reiterate that the alliance had 
already secured the bases before accepting Spain as a full member. The conventional 
military contribution of Spain is worthwhile as well. Spain had the sixth biggest armed 
forces among the allies at the time of accession. The Spanish Navy and air force had well 
13
 Ibid., 157. 
14
 Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO, Strategic Facts and Political Realities ", 127. 
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equipped forces that could strengthen NATO's maritime and air superiority over the 
Warsaw Pact. 
POST COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT 
As explained in Chapter 6, NATO was not considering an enlargement policy 
until the Bosnian War. NATO's European allies wanted to strengthen the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe as the main platform for security matters. All the 
European Countries had a seat in the OSCE. However, by the mid 1990s, it became clear 
that OSCE could not meet the security needs of the Central and Eastern European 
Countries. Especially after the Bosnian conflict, both NATO and CEEC realized the 
ineffectiveness of OSCE.15 The enlargement option began to be debated seriously at 
NATO's Brussels summit in 1994. The summit declaration highlighted that European 
integration could be achieved with NATO's leadership. In contrast to the Cold War era 
enlargement, NATO's second wave of enlargement should be assessed as a whole rather 
than individually. Although NATO enlargement occurred in several rounds, the aspiring 
countries had already made their bids before NATO's Madrid Summit in 1997. NATO's 
decision to extend the invitation gradually was a result of assessing each candidate's 
qualifications in detail. 1999, 2004 and 2009 enlargement rounds aimed at securing a 
whole and free Europe. As seen in figure 6, NATO's post cold war era enlargement has 
almost left unified the Europe. 
NATO's new function has both a political and security dimension as discussed in 
the previous chapter. The political dimension involved promoting democratic reforms in 
the ex-communist countries while the security dimension is tampering the security 
15
 Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 701. 
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concerns in Europe. Since the region is strategically located between Russia and 
European major powers, the stability of Central and Eastern Europe is key to the security 
of the whole Euro-Atlantic region. Henceforth, NATO's political goals played a major 
role in the post-Cold War enlargement. 
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The gradual enlargement approach, instead of a big-bang one, is the result of the 
aspiring countries' readiness to bear the membership responsibilities. NATO's 
assessment on the Central and East Europe was that only NATO membership could 
mitigate the security concern of the region. In addition, any exclusion in this region could 
establish new division line in Europe, therefore the prospect for NATO membership has 
not been closed for any country in the region. 
It is worth highlighting the capability contribution of the second wave countries 
here as well. After NATO's main adversary was diminished in 1990, NATO did not need 
a conventional military contribution. Indeed, NATO had excessive military capability 
that most of the members cut the defense spending and focus on economic developments. 
What NATO needed was political and military specialized capabilities that could make 
NATO achieve its new core function of Whole and Free Europe. As Thomas Szayna 
suggests, NATO's enlargement decision "stems from NATO's transformation into a 
conflict management organization and a tool for the reintegration of Europe."16 
Meanwhile, the public support for NATO membership in the aspiring countries 
i n 
was over 60 percent even before NATO decided to enlarge. All of the new countries are 
staunch proponents of the atlanticism. The new members assured the necessity of the 
transatlantic link in a time of major power shift in the international environment. 
According to the new members, the US power is the main deterrence factor of the 
alliance. On the contrary to expectations, the military contributions of these new 
countries to NATO's new missions were indeed substantial. 
16
 Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 : Determinants and Implications for Defense 
Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 20. 
17
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From the aspiring nations' perspective, NATO membership was the choice of 
necessity between a European and Transatlantic option.18 The Bosnian war underscored 
a European option's ineffectiveness in the security field. NATO was the instrumental tool 
for securing the sovereignty of the newly independent countries. 
According to Haerpfer, Milosinski and Wallace, neighboring countries, great 
powers, minorities and ethnic groups were security concerns for the aspiring NATO 
countries.19 A resurrected Russian threat was a primary consideration to join NATO. 
CEEC countries worried to be drawn into the Russian orbit once more in the future. 
Szayna proclaimed that strategic calculations and membership criteria played a 
prominent role for the post Cold War NATO expansion. According to him NATO 
evaluates future members in terms of power projection capability, alternative costs, 
associated risks and meeting the political, economic and military criteria set by NATO.20 
A close look at the second wave enlargement will show that all of the candidates had the 
power projection capability to the NATO's focus area, which was basically the Balkan 
Region at the time. Besides, the candidates were eager to join any crisis management 
21 
operation in order not to be seen as a free rider. 
One can raise a fair objection here in regard to the new members' military 
contribution to the NATO functions. For example, what might Slovakia or Albania be 
able to contribute to the collective defense of the alliance territory? The answer lies at the 
changing core function of NATO during the post Cold War era. Although the collective 
18
 Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, Enlarging NATO : The National Debates (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2001), 5. 
19
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20
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Shaping, 73. 
21
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defense is still the essence of the alliance, there is no risk of a conventional threat to the 
alliance territory. Rather, the new function of Whole and Free Europe takes precedence 
in the list of NATO functions. Therefore, the new members should be assessed according 
to their contribution to the crisis management besides their political and geostrategic 
capabilities. 
Additionally, the military contributions after the Cold War should be considered 
with NATO's transformation. NATO initiated a massive military transformation during 
the 1990s to acquire light, mobile forces suitable for the crisis management and 
unconventional operations. The new candidates were advantageous in acquiring mobile 
capabilities, in contrast to the older members due to the latter's huge sunk cost of 
conventional military. In sum, the new members of NATO are not the free-riders in the 
alliance, but rather are security providers. 
Before exploring each individual case, it would be beneficial to explain the 
roadmap and the mechanics of NATO enlargement in the second wave. NATO 
institutionalized the membership procedure in 1995 by conducting an enlargement study. 
The criteria, expectations and commitments are laid down explicitly in the study so as not 
to cause unrealistic hopes 
THE ROAD TO THE ENLARGEMENT 
There was no discussion of NATO enlargement in the early days of the post Cold 
War era. Jonathan Eyal states that "the idea that the central European countries should 
become members of NATO did not even cross any Western leader's mind in 1989, when 
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all the communist regimes collapsed."22 Indeed, NATO promised not to take advantage 
of the Russian weakness "that its loss in Europe would not be translated into a Western 
gain."23 
NACC was the alliance's first reaction to the developments in the new 
international structure. Without any restrictions, all countries in European continent were 
eligible for the membership. Later, there was no consensus among the allies on the 
decision for enlargement until 1995. While some countries favored the enlargement to 
increase their security, the others opposed it for fear of a Russian backlash. However, 
after NATO's Brussels summit in 1994, it became clear that NATO would add new 
members in the coming years. 
THE MECHANICS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Before the second wave of enlargement, NATO prepared an extensive analysis of 
the options for the enlargement and their likely impact on the alliance.NATO's Study on 
Enlargement was a stage setter for the enlargement. 
Study on NATO Enlargement 
The study was targeted both the alliance and the aspiring countries. It provided 
rationale and criteria for the enlargement.The Alliance's criteria for the membership were 
very restrictive. If a country could not contribute to the alliance security it would not be a 
candidate for membership. The point was made clear by US Secretary of State at the 
time, Madeline Albright, during a NATO meeting: 
22




This means that the first new members of NATO shall not be the last. If a 
European country is important to our security, and if it demonstrates that it is 
ready — politically, economically, and militarily — to contribute to our security, it 
will be in our interest to welcome it through the open door. This is central to the 
logic of a larger NATO. It also means that our approach to future rounds should 
be as pragmatic as our approach to the first. Our timetable should be driven not by 
political calculations, but by the performance of aspiring countries.24 
New members were to be not just the consumer of security but producers 
as well.25 NATO emphasizes that "the ability of prospective members to 
contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance's new missions will 
be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance."26 Especially 
after 9/11, aspirant nations are evaluated according to their political or military 
97 
contribution to NATO once they are accepted. However not explicit in the 
study, there are some informal criteria spelled out by NATO. Each candidate is 
• 98 
expected to meet the following qualifications: 
Political Qualifications 
Aspiring countries are expected to have a functioning democratic regime 
with effective democratic control of the military. The eastern European armies 24
 NATO, "Speech by the US Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright at the North Atlantic Council," 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980528d.htm (accesses Dec 29, 2009). 
25




 Moore, NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 54. 
28
 NATO, "Study on Enlargement." 
119 
were affiliated deeply with the communist parties during the Cold War. NATO 
insisted on a professional military with no ideological or political orientation. A 
functioning democracy would ensure the transparency and accountability of the 
regime and its armed forces. Meanwhile, new members are expected to resolve all 
territorial and minority disputes. NATO membership was a strong incentive for 
the aspiring countries to eliminate the sources of instability. 
Economic Qualifications 
All the aspiring countries had a command economy which prevented a 
sufficiently competitive diverse economy. NATO's insistence on free market 
economy was in line with the global orientation to liberalization and openness. 
Furthermore, a working integration requires the compatibility of political, 
economic and military domains. 
Military Qualifications 
In general, NATO's criteria for military qualifications were less strict than 
the political ones. Almost all of the new members of the second wave did not 
match NATO's military standards. However, the new countries were expected to 
achieve a minimum military requirement at interoperability of the forces and 
standardization of the equipment. All NATO members were required to contribute 
to the collective defense of the NATO territory. Therefore, new nations need to 
allocate a significant portion of their GDP to defense. 
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NATO membership urges the member nations to build constructive relationships 
with the neighboring countries. To give an example, as Polish Ambassador to the United 
States, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, asserts "Poland signed treaties of friendship with all its 
neighbors and actively participated in regional initiatives such as the Visegrad Triangle 
(including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and OSCE (the 
JQ 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)." 
Membership criteria were aimed at reducing the cost of integration. From an 
economic standpoint, NATO decision makers weigh the commitments of the alliance to 
the benefit of the enlargement. The new commitments entail a risk of altering the security 
environment in favor of more conflict. If the aspiring country has some unresolved 
territorial or minority problems with the non-NATO members, NATO can find itself in 
the center of new disputes with non-members. Therefore, NATO necessitates the 
establishment of friendly relations with neighbors for the candidates. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, NATO became a comprehensive security 
organization over time. The norms and values are important to maintain the healthy 
relations among the member states. NATO members resolve intra alliance disputes by 
using the established rules. Having the same identity is the primary factor to achieve the 
cohesion in NATO. Henceforth, NATO's insistence on a democratic government based 
on market economy is a requirement of its intra-alliance functions. 
Lastly, NATO membership is not a security warranty against a common threat. 
The membership also provides security from any threat from NATO. The self restraint is 
29
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one of the key practices of NATO. Members tend to avoid conflict with each other. In 
rare cases where a military conflict is probable, the club pressure force the adversaries to 
handle the problem diplomatically. 
The Enlargement Process 
NATO expansion takes place in three phases: In the first phase, aspiring countries 
that have an intention to be a member are invited to join the intensified dialogue with 
NATO. Nations demonstrate their willingness to join NATO by their participation or 
supporting of NATO activities. The invitation is offered via accession talks with a NATO 
team. During the talks, NATO reiterates the political, economic, military and legal 
preconditions for the membership. Candidates are expected to coordinate their policies 
with NATO. 
In the second phase, Aspiring countries are invited to participate in the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Through 
MAP and PARP, NATO and Aspiring Countries engage in common transactions and 
processes. New networks are constructed to diffuse background knowledge. NATO 
collects data on the countries' abilities to analyze how the membership affect NATO's 
article 5 commitment. The Social learning took place at this phase. The aspiring countries 
officially acknowledge their acceptance of the timetable and membership obligations. 
In the third phase, when a common identity is developed and qualifications are 
met, the new countries join NATO after accession protocols are signed by all NATO 
30
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members. Any deficiencies in minimum military requirements should be mitigated at this 
phase prior to NATO's extension of article 5 commitment. 
Intensified Dialogue 
The mechanism was invented in 1997 Madrid Summit. Intensified dialogue would 
"cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to 
T 1 
possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision." 
Currently, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro have intensified 
dialogues with NATO. 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
Having been established after the Washington Summit in 1999, Membership 
Action Plan is the principal vehicle to judge the qualifications of the aspiring nations. In 
NATO terms, MAP is "a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support 
tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance." MAP enables 
NATO to fully utilize the future members' capabilities by making them interoperable 
with NATO standards. Aspirant countries are entitled to achieve certain goals in political, 
economic, defense, security and legal areas. As for political and economic goals, MAP 
countries are required to solve territorial disputes with their neighbors, establish civil 
control on the military, achieve the international standards on human rights and sustain a 
stable free market economy. In defense and security sector, MAP countries are to 
31
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contribute to the NATO's functions. Aspiring countries are also expected to abide with 
the legal commitments in the alliance. 
MAP is a well defined timeline for NATO membership. Annual assessment 
provides both the aspiring country and NATO on the status of application. A country 
needs to participate in the MAP at least three years before accepted to the membership. 
THE ACCESSION OF POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC AND, HUNGARY 
These three states, called as Visegrad states, were prominent candidates for 
NATO membership. Democratic governance was well established in these countries. 
Although their militaries needed to be modernized before accession to NATO, their 
political value was big enough not to defer the enlargement decision further. Visegrad 
countries see NATO as the sole security guarantor in Europe. Although weakened, Russia 
was still a major concern if the democratization efforts fail. Additionally, Unified 
German power produced question marks especially in Poland and Czech Republic. That 
is why the first round of post Cold War enlargement was heavily supported by Germany. 
With an enlarged NATO, the lingering fears of Germany and Russia could easily be 
overcome in Europe. 
Poland was the most qualified country among these only candidates for NATO 
membership. It not only met the criteria for membership; in fact, its accession to NATO 
provided substantial geostrategic, political and military capabilities. Poland was the 
strongest supporter of the NATO operations after the Cold War. 
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Czech Republic's NATO aspiration is a good example of the fragmentation and 
integration dilemma in Europe.33 On the one hand, most of the ex-communist countries is 
aiming a homogeneous state, on the other hand, they need to integrate to supra-national 
bodies to ensure their newly gained sovereignty. Having been a victim of Soviet 
aggression during the Cold War, Czech Republic was seen a de facto NATO member. 
The Czechs did not have any territorial or ethnic tensions with their neighbors.34 They 
had a well developed economic and military power. Thus Czech membership to NATO 
was a done deal from both sides. Hungarian aspirations were overshadowed by 
Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. The nationalistic feelings were 
especially strong in Hungary, which raises doubts about future conflicts with non-NATO 
nations. Yet, the Hungarian desire for NATO membership surprised most of her critics 
and Hungary not only resolved minority disputes with her neighbors but also promoted 
regional integration in the East Europe. Table 1 shows the Visegrad States' contribution 
to NATO in terms of armed forces and military expenditures at the time of accession. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Geostrategic opportunities that Visegrad countries offer played a major role in 
NATO's decision to expand.35 Poland and Hungary are located between NATO territory 
and Russia. They could offer a buffer zone to the industrial core of the Europe. With 
33
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NATO enlargement, to quote Sean Kay, " the German, Polish and Russian security 
dilemmas are resolved." 
TABLE 1. Aspiring Countries' Population, Armed Forces, GDP, Military Expenditure 
as of 1999 



















10.3 54 99,900 1,970 2.0 
Hungary 10.2 51 85,100 1,400 1.6 
Poland 38.7 200 250,000 4,730 1.9 
Source: Data from US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 2005, http://www.state.gOv/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm 
Political Capabilities 
NATO membership triggered a high degree of regional cooperation in the 
Northeast Europe. Poland signed bilateral agreements with Lithuania and Germany to 
36
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resolve the territorial disputes. Accordingly, Hungary softened her relations with Russia, 
Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Romania over the Hungarian diaspora 
problem.37 
Military Capabilities 
However, the militaries of the Visegrad countries lacked the training and 
technological level of NATO members.38 These countries supported NATO's crisis 
management operations even before joining NATO.39 The new air and navy bases that 
these countries contribute enhances NATO's force projecting capabilities. Among the 
three aspiring nations, Poland had an above-average, Czech Republic had a NATO 
average and Hungary had a less than NATO average military capabilities.40 
THE ACCESSION OF BULGARIA AND ROMANIA 
Bulgaria and Romania can be singled out from the other 2004 candidates in their 
population size. Both countries were staunch supporters of the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. Even after the collapse of communism, the Bulgarian public saw their "Slavic 
elder brother" not as a threat.41 Bulgaria and Romania surprised many foreigners in their 
reconciliation with the free world. Romania peacefully handled its dispute with the 
Hungarian minority. Similarly, Bulgaria dropped its claims over Macedonia. Both 
37
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countries signed into the PfP and made available their resources to NATO way before 
membership. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are located in the problematic Balkan 
region. Ethnic struggles triggered major conflicts in the past. The accession of these 
countries would both satisfy their security concerns and also prevent any exploitation of 
the region from a foreign aggressor. To quote Bulgarian Ambassador to NATO, Emil 
Valev, the alliance's new members will "help keep the instability in the Western Balkans 
at bay and entail lower costs for the NATO-led missions in the region. " 42 Moreover, as 
Sandler suggests, the seven new members enhance NATO border security by reducing 
the NATO's external border length with non members.43 
Political Capabilities 
NATO's expansion to Bulgaria and Romania increased the dialogue in the Black 
Sea region. Historically and culturally having warm relations with Russia, these countries 
can be a catalyst to enhance the NATO-Russia cooperation. Tomislava Penkova states 
that Russians know that not all NATO members see herself as a threat: 
It is worth noting that, contrary to the previous Conception where NATO was 
perceived solely as a threat and Russia did not enjoy any support from inside the 
Alliance, during the two presidential mandates of Putin, some NATO members 
took Russia's part (see 2008 and 2009 NATO summits). It is on them that 
42
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Moscow can now count on when promoting its policy of conditional 
partnership.44 
Military Capabilities 
The new nations in the second wave brought substantial capabilities to 
meet NATO's primary function at the beginning of the new millennium. Even 
before being a member, aspiring nations contributions to NATO was significant. 
Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO's operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The two 
nations provided troops for the Afghanistan war Bulgaria offered a nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons decontamination unit to NATO for Afghanistan 
operation.45 It is not just Romania and Bulgaria who offered their capabilities for 
NATO use. As Douglas J. Feith emphasizes, " in 2001, seven of the nine NATO 
aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and eight of 
the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia. They have also shown much-appreciated 
solidarity with the United States through their contributions to Operation 
Enduring Freedom. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies to act. 
For operations in Afghanistan, the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence, 
over-flight rights, access to bases, and public diplomatic support."46 
In addition to NATO contribution, Bulgaria and Romania with five other 
partners established South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Through this 
44
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multinational brigade, Bulgaria and Romania fosters the regional security in 
South East Europe. 
NATO's counter terrorism role has been another factor to accept new 
nations as members. Gallagher believes that Bulgarian and Romanian accession 
to NATO had a major boost after 9/11 terrorist attacks.47 
THE ACCESSION OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND, ESTONIA 
The three Baltic States have unique characteristics in their bid for NATO 
memberships. They were treated as Soviet republic in the Cold War. Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia needed to be in the Euro-Atlantic club to ensure their sovereignty. Being 
occupied by Soviets during the WWII, the Baltic States had the golden opportunity to 
become a free member of international community after 1990. The NATO membership 
of Baltic States was on the table even during the previous round of enlargement. Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania achieved all the qualifications to become a full member. They 
resolved their border disputes with Russia and neighboring countries. Measures were 
taken to soften the tension with the Russian minority. All three countries allocate a 
substantial amount of their GDP to build the defense forces from scratch. However, the 
opposition to the Baltic membership continued in the alliance for a long time. The two 
issues regarding the Baltic States bid were worth mentioning here. The first is the fear of 
Russian step back to authoritarianism and second the over extension of NATO's 
collective defense commitment to a geography that may not be feasible to defend 
47
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militarily. The first concern was overcome when the Putin administration came into 
power in Russia. Putin reluctantly admitted the Baltic quest for NATO. The second 
concern was taken at risk by an assumption that Russia would not attack any NATO 
member in the near future. At least domestic and international conditions were not 
convenient for a Russian aggression to the most powerful alliance of the time. 
Das Kundu asserts that the national security documents of all three Baltic States 
underscores that "the national security and defense system of the Baltic states is to be 
developed as part of common European and transatlantic arrangements."49 Baltic states, 
like most of the second wave members, provide niche military capabilities instead of full-
scale contribution to NATO. 
Baltic membership to NATO was fiercely objected to by Russia on the grounds of 
jeopardizing her national security. However, after 2001, Russia softened its language by 
realizing that a NATO membership would be better than a neutral position for Baltic 
States. If they were to stay neutral, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were to be a source of 
instability hole in the European Security framework due to the tensions with the Russian 
minority, organized crime and territorial disputes. In fact, NATO membership of the 
Baltic States stabilized the NATO-Russia relations in the Northern Europe. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Baltic states are located in the northeastern part of the alliance and all three have 
borders with Russia. The collective defense of Baltic territory was a concern for NATO 
members due to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. 
48
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Aside from Bulgaria and Romania, the other five countries that joined NATO in 
2004 do not have a big impact on NATO's defense planning. These small European 
nations, though, revitalize the alliance in political terms. Stressing both US and European 
pillars, the new nations provide political assets for NATO's persistence as a valid Euro-
Atlantic security platform. Under the NATO security guarantees, the regional 
cooperation increased substantially due to the mitigation of security concerns in Baltic 
and Southeast Europe. 
Military Capabilities 
In terms of Baltic States military contribution to NATO, the niche 
capabilities are important to count: such as developing specialized ordinance and 
minesweeping units, chemical biological units and medical units.50 Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have joint defense initiatives to acquire niche capabilities. 
The Baltic battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Defense College, Baltic Air 
Surveillance center are developed jointly before assuming full NATO 
membership.51 
THE ACCESSION OF SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA 
Czech Republic and Slovakia broke up in 1992 peacefully. After that, two 
countries followed separate security policies. The elite support for NATO membership 
was not as strong in Slovakia as it was in Czech Republic. Furthermore, Slovakia treated 
50
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NATO enlargement mostly as a democratization issue while Czech Republic saw it as a 
security enhancement vehicle.52 NATO membership was seen mainly as a return to the 
west in Slovakia. Slovakia missed the first post Cold War round of enlargement due to its 
political problems. Slovenia was the most likely candidate for NATO membership among 
all the other aspiring countries. She gained her independence from ex-Yugoslavia after a 
short war in 1991. Since then, Slovenia aspired to be a permanent member of western 
economic and security institutions. NATO membership helped Slovenia solve its 
territorial disputes with Italy, Hungary and Austria.53 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Both Slovakia and Slovenia are located centrally in Europe. They are at the 
crossroads of Europe, thus preventing islands in the European security structure. 
Political Capabilities 
Support for NATO was not as strong as it was in other aspiring countries. Yet, the 
membership opportunity was the driving force for the democratization of these two 
countries. 
Military Capabilities 
Slovakia and Slovenia have military capabilities in accordance with their sizes. 
Although not comparable with the big countries in the alliance, the membership of these 
two countries did not bring extra commitments for NATO since they have adequate self 
52
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defense capabilities. The major upgrades in the weaponry and forces show that these 
new members would not be a consumer of the security if not contributors for the peace 
keeping operations in Southeast Europe and in out of Area operations. 
THE ACCESSION OF ALBANIA AND CROATIA 
Albania and Croatia were invited to NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008. Both 
countries joined NATO in 2009. The last round of enlargement stems from the 
geostrategic and political contribution of these countries to the alliance. NATO's relation 
with Albania goes back to 1992. Albania, first, joined the NACC and then PfP in 1994. 
The domestic support for NATO membership had been always above 95 percent in 
Albania.54 The membership process helped Albania to undertake major reforms in 
politics, economy and defense sectors. Albania's NATO aspirations rose dramatically 
after NATO's Kosovo operation.55 It is not an exaggeration that NATO membership 
enabled a constructive Albania in Southeast Europe. Croatia's NATO aspirations started 
when the country signed the Partnership for Peace program in 2000. NATO membership 
candidacy help Croatia achieve good neighborly relations in the region. 
Geostrategic Capabilities 
Albanian and Croatian membership fills the hole in the Balkan region for 
European security. Moreover, these two countries' cultural and historical relations with 
Serbia and Kosovo can help with enhancing NATO's constructive role in the Balkans. 
54
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Political Capabilities 
NATO membership helped democratization in Albania and Croatia. Especially 
after the death of Franjo Tudjman in 1999, Croatia followed a western foreign policy in 
the hopes of being admitted to the alliance. 
Military Capabilities 
Albania's and Croatia's contributions to NATO before being full members were 
worthwhile. Albania supported NATO's operation in Kosovo in 1999, and the ongoing 
peace keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 
NATO established a new headquarter to support its presence in Kosovo as well. Croatia 
has joined the NATO-led operations actively as well. She provided sea /air bases and 
over flight rights for NATO operations, supported Afghanistan operation with 300 troops 
and donated weapons to Iraqi military through NTM-I.56 
Table-2 summarizes the seven new countries' contribution to NATO after the 
2004 enlargement in terms of armed forces and military expenditures at the time of 
accession. 
CONCLUSION 
NATO's post Cold War enlargement was intended to achieve a political-military 
function. NATO used membership as a carrot for some of its aspiring members to 
establish stability in Europe. Without membership, these countries would never feel safe 
to foster the democracy. Similarly, NATO filled its military capability gaps fort the new 
56
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kind of missions. Although most of the new countries do not have significant militaries, 
they can provide specialized military capabilities for NATO's evolving unconventional 
tasks at the strategic distances. 
TABLE 2. New members' Population, Armed Forces, GDP, Military Expenditure 
Country People Armed Forces Gross Military ME/GDP 
(AF) Domestic Expenditures 
Product (ME) 
(GDP) Million $ 
Million $ 
Millions Thousands Constant Constant % 
2005 2005 
Bulgaria 7.5 42 25,600 645 2.5 
Estonia 1.3 4 12,700 194 1.5 
Latvia 2.3 6 14,500 185 1.3 
Lithuania 3.6 11 23,800 329 1.4 
Romania 22.4 91 95,000 1,920 2.0 
Slovakia 5.4 18 44,700 757 1.7 
Slovenia 2.0 6 33,700 500 1.5 
Source: Data from US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 2005, http://www.state.gOv/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm 
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NATO's Cold War era enlargement was aimed to cope with the Soviet Union. All 
the aspiring countries are assessed according to whether their accession would help when 
deterring and containing its main rival. The geostrategic, military and political 
capabilities were compared with NATO's committeemen to the new members. Not all 
aspiring countries were to be accepted due to the high cost of the collective defense. The 
values are of secondary importance when assessing each country's eligibility for 
membership. Since the containment of Soviet power in all aspect was NATO's central 
goal, NATO's internal functions did not get much attention during the Cold War. 
Greece, Turkey and Germany were not among the founder members of the NATO 
in 1949, but they were always thought to be of strategic importance to the west. UK and 
then US had bilateral security ties with Greece and Turkey before and after the war. 
Occupation powers still had troops in German soil. However, these three countries were 
not included into the western security ring initially due to the defensive function of 
NATO at its inception. As mentioned above, NATO would not make new commitments 
to new countries although they were strategically important. What made the difference in 
the 1950s was a changing perception of NATO's role in the new international context. 
With the open aggression in Korea, NATO members concluded that although being a 
defensive organization, NATO's security depended on the containment of the threat. 
Thus, Greek, Turkish and German membership can be understood by a shift in NATO's 
strategy from collective defense to an effective deterrence and containment of the 
enemy. When containing Soviet Union the periphery became as important as the core of 
the Western Alliance. While countries at the periphery could limit Soviets expansion, the 
core nations in the western alliance could raise the forces to punish the aggressor. 
NATO's second wave enlargement was more value oriented. There was not a 
major power threat to any member of the alliance. Rather the stability of the neighboring 
eastern Europe was an issue in NATO's new security agenda. Since the threat was not 
directly militarily, NATO's response was enhancing security through cooperation and 
integration. Thus, post Cold War enlargement was aimed at exporting stability to the 
newly independent nations to the east. The diminishing ideological divide between east 
and west enabled NATO to follow its new function of Whole and Free Europe. 
NATO was, indeed, rigid on the political qualifications of the aspiring countries . 
Military qualifications played a secondary role in most of the cases. As for economic 
criteria, NATO did not raise any objection for any under qualified country. The criteria 
are closely related to what NATO wants to achieve from enlargement: A political-
military function of'Whole and Free Europe'. 
NATO became an alliance of 28 nations with the accession of Albania and Croatia 
in March 2009. The alliance's new functions are not just protecting the territory of its 
members but the social welfare and human rights from new asymmetrical threats. The 
alliance's new outlook is no longer just the Euro-Atlantic region. Every source of 
instability throughout the globe is now a concern for NATO. The Black Sea region, 
Caucuses and Central Asia will be NATO's strongest new focus in the coming decade. 
Whether NATO will enlarge further depends on NATO's willingness to fill the capability 
gap by using its members' contribution. 
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CHAPTER V 
KOREAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Korean War and its implications for NATO enlargement will be explored in 
this case study. The chapter examines whether the capabilities of the new members in the 
aftermath of the Korean war could fulfill NATO's main function or not. To do so, the 
change in security environment, NATO's new functions and capability requirements are 
identified in the chapter. From 1945 till 1960, the security environment and 
accompanying challenges changed drastically. Although North Atlantic Treaty was 
signed in 1949, the security threats one year later were substantially different than it was 
in 1949. Hence, NATO's functional evolution in the first five years was very important. 
Many essential components of the current NATO were put in place in the early years of 
1950s.The Korean War was a turning point in Cold War history. As Jervis suggests, "if 
the war had not taken place, no other events that were likely to have occurred would have 
produced the effects that Korea did."1 NATO faced a major test after one year of its 
establishment. The Korean War in 1950 exacerbated the tension in Europe. NATO was 
not properly equipped to undertake the new threats posed by the Soviet Union. 
THE WAR IN KOREA 
Korea was occupied for more than 40 years by Japan until 1945. According with 
the WWII alliance agreement, the Soviets liberated Korea from Japanese forces in the 
1
 Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 
(1980): 563. 
northern part of 38th parallel and US took control of the south part accordingly. After 
WWII, the first goal for the international community was to unite the country. However, 
as the tensions mounted between US and Soviet Union, the chances of a united Korea 
diminished along with the chance of Germany's unification. Although UN sponsored free 
elections were held and a central government took control of the country in 1948, a 
separate communist regime was established in the north with strong backing from Soviet 
Union. After 1948, both sides attempted to unite the country under its authority. The 
West had an interest in keeping Korea democratic but the last US forces left the country 
in 1949. 
On June 25, 1950, North Korean army crossed the dividing line of 38lh parallel 
and attacked the South Korea. In less than a month, the North was able to capture Seoul. 
Alarmed with the open communist aggression, the US used the opportunity of Soviets' 
absence in the UN Security Council in order to pass a resolution to condemn the attack. 
UN resolution called the contribution of all members to defend the South Korea. 
Dominated mainly by US forces, the UN took control of Seoul in October 1950 and 
pushed back the North Koreans to the pre-war borders. However, UN forces' further 
progress was halted when the Chinese entered the war in favor of the North in the late 
October. By the mid 1951, the war became a stalemate. Neither side had substantial 
achievement. The armistice was able to be signed after Stalin's death in 1953. 
There are different views on the source of the conflict. Some see the conflict as a 
pure civil war, ended with an international intervention, while other think it as a covert 
2
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Magazine of History 14, no. 3 (2000): 11. 
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Soviet aggression against the free world.3 Whatever the real origin of the war, it is a fact 
that Soviet union tested the West's determination in Korea. Lawrence S. Kaplan suggests 
that "the Truman administration assumed that Stalin had incited the North Koreans to test 
NATO's resolve."4 The war revealed the Soviets revolutionary revisionism in the key 
confrontational regions. 
US intervention in Korea was the reflection of major lessons derived from the 
pre-WWII era. According to Truman administration, there was a perfect analogy between 
what Soviets was trying to achieve in Korea and Nazi invasions before 1939. Were the 
west to appease the aggressor, she would have to pay a higher price later.5 In other words, 
it would be very logical to expect the next war in Europe through a divided Germany, in 
the same way a divided Korea ended up with a war. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KOREAN WAR 
What makes Korean war a milestone in NATO history is its being a catalysis in 
NATO's functional and geographical evolution. Before the Korean war, NATO was more 
about a political organization aimed at coordinating policies to provide security which is 
essential for economic recovery. The allies did not see the Soviet threat as imminent. 
However with the Korean War, NATO concluded that the danger to the European 
security was much closer than the earlier assessments. The Korean war accelerated the 
evolution of NATO's role and missions. 
3
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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The security environment changed substantially after the Korean war. Soviet 
Union was no longer a concern for NATO but a direct threat to the alliance's existence. 
The era between 1945 and 1950 in Europe can be categorized as rehabilitation of the 
nation states to the new world order. Along with the economic devastation, Europe now 
faced a more powerful Russia, a partition based on ideological lines, and a defeated but 
unresolved German question. Not a single country in Europe could handle the above 
challenges by itself. Ironically, the sources of conflict provided the venue for cooperation 
in the Europe. 
The common concern for European powers was securing their sovereignty. 
Besides the Soviet threat each country had different interests. The UK was aware of its 
declining power but still wanted to play an equal role along with US and Soviet Union. 
France was looking to be the leading country in Europe by keeping Germany down. And 
the US was more concerned about containing Soviet power globally. However, without 
pooling the capabilities, the chances of success were too low considering the scale of 
challenges. Thus, NATO was founded as a political reassurance in the Euro-Atlantic 
region. 
In regard to the common threat, The US and NATO did not adequately assess or 
evaluate the level of threat until the North Korean attack. The Soviets were considered a 
state with hostile intentions, however it was thought to be weak and would not choose a 
direct military conflict with the west in the near future. European and American leaders 
assumed that if a war with the USSR were to ever happen, it would be a total war 
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affecting all the European continent.6 Were that to happen, the American nuclear 
monolopy and strategic air assets were considered more than enough to punish the 
aggressor. Meanwhile, few policymakers would be willing to allocate resources to the 
military in a post war period. 
The war confirmed NATO's fears on Soviet intentions. The coincidence with the 
publications of US NSC-68 document drew a global attention. The document highlights 
the logic of Western thinking in behind the military requirements as a result of the 
Korean War: 
Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a 
much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is 
more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the 
Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the 
Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in 
Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area 
sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to 
delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a 
bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.7 
NATO'S REACTION 
The whole security paradigm of NATO was modified as a result of the Korean 
war. In Lord Ismay's words, "for NATO the period of cautious optimism and slow 
6
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methodical progress was over" after the North Korea assault began in 1950.8 The 
similarities of the Korean peninsula and Germany were striking. Korea had the same post 
Cold War division between a communist and a non-communist authority. In both 
geographies, Communist forces and Western forces had direct contact with each other. 
The communist authority of the country was armed and had the intentions to unite the 
country with force under the communist regime. If the Soviets were to attack to West 
Germany by using East German forces, it would be impossible to block the advance of 
communist forces in the Western Europe. 
Thus, the allies were alarmed with the communist intervention in a country where 
US interests were highly evident. More importantly, NATO's European partners feared 
from the ineffectiveness of the security guarantees of NATO if the US was stuck with 
another war in another region of the globe.9 Europe could easily become a victim of a 
power struggle in Asia. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR 
During its first years, NATO had the perception that although the allies did not 
have large scale standing militaries, the industrial potential and the nuclear stockpile 
would provide security in Europe without undergoing an expensive defense buildup.10 
The Korean war was the solid proof of the Soviet capacity and intention to spread 
communism using force. The war united Western support for the collective action against 
Communism. The war transformed NATO from a political organization to a political-
8
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military organization. At the end of 1955, NATO was transformed into a military 
behemoth from a paper commitment. 
INSTITUTIONALIZING NATO 
NATO's basic documents emphasize that the strategic goal during the Korean war 
was "to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense planning."11 In 1951, 
the office of the Secretary General was established. Before then, NATO did not have a 
permanent representative of the organization which prevented the effective execution of 
the policies. However, with the new Secretary General, NATO had the ability to talk in 
one voice and enhance political consultation in the alliance. In 1951, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was appointed as the head of Supreme Allied Command Europe. The allies, 
for the first time in the history of alliances, established a concrete example of a 
multinational military integration. The appointment of Eisenhower as S ACEUER was a 
sign of US commitment to the defense of Europe in the future as well. 
RESOLVING GERMAN QUESTION 
If there is one issue that is at the center of the European Security dilemma before 
and after WWII, it is without any doubt the accommodation of Germany into the 
international structure. With her geostrategic location, industrial base and human 
resources, Germany would always be one of the leading powers in Europe. Considering 
her potential, Germany's defeat in WWII did not offset the concerns of either France or 
other European powers. The tampering of the security dilemma in Europe, as mainly 
11
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referred as German question, necessitated a permanent solution to Germany's role in 
Europe. It is in this context that a European integration was thought to be a viable 
solution to achieve peace in Europe. The US and Britain had the idea of integrating 
Germany into the West long before the Korean war. However, it is the Korean War that 
provided the impetus for the integration. French opposition to German rearmament was 
only softened after the Korean War. France accepted German military buildup if there 
were to be a multinational oversight of the latter's military. 
With the Korean intervention, the US gained credibility on holding her security 
commitment. The European allies realized that the US commitment to NATO had sound 
bases. Additionally, the shock of war almost guaranteed the public support for the 
unpopular defense increases just a couple years after the WWII.12 
There are also a few unintended consequences of the Korean War. First, German 
accession to NATO practically put a stop to the German unification efforts. Second, the 
massive defense buildup accelerated the arms race between the USSR and the West.13 
Third, the Warsaw pact was founded, in May 1955,as a counter organization to NATO by 
the participation of USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic, Poland, Romania, and the Czechoslovak Republic. 
NATO'S NEW FUNCTIONS AFTER THE WAR 
Until the Korean War, Jersey asserts that NATO was not an organization against 
the Soviet Union.14 The primary function of NATO was to achieve security by means of 
12
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collective defense commitments. The mismatch between the Soviet threat and NATO's 
capabilities were evident only with the Korean war. NATO's new function called for 
securing the Euro-Atlantic region with credible deterrence and containment of the enemy. 
While containment is a political instrument to limit the Soviet Power in every aspect, 
deterrence is the military counterpart of containment which is to convince the enemy that 
any aggression would bring more harm than benefits.15 The pledge for collective defense 
would not be adequate to deter the Soviets. The rationale behind the new function was the 
perception of the domino effect. Had Soviets been able to chew a small piece by limited 
war, then it would be more assertive and aggressive in the next steps. Thus, if the Soviets 
dared to start a proxy war in Germany or South East Europe, the next country to fall to 
communism would be either France, Italy, or any other country in the West Europe. 
What the Korean War tells us is that there would not be a deterrence based purely 
on the nuclear retaliation concept. The USSR did not hesitate to trigger a war in a region 
where US interests involved openly. The Soviets used North Korean satellite regime to 
attack, instead of a direct confrontation with the US. The lack of credible conventional 
forces triggered the Soviets' adventure. According to Daniel J. Meador, Stalin was 
resisting the North Korean request for an invasion, but after the Soviet Atomic bomb and 
the withdrawal of US troops from Korea, Stalin changed his position and supported the 
North's aggression.16 In fact, all the war plans were made by Soviet advisors. 
The Korean War is a perfect example of the deterrence failure. As, Thomas 
Schelling suggests, deterrence can be efficacious if it is credible, and its credibility 
l5Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "The Frg and NATO: Between Security Dependence and Security Partnership," 
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depends on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making the 
threat.17 
NATO's answer to the Korean war was to install a credible deterrence system and 
to exploit every weaknesses of Soviet Union in order to contain it effectively. Hence, the 
Korean war urged NATO to raise the defense spending in order to match the 
conventional military power of Soviet Union in the Europe. NATO's 1952 Strategic 
Guidance clearly demonstrates the changing nature of NATO's function: 
North Atlantic Treaty Nations will develop and mobilize their combined strength 
with the object of achieving the earliest defeat of the USSR and the attainment of 
1 8 
allied war objectives. 
Thus, Korea was a limited war fought with conventional weapons. The 
implications of this kind of limited war were tremendous for European countries. A 
military capability based on air power would not guarantee the security if the aggressor's 
intention was to wage limited war. A balanced force structure of Army, Navy and Air 
Force was instrumental for a successful deterrence.19 The loss of American nuclear 
monopoly also complicated the defense of Europe. There was no longer a cheap way of 
deterring Soviet Union. The need for a well prepared conventional military force was 
clear by 1951. NATO countries had to exploit all options to increase their defense levels. 
And, as expected, to quote Robert Jervis, "the first meeting of the NATO Council after 
17
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the start of the war agreed to develop a large army, and three months later a central 
headquarters was established."20 
What worried NATO most was the possibility of a Soviet miscalculation that 
could end up with a total war. NATO's peacetime readiness was imperative in the face of 
such miscalculations. Otherwise, once the Soviets were to invade NATO territory, it 
would be much more costly to liberate the occupied countries, if not impossible. 
Besides, security in Western Europe including Germany was a public good. An 
attack on Germany would in practice initiate a war between NATO and the Soviet Union. 
If Germany had been kept out of the alliance, she would be a free rider of the security. 
However, a huge allocation of resources to defense would undermine the economic 
recovery of Europe. Therefore European allies needed new partners to share the burden 
of defending Europe. 
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
While the military buildup was necessary to match the Soviet military 
capabilities, it had the risk of offsetting the economic recovery in Europe. When NATO 
started the military buildup, it became clear that European allies would not reach the 
defense goals without jeopardizing the economic recovery. On the one hand, NATO's 
containment of the Soviet Union in the early 1950s could wipe off all the benefits of the 
Marshal plan.21 On the other hand, the increasing number of key US policymakers voiced 
the concern on US bearing the cost of defending Europe while European partners are free 
20
 Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 580. 
21
 Walter Lafeber, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context in American Historians Ant the Atlantic 
Alliance " in American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent, OH: Kent State 
University Press, 1991), 39. 
149 
riding.22 The unbalanced burden-sharing among the allies force NATO to look for 
external capability accumulation. Hence, the desired conventional military capability 
could be achieved via the new accessions to the alliance. A NATO expansion would offer 
deterrence in Europe less costly than the existing NATO structure. To summarize, NATO 
countries had fourteen ill-equipped divisions in Europe in 1949. As of 1953, there were 
fifteen well-trained divisions of which 6 were Americans. The average defense 
spending rose from 5.5 percent of GNP to 12 percent GNP.24 
In addition to force contributions from nations, NATO invested heavily from its 
common funds into the fixed infrastructure. In his address to ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Bonn, May 1957, NATO Secretary General at the time 
highlighted the accomplishments of NATO as a result of armament and new accessions: 
In April 1952 there were less than 20 airfields available to NATO forces. 
Today there are 150 usable by all types of aircraft. 
In the communications field, 5,500 miles of land-lines, 1,250 
miles of submarine cables, 1,940 miles of radio links have been added to 
the existing civilian networks. 
In April 1952 there were no POL pipelines or storage facilities. 
There are now 2,840 miles of pipeline, and storage facilities for 30 million 
imperial gallons. 
22
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GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT 
NATO's new functions necessitated new members although NATO originally 
was founded as an alliance of North Atlantic region. Article 10 of the Washington treaty 
left the door open to the new members; the rationale for the enlargement was to enhance 
the Euro-Atlantic security by acquiring new contributions. The Article says that "any 
European state may be invited to join the Treaty if all the members agree that it is in a 
position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. It was under this 
provision that invitations were extended to Greece and Turkey in 1951 ."26 
NATO expansion discussions began immediately after the North Korean 
aggression. NATO archives highlight that the main discussion in the North Atlantic 
Council were: 
the political and diplomatic aspects of the accession of Greece and 
Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance (1950/1951); 
the various aspects of German participation in western defence and 
the progress of negotiations with the German Federal Government in 
regard to the part that Germany might assume in the common defence 
(1950 and later).27 
Three countries were accepted to NATO by 1955: Greece, Turkey and Germany. 
Although all three new members brought new contributions to the alliance, there were 
some differences in their contribution. German accession stemmed mostly from its 
military value and less from Germany's strategic location. Indeed, the Federal Republic 
26
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of Germany was hosting occupation forces from US, UK and France already at the time 
of its accession to NATO. Therefore, German territory would no doubt be a battlefield in 
a future war with Soviets. However, German industrial and military capability was 
desperately needed to counterbalance the Red Army. Considering the American global 
commitments in Asia, German membership issue could not be deferred further. 
However, Turkish and Greek membership was a factor of geostrategic 
considerations. These two countries would help allies to conduct effective counter 
offensive operations to the deep inside Russia from the south flank. 
GERMANTS ACCESSION TO NATO 
From the German perspective, Germany's NATO bid is a policy of "self restraint 
and multilateralism." Two important factors shaped West Germany's security policy 
after the WWII: The geostrategic location of Germany in the middle of Europe and the 
catastrophes of the past that must be avoided in the future.29 Germany should be neither 
too weak to tempt the threats of the big powers nor too powerful to worry the rivals and 
thus left alone in the Europe. Self restriction is needed to accommodate the neighboring 
countries interests. France had special concerns about Germany's rise once again. In that 
respect NATO could reinforce German self restraint by allowing the alliance to oversee 
the rearmament of Germany. In regard to the multilateralism, NATO was the most 
effective way to broaden the venue for autonomy. WWII put Germany's sovereignty 
under the scrutiny of the four winning powers: France, UK, US and USSR. The German 
state could not follow any independent policy in 1950s because of the occupation 
28
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authority. The only way to circumvent the occupation authority was through the 
international institutions of which NATO was the most important one at that time. 
Acceptance into NATO was a major victory for Germany at a time when it did 
not have the right to stand equally with other states. NATO membership enabled both 
Germany's sovereignty and rearmament. Germany was not an occupied country anymore 
but rather an indispensable ally of the west against the USSR. 
German membership was on the alliance's agenda along with the North Korean 
aggression. Before the Korean War, the prospect of German integration with the West 
was very little. France and the UK were "comfortable with the status quo" in the 
Europe.30 It was only when the Korean war broke out that European allies realized that 
the security of Europe could only be achieved through German contribution to the 
alliance. By 1950, the defense of Europe became more important than political settlement 
with Germany. Hence, NATO could not match the Soviet military power without the 
German military capabilities. Without Germany's industrial and geostrategic 
contribution, NATO would remain "more of a screen than a shield."31 
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY 
German participation in NATO was fiercely opposed by France and small 
European countries. France did not want a revitalization of its former enemy. As a middle 
ground, France offered the Pleven plan which calls for a European Defense 
30
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Community. Germany was to be allowed to join the EDC without having an 
operational planning capability. Furthermore, Britain and US extended security 
guarantees to make EDC a viable organization. From NATO's perspective, as long as it 
could guarantee Germany's capabilities, any solution would be suitable. Paradoxically 
the EDC treaty was killed by its own supporter, France, when she did not ratify the treaty 
in 1954. Stephan Keukeleire claims that the fear of German domination was the main 
reason for France's decision especially considering the absence of UK in EDC. 
Henceforth, NATO proceeded with the accession of Germany into the alliance. The 
German military was to be embedded into NATO command structure instead of allowing 
an independent German Armed Forces. Germany would not have a separate operational 
planning capability. All the German military forces would be integrated into the NATO 
military command. Integrated military command helped eliminate the other members 
concern on Germany's rearmament. 
NATO expansion during the Cold War was also gaining forward defense 
capability, which was a direct result of the Korean War. As Lord Ismay wrote, "from a 
military point of view, the main argument in favor of participation was that NATO's 
forward strategy made it imperative to defend Europe on German soil: this was hardly 
conceivable without the military and political participation of the German Federal 
Republic."34 
In a bipolar thinking, the German membership to NATO prevented a potential 
German alignment with Soviets in the future. In other words, German membership is a 
32
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means of "preventive diplomacy."35 From a Soviet perspective, neutrality was the 
linchpin for a unified Germany. However, neutrality would mean depriving the West of 
German resources, and thus was unacceptable to the other three occupying powers. 
TURKEY'S A CCESSION TO NA TO 
Turkey's NATO aspirations peaked especially after the USSR asked for a new 
agreement to control the Turkish straits. Turkey refused to alter the existing Montreux 
agreement. The Soviet intimidation was a key factor for Turkey to integrate the Euro-
Atlantic security apparatus. NATO's Strategic Guidance in 1952 emphasizes the 
importance of Turkey for NATO's security in that: 
The enemy will devote considerable effort to the conquest of Turkey, thus 
depriving the Allies of their dominating positions on the Black Sea, athwart the 
direct approaches to the Middle East, and of the air bases and other facilities 
which Turkey provides. The possession or neutralization of Turkey would give 
the enemy access to the Mediterranean and greater freedom of operation against 
the Middle East. In particular it would threaten important Allied oil producing 
areas, as well as extending the enemy's air warning cover and the range of his air 
operation.36 
Turkish accession to NATO provided NATO with "19 newly-equipped and well-
trained divisions."37 But more importantly, Turkey divided the Soviet Union's troops and 
concentration from European flank. In addition to European defense, UK supported 
35
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Turkish membership due to securing the Middle East from Soviet control. Turkish 
military and geostrategic capabilities were essential to protect Middle East oil. Therefore, 
the UK insisted on Turkey joining Middle East Command alongside NATO.38 
GREECE 'S ACCESSION TO NA TO 
Greece's NATO membership was tied directly to Turkey's membership. NATO 
allies concluded that any southern Europe enlargement should include Greece and Turkey 
together. Although Greek military contribution to NATO would be less than a Turkish 
one, NATO would not afford a neutral non-aligned Mediterranean country. 
Turkey and Greece contributed 25 divisions to NATO that made the alliance 
superior to USSR in the southeast flank of Europe.39 In fact, Turkey and Greece were in 
one sense the main catalyst of the US new non-isolationist Truman doctrine. Thus it is 
fair to claim that US commitment to Greece and Turkey in 1947 was the start of a new 
European security structure. 
The US initially tried a bilateral security arrangement with Turkey.40 But fierce 
Turkish reaction to anything short of full membership to NATO forced the US and other 
allies to consider an associate membership for both Turkey and Greece. NATO did not 
want to extend its commitment to the Greece and Turkey if their capabilities would be 
guaranteed by other means. However, the solution of associate membership did not 
satisfy the aspiring two nations. Therefore full membership remained the only viable 
38
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option to extend security guarantees to Greece and Turkey. After Greek and Turkish 
accession NATO established Land Forces South Eastern Europe Command, under 
Commander-in-Chief South in Izmir/Turkey in 1952.41 
CONCLUSION 
The war caused 'a new equilibrium' in the international structure.42 It became a 
global, more ideological and more expensive one.43 Until the Korean War, NATO was, 
in fact, an alliance of 'one for all'. The US was practically committed to providing the 
West European Security under the legal binding of NATO treaty. However, the Korean 
War changed the paradigm of NATO by enforcing the organization into an 'all for one' 
alliance. The allies were no longer able to free ride without contributing the Euro-Atlantic 
security. The need for new members was obvious in light of European members' 
incapacity to generate the required capabilities. 
Additionally, as a result of the war, a significant aspect of state sovereignty is 
surrendered to NATO to ensure the security of the members. The Supreme Commanders 
of NATO could plan, and conduct operations using the members' national forces. The 
allocation of national military forces to NATO during peacetime was important in that 
members voluntarily accepted the superiority of NATO to the state in exchange for 
protection from the aggressor. 
The Korean War had paramount impact on the structure and functions of NATO 
as well. During 1950-53, NATO underwent huge organizational transformation. During 
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42
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the war, NATO revised its main function from a collective defense based on the 
commitments into an effective deterrence and containment function. The capability 
requirements were met partly by military integration and accompanying defense buildup. 
However, the remaining capability gap between NATO and Soviet Union was relieved 
with the accession of Greece, Turkey and Germany. To quote Kaplan, "Greece and 
Turkey, on the southeastern flank, and Germany, in the center, joined the alliance to 
fulfill the new functions of NATO."44 
As shown in the previous sections, NATO did not directly offer membership to 
the aspiring countries. Instead, NATO first looked for a solution to acquire the 
capabilities with the least costly option. Thus, the European Defense Community in the 
case of Germany and Associate membership in the case of Greece and Turkey were an 
integration mechanism in which NATO could access all the capabilities of the embedded 
country without making full collective defense commitment. However, the failure of the 
mentioned alternatives left alone the enlargement option for NATO. In other words, in all 
three accessions, the capability contribution, either from military, political or geostrategic 
perspective outweighed the cost of commitments to the aspiring countries. 
The Korean War highlighted that US nuclear deterrence might not work for 
Soviets indirect aggression. A limited, local, war could happen in Europe as it is seen by 
Korean War. The war forced NATO to fill the security gap in Europe. If acted lately, the 
Soviets could have penetrated into Greece and Turkey in the south either with open 
aggression or by covert action. That might trigger a domino effect across the globe 
putting NATO in a disadvantageous position. 
44
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Lastly, the Korean War is proof of the consequences when there is a mismatch 
between capabilities and functions. NATO's collective defense posture would be a 
hollow promise if not supported by a commensurate military force level. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE BOSNIAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In the second case study, the implications of the Bosnian War on NATO's 
functional and geographical enlargement will be explored. The change in the security 
environment after the Bosnian war, NATO's main functions and capability requirements 
are identified accordingly. The chapter will examine why NATO changed its policy from 
not to enlarge in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union to an ambitious 
enlargement effort after the Bosnian war. The accession of new members are analyzed 
according to their ability to contribute to the NATO's main function in the new security 
environment. 
The Yugoslavian crisis was the result of Europe's neglect and miscalculation. 
Preoccupied with the collapse of communism and the ousting of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait, Europe did not evaluate the magnitude of the problems in Yugoslavia. Although 
expected, the brutality of the Bosnian war caused enormous reaction in European 
countries. Initially, NATO was reluctant to intervene to the conflict. The tipping point for 
NATO came only after the massacre of Srebrenica. Indeed, if the US had not put its 
weight on the issue, the conflict might not have ended in 1995. The operation Deliberate 
Force brought the Serbs to the peace table, but the damage to the alliance's credibility 
had already been made. 
The Bosnian War demonstrated the alliance's inability to wage an 
unconventional war. First of all, NATO did not have the political solidarity when 
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it came to risking lives to fulfill a commitment. Secondly, there was a 
transatlantic technological gap. The allies did not have adequate military assets to 
wage war along with the US forces. Therefore, NATO had to rely on American 
assets to conduct the war. The capability gap resurfaced before the Kosovo war. 
The gap was evident when the US President declared that NATO was not the 
proper tool to intervene Afghanistan. Although NATO offered its help to 
Americans, the US formed a coalition of those willing to wage the war. Rebecca 
Moore claims that "for some at the Pentagon, the principal lesson of the 1999 
Kosovo conflict was that NATO had few military capabilities that would warrant 
another war in which U.S. military strategy would require the blessing of the 
North Atlantic Council-NATO's principal decision-making body."1 
The Bosnian War also points out the vulnerability of the stability in the newly 
independent states. Unless, tying the Central and Eastern European states to the West, it 
would be a matter of timing for the chaos to resurface in Europe. It was a paradigm shift 
within NATO on the security of Europe. NATO realized that neither the existing military 
nor political structure could bring peace to the continent. NATO's reluctance to act in a 
timely manner in the Bosnian War cast a shadow over its main function as a free and 
democratic European. Nevertheless, intervention to Yugoslavia opened the way for a new 
wave of NATO enlargement. 
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The initial years of the 1990s were full of hope and uncertainties for international 
community. The fall of communism, the unification of Germany, and successful 
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liberation of Kuwait brought optimism for the future. However, the ethnic tensions 
throughout Eastern Europe and risk of backlash in Russia generated concerns. 
Cooperation, more than conflict, was thought to be dominating the new security 
environment in the next century. The main feature of Europe was a simultaneous 
fragmentation and integration process. On the one hand, the new democratic countries 
were rising in the continent, and on the other hand the European Union was heading 
towards a more economic-political union. Suffice it to say that the events in Yugoslavia 
was a shock to international community that presented the dark side of the new era. 
THE BOSNIAN WAR 
The Bosnian War was a part of a larger Yugoslavian conflict which lasted from 
1991 until NATO's Kosovo operation in 1999. The conflict began when Croatia and 
Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Initially, the European 
Community (EC) was involved in the crisis since it was thought to be a pure European 
problem. However, the weakness of EC's military pillar prevented any success in the 
ongoing conflict between Yugoslavian army and the secession states of Croatia and 
Slovenia. By 1992, the conflict spread to Bosnia. The reaction of international 
community was not beyond condemnation and an arm embargo. EC, CSCE and UN all 
engaged in the crisis, but a European solution could not be found due to the 
disagreements among the major European countries. 
In 1992, the Vance-Owen Plan was introduced to stop the ongoing conflict. 
However, due to the EC's reluctance and Russian opposition to an increased US role, the 
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plan was not enforced adequately. Later, the plan was completely rejected by Bosnian 
Serbs. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council established a UN force (UNPROFOR) to 
provide humanitarian aid. In May 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 824 which installed safe zones at Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goradze, Srebrenica 
and Zepa to protect civilians. The UN resolution demanded that the mentioned towns 
'should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from 
armed attacks and from any other hostile act.'3 The turning point in the conflict came 
when Bosnian Serbs killed more than 8000 Bosnian Muslims at the UN declared safe 
zone of Srebrenica. NATO launched an air attack from 30 August until mid September 
1995. The Bosnian War ended with the Dayton agreement in November 1995. 
THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC) 
The Yugoslavian crisis was seen initially as a European question. It was a chance 
for the European Community to prove its credibility. Moreover, the initial US position 
was not to push NATO to interfere into a local European conflict.4 However, the internal 
rift in EC prevented a cohesive policy towards the region. While France was emphasizing 
a European solution to the conflict, the UK was keen on an Atlantic settlement. 
Meanwhile, the EC's political and economic instruments did not deter the Serbs from 
aggression. EC's failure resulted in the resurrection of NATO as the leading security 
provider in Europe. 
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Kori Schake claims that the Yugoslavian Crisis meant the subordination of an 
independent European Security and Defense Identity to NATO.5 The latter" s military 
capabilities "defeated the French alternative security structure."6 
THE ROLE OF UN 
UN involvement in Bosnia goes back to early 1992. With the launch of 
UNPROFOR, UN peacekeepers were dispatched into the conflict zone. The mission of 
UNPROFOR was to create "conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation 
of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."7 UNPROFOR's mandate enlarged to 
encompass the safeguarding Sarajevo and its airport to maintain humanitarian assistance. 
Later, no-fly-zone and safe zones were established along with NATO's military 
assurance. 
THE ROLE OF OSCE 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the general sense in Europe was to promote the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), then the OSCE, as the 
leading apparatus in European security. Since Russia is a member of the CSCE, it would 
be much easier to integrate Russia as a security provider in Europe. Moreover, NATO did 
not want to engage in non-conventional tasks at a time when the allies wanted to ripen the 
peace dividends and focus on economic development. However, the internal divisions 
precluded the functioning of the OSCE. Despite the optimistic expectations, the 
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divergence between the Russian and European perspective on permanent peace in Europe 
prevented the OSCE from playing a central role. As Beverly Crawford suggests, "the 
lesson of Bosnia was that institutions that included Russia were weak and could not 
o 
provide security in Europe." No other organization was able to effectively intervene to 
the international crisis during an armed conflict. The UN had peacekeeping operations 
but they were mostly post-crisis operations in which UN forces did not risk the lives of its 
forces. 
The effectiveness of NATO originated from its political cohesion and integrated 
military structure.As the hopes for an OSCE driven peace talks diminishes, an ad-hoc 
grouping took the lead to end the conflict. 
CONTACT GROUP 
In 1994, as the Serbs intensified their attacks in Sarajevo, the representatives from 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed what is 
known as the contact group. The purpose of the group was to end the violence that the 
EC, OSCE and UN could not stop. The contact group convened several times throughout 
the year. European powers welcomed Russian involvement since it could exert pressure 
on the Serbian leader as a result of the Contact group agreements. Besides, Russia had an 
interest in continuation of the group because the next step would be a NATO involvement 
where she did not have any say.9 The group dissolved in the summer of 1995 as there was 
no unity and progress in the talks. 
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NATO'S INTERVENTION 
NATO's involvement in the Bosnian war was a gradual process. NATO's role 
evolved from a subcontractor of UN in 1992 into the leading power in 1995.10 After UN 
Security Council Resolution 787, NATO took the responsibility of enforcing UN 
embargo to the region. Operation Maritime Guard was launched to enforce the sanctions 
in November 1992. 
What motivated NATO to intervene in the Balkans is not just the containment of 
the conflict, but the integration of the region with the rest of Europe was more evident in 
NATO's policies.11 Therefore, NATO operations in the Balkans differed from those of 
previous missions, in that both the IFOR and KFOR mission aimed at preserving the 
dignity of human life. NATO interventions in the Balkans were commensurate with its 
value based new function. The Bosnian war was not the cause of NATO enlargement, but 
it provided a rationale for NATO's new roles in the European security, which in turn 
brought further enlargement. 
OPERA TION DENY FLIGHT 
NATO's first active involvement in the Bosnian conflict was to enforce the no-
fly-zones over six safe areas. Operation Deny Flight was launched in April 1993 for this 
purpose. While conducting Operation Deny Flight, NATO shot down four warplanes 
violating the no-fly zone in February 1994.12 During this period, NATO's actions were 
limited in scope due to its seeking UN approval for the operations. According to what is 
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known as "dual-key policy," the consent of both the UN representative and the NATO 
commander was needed to launch an air strike.13 
On 5 February 1994, the Serbs shelled an open market area in Sarajevo. Sixty 
civilians were killed in the bombing. Public outrage in the West encouraged NATO to 
take unilateral action against the Bosnian Serbs. Following the attack, NATO issued an 
ultimatum to the parties to stop fighting within 20 miles of Sarajevo or be threatened with 
air assaults.14 The ultimatum stated that: 
...with immediate effect, if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons are 
carried out on the UN- designated safe areas of Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla 
and Zepa, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb Military assets, as well as their 
direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel 
installations and munitions sites, will be subject to NATO air strikes, in 
accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and 
UNPROFOR following the Council Decisions of the 2nd and 9th August 1993.15 
OPERA TION DELIBERA TE FORCE 
NATO's threats to the Bosnian Serbs continued until late August 1995 without 
any major accomplishments. NATO conducted Operation Deliberate Force from 30 
August until 15 September 1995, which ended the conflict. NATO's air strikes targeted 
Bosnian Serb communication and heavy weapon sites. To some observers, the operation 
was a milestone in NATO history, in that it effectively put an end to the "out-of-area" 
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debate and transformed NATO from a Cold War era alliance to a security organization 
with new functions.16 
IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) 
NATO's presence in Bosnia was confirmed by the agreement which called for "a 
multinational military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, 
with a grant of authority from the UN."17 IFOR's primary function was to implement the 
Dayton Peace accord. Under the security umbrella, other international and non-
governmental organizations were able to engage in reconstruction activities. IFOR's 
mandate was over after one year. In 1996, NATO activated a new force (SFOR) to 
stabilize the peace. 
After the 1996 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO's Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) replaced the IFOR. From December 1996 until June 2004, NATO's SFOR 
mission continued to support the reconstruction efforts. With NATO's Istanbul Summit 
in 2004, the responsibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina was handed over to EU led 
Operation Althea. 
NATO's success in Bosnia triggered the NATO expansion.18 In Bosnia, NATO 
demonstrated that European security could not succumb to Russian concerns. The war 
caused major discussions in Europe on a future European Security structure. NATO's 
successful intervention showed that no other organization had the enforcement 
mechanism as NATO had. With the launching of a partnership for peace program (PfP), 
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NATO took the lead in shaping of European security. Although some see the PfP as a 
natural step for NATO expansion, NATO's goal was not more than enhancing 
cooperation in Europe.19 
NATO'S NEW FUNCTION 
NATOs Cold War function was focused on securing the alliance from external 
aggression. However, by 1992, the stability in Central and Eastern European became a 
90 
much important task than protection from the east. NATO's long time deterrence 
21 
function could not prevent the spread of instability from the East. Neither the UN nor 
could was able to end the conflict with diplomacy. Even NATO's threat to air strike was 
not successful in bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table. It was the use of the 
military along with diplomacy that enabled peace in Yugoslavia.The implications of the 
Bosnian war for NATO's functional enlargement is evident in NATO's Madrid 
Declaration: 
NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international 
organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our 
common security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and 
undivided Europe.The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that 
of the whole of Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for 
19
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20
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nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently 
99 prevails remains a major Alliance interest. 
The Bosnian conflict justified NATO's new roles in European Security. It would 
not be an exaggeration to state that NATO did finally reach a consensus on its role in new 
Europe as a result of the conflict. Unless the ex-communist countries were incorporated 
into NATO, the risk of a new Yugoslavia was high. For NATO, conflict prevention was 
far cheaper than ending an ongoing conflict. Hence, integration of the Central and 
Eastern Europe countries into the West was the only solution to check the forces of 
instability. Meanwhile, the war demonstrated that other European institutions were still 
too weak to provide security to Eastern Europe. Here, one can wonder why not the EU 
but NATO took the lead in the integration process. Bosnia was a test case for the 
international institutions. NATO apparently saved both Bosnia and its future in 1995. 
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
Bosnian War demonstrated the magnitude of the threat in the newly independent 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Without promoting democratization and 
cooperation, the tensions would ignite new conflicts throughout the region. 
DEPLOYABLE FORCES 
The Bosnia operation openly necessitated a new force posture for the non-article 5 
operations. The allies' conventional military forces were too cumbersome for the new 
22
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security environment. The NATO allies needed deployable forces in order to have 
enough flexibility when intervening the conflicts. The transformation of the existing force 
structure to a deployable force was costly and required domestic consensus. Not all allies 
were ready to undergo such a big transformation. A more affordable option was to 
acquire new forces for NATO's new operations. Especially the niche capabilities of the 
new members were suitable for this purpose. 
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY 
The biggest challenge for NATO in the post Cold War era was to prevent a crisis 
before it happens. However, it would be impossible to stabilize the Central and Eastern 
Europe without satisfying the security concerns of the countries in the region. Although 
the PfP and other cooperation initiatives were a right step in stabilizing the region, they 
did not bring a lasting peace. NATO's proven record of tempering intra and inter-state 
relations was, then, a political asset that could be use to enhance security in Europe. 
Henceforth, the second wave NATO enlargement was aimed at achieving a political goal 
in Europe. 
PARTNERSHIP AS CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
In order to enhance cooperation with non-members, NATO launched the 
Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994. The PfP was a direct result of the 
developments in former Yugoslavia. The underlying assumption of the PfP was that 
political and military interaction with NATO would promote democratization efforts in 
the partner countries. Furthermore, if a crisis were to erupt, NATO could use PfP assets 
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for the operations. According to Kaufman, the PfP was NATO's positive incentive to 
eliminate war from Europe.23 Needles to say, the PfP lacked the NATO commitment that 
could end the region wide tensions. 
GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT 
The NATO allies concluded that the PfP, although successful, could not guarantee 
stability in Europe. The PfP lacked the instruments to push the resolution for the ethnic 
and border problems in eastern Europe. Unless the security concerns of the CEEC were 
satisfied, the chances of conflict would always be high. Thus, NATO security coverage 
was offered to achieve the desired goal of a whole and free Europe. NATO enlargement 
would induce democratic reforms, eliminate the security concerns and soften the relations 
in the region. And also, the new members would enhance the political weight of NATO 
in the future crisis response operations. 
1994 BRUSSELS SUMMIT 
NATO resisted the expansion calls until 1994, at the Brussels Summit on 11 Jan. 
In 1994, NATO revealed its desire to expand the alliance. The Summit declaration stated 
that: 
Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North 
American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and 
stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the 
democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in 
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other 
23
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European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to 
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would 
welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as 
part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe.24 
The Brussels summit was the first enlargement summit. NATO members openly 
declared that NATO was considering enlargement in order to enhance security in Europe. 
By 1997, twelve Central and East European expressed their aspirations to join NATO. 
Among them, three Visegrad countries, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, were 
invited to join NATO. The accession of the new members coincided with NATO's 
second biggest operation in the post Cold War. From 23 March 1999 until 10 June NATO 
conducted air strikes against Serbian Forces in order to prevent ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo. The timing of the Air campaign was meaningful in that new nations were made 
fully aware that they were expected to be not just security consumers but also security 
providers. 
ACCESSION OF POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY 
After some lengthy discussion in NATO circles, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary were invited to join NATO in 1997. Their actual membership would be assumed 
in 1999. The accession of the Visegrad countries was just the beginning of the second 
24
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wave of NATO expansion. The Washington Summit declaration emphasizes NATO's 
intention for the next enlargement efforts: 
Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, 
willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion 
would enhance overall security and stability in Europe. NATO is an essential 
pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility. Working 
together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their 
cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a 
Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.25 
To assess the contribution of the new members to NATO's capabilities and 
missions, the second NATO operation in Balkans is a perfect example. Borrowing from 
Ryan C. Hendrickson, below, three countries' contributions to NATO's Kosovo 
operation were listed. 
Poland 
Poland was one of the strongest supporters of NATO's Kosovo operation. Public 
opinion polls report that 70 percent of people supported NATO air strike.27 Poland 
offered a military force to protect NATO forces in Kosovo and accepted 2000 Albanian 
refugees in a humanitarian effort. During the post-conflict phase, 900 polish troops were 
25
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in Kosovo as a peacekeeper force. Hence, Poland was very supportive in all bureaucratic, 
military and humanitarian perspective. 
Czech Republic 
The public support for Kosovo operation was the lowest in Czech Republic 
among the three new members. However, Czechs did not hesitate to join the Kosovo 
• 98 
operations. They provided a field hospital in Albania. Czechs also accepted 1000 
90 
refuges during the war. 
Hungary 
Hungary contributed substantially to the NATO operation in Kosovo, although a 
nearly 200.000 Hungarian minority was living in Serbia. Hungary opened its air space 
A 
and allowed the use of airfields for NATO airstrikes. Hungary supported the operation 
with logistic experts as well. The most important contribution of Hungary was accepting 
4500 Albanian refugees during the operation. The above contributions show that the new 
allies were not the free riders of the alliance. In fact, the new members were staunch 
supporters of the Euro-Atlantic security apparatus even more than some old members. 
ROADBLOCKS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Despite the necessity for new members, there were some concerns regarding the 
NATO's geographical enlargement. Specifically the Russian reaction, the cost of 






 Ibid.: 34. 
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R USSIAN REA CTION 
NATO rejects any Russian influence on the enlargement decision. However, the 
evidence shows that Russia's policies had a great impact on NATO's timing of 
enlargement. It is an undeniable fact that Russia is still seen as the major threat by the 
most of the countries in east Europe. Until the Brussels summit, NATO avoided any 
enlargement option in order not to alienate the democratic reforms in Russia. The events 
in former Yugoslavia forced NATO to take action even if Russia was expected to oppose. 
The war enabled NATO to realize how far it could follow policies despite Russian 
reaction. The sidelining of Russia in NATO's Bosnia operation was an indication of 
NATO's further enlargement intention. Russia joined the PfP in the hope of shaping 
NATO's enlargement policy. However, the PfP was a very loose partnership initiative 
which could not determine NATO's future orientations. 
As NATO's decision to enlarge unfolded in 1995, Russia hesitantly accepted 
NATO's new policy. Russia played its last card against NATO enlargement in the 
NATO-Russian Act. After the agreement was signed in 1997, virtually there was no 
objection from Russians on the accession of former allies to NATO. 
THE COST OF ENLARGEMENT 
The cost of new members to the alliance was raised after NATO concluded its 
study on the enlargement. There were different approaches to the cost issue. While some 
studies covered only NATO's expenditure to integrate the new members into the alliance, 
others were more broad in scope, covering new challenges as a result of NATO's new 
commitments. But the real cost of enlargement was less than what previously envisioned. 
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The new member itself carries the cost of membership rather than alliance. NATO's 
expenditure was not more than some infrastructure projects in the new members. 
WHOM TO INVITE FIRST 
The question of who would be the first to join NATO resulted in a major 
transatlantic rift among the allies. Some European allies were inclined to keep the initial 
enlargement as broad as possible. However, NATO's international staff did not want an 
unlimited enlargement. Study of NATO enlargement made it clear that only the countries 
who met the enlargement criteria could join the alliance. Thus, the first enlargement of 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic was an institutional choice of NATO. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bosnian war eliminated all the concerns about NATO's value in the post 
Cold War era and opened the path for new members. To put it differently, NATO's 
success in Bosnia extended the life of the organization. NATO's military intervention in 
Bosnia and subsequent enlargement initiatives are the two sides of the same policy. The 
common goal was to achieve the NATO's primary function in the post Cold War era. To 
conclude, the Bosnian war had the following important consequences for NATO: 
• The inactivity of NATO from 1991 until 1994 resulted in thousands of lost 
lives not to mention the region-wide instability in Balkans. Ethnic conflicts in 
Yugoslavia were an alarming bell for other hot spots in eastern Europe. NATO expansion 
was a natural solution to mitigate the ethnic and intra state conflict in the region. 
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• NATO's leading role was reaffirmed in the European security architecture 
with the Bosnian War. The Bosnia Intervention put a stop to the ongoing discussions in 
the future orientation of the alliance. The struggle between whether a European or an 
Atlantic Pillar was settled as it became clear that NATO would maintain its role of the 
leading security platform in Europe.31 In other words, an institutional hierarchy, with 
NATO at the top, was established as a result of the war. 
• NATO was able to incorporate the Russian contribution without 
jeopardizing the NAC mandate. NATO's unilateral action in Bosnia was a message to the 
Russians that NATO would not accept any line of divisions in Europe. 
• IFOR was NATO's first out of area operation. NATO had never used 
military force during the Cold War, and the IFOR operation was an indication of 
NATO's pursuit of new value based functions. 
• The obvious implication of NATO's involvement in Bosnia was that 
NATO assumed the new function of providing a European security apparatus. The 
enlargement decision at the 1994 Brussels summit was necessitated by NATO's new 
function. NATO would accept new countries when their contribution to European 
Security would exceed the NATO's commitment to them. 
• Bosnia proved that diplomacy could only work if backed by a credible 
military force. NATO had both instruments available in 1990s. The accession of new 
countries would contribute to the alliance's political and military capabilities. Since the 
alliance works on a consensus base, any decision of NATO is in fact the decision of each 
ally. NATO ties its members politically and militarily. 
31
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• Institutional cooperation was essential but not adequate in bringing peace 
in Europe. Only NATO's military capability enabled a peace agreement. All the efforts 
to incorporate the UN, OSCE and Russia in Bosnian conflict did not produce any 
effective results. Although Russia was an important player in European Security, there 
was a huge gap between the interests of the two sides. NATO had to act unilaterally in 
the areas where disagreements between NATO and Russia were widespread. In fact, 
NATO's reluctance until 1994, made the conflict more brutal and prolonged. 
The cooperation with other international organizations was desired but not 
indispensable for NATO's new roles. During the last days of conflict, NATO 
commanders were no longer seeking UN approval to conduct air strikes. Crawford says 
that the Bosnian war led an institutional hierarchy in which NATO had the prominent 
position.32 The OSCE was responsible to oversight the 1996 elections, the EU would 
assist in economic recovery of the Bosnia, the UN was to provide humanitarian aids if 
needed and NATO was to ensure the security of the new state.33 NATO and Central and 
Eastern European Countries took the same lessons from the war. Without NATO's 
security umbrella, their future would not be better than their past. As the tensions were 
escalating in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's response to the changes in the security 
environment was to enlarge functionally and geographically. 
With the successful Bosnia intervention, NATO explicitly declared that the 
alliance no longer accepted the east west divide in Europe. NATO was an article-5 
alliance until the Bosnian War, when it became a comprehensive organization which had 
more non-article 5 operations than the article 5 ones. If NATO were to preserve the Cold 
32
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War functions and structure, it would not have expanded to include new nations. 
Therefore, the Bosnian War marked a transition point in NATO's history from a 
War alliance to a security organization. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the results of the case studies in regard to the 
hypothesis: NATO's new functions drive the geographical enlargement. The restated 
thesis explains the dissertation's goal more clearly: NATO enlarges geographically unless 
the capabilities needed to satisfy the new NATO functions can be developed by existing 
structures. 
The following questions that are highlighted at the beginning of the study will be 
the foundation of this chapter.1 Is there a causal relation between functional and 
geographical enlargement? Was the past enlargement successful? Are there any side 
effects of the enlargement? Does NATO need new functions or new territories or both? 
Should NATO remain a regional collective security organization or reach to the areas 
traditionally beyond Europe? 
The conceptual framework of the dissertation is threefold: First, NATO's 
functional adaptation as a result of changing security environment (independent variable); 
second, Required Capabilities to satisfy NATO's new functions (intervening variable); 
third, NATO's geographical enlargement (dependent variable). The framework explains 
what has driven NATO's continuous geographical enlargement throughout its history. 
Based on the model in the previous chapters, the findings are in line with the 
dissertation's main argument, which states that NATO's functional enlargement is key to 
1
 The methodology for the analysis chapter is borrowed from Robert M. Antis, "The Reinvention of 
NATO" (Old Dominion University, 2006). 
explaining its geographical expansion. Since NATO membership entails an "all for one" 
commitment, enlargement was the last resort in NATO's search for capability fulfillment. 
The first round of enlargement was only available after the shock of the Korean War. The 
Greek, Turkish and German memberships relieved the defense burden of NATO allies 
and established the military balance in Europe. 
Similarly, the possibility of enlargement was not on NATO's agenda in the 
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The 1991 Strategic Concept and 
accompanying NATO summits did not raise the question of adding new members to the 
alliance. It was only when the new functions could not be satisfied by other means that 
enlargement became an option. As in the first wave of enlargement, NATO followed a 
partnership and cooperation path to achieve its new main function. However, as the 
conflict escalated in Yugoslavia, NATO concluded that only through enlargement would 
NATO prevail. Hence, the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 
1992, the initiation of Partnership for Peace Framework in 1994, and accession of Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary in 1997 were the means of achieving the same NATO 
function. 
Two case studies marked significant changes in NATO history. While the Korean 
War transformed NATO from a paper organization to a military alliance, the Bosnian 
War ended the contraction of NATO. Although NATO was not directly involved in the 
Korean war, it perceived Soviet Union as a paramount threat to the vital interests of the 
alliance. Both occasions triggered the transformation of the alliance and thus it is no 
coincidence that NATO enlargement happened just after the two conflicts. 
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Previous studies on NATO enlargement handle NATO's new members and new 
functions as unrelated distinct issues. However, my analysis in the dissertation proves 
that in fact, there is a close relationship between the two phenomenon. The later is 
triggering the first one. The reason why the previous studies missed the relation is due to 
a narrow focus on the institutional expansion. Most of the studies, as explained in the 
previous chapters, employ only actor-based explanations concentrating on the US and a 
few other major European Powers' position. The arguments in this study do not mean 
that the preferences of individual nations, especially of the major allies, are irrelevant to 
the expansion. Rather, the study offers that an agent-based explanation is not adequate in 
understanding the institutional expansion. The dissertation proves that institutional 
choices provide a better understanding of the enlargement issue. 
As explained in the previous section, many realists believe that the absence of 
threats lead to the demise of a security organization. But as we have witnessed in the last 
twenty years NATO has managed to exist after the Cold War. The main driver behind 
NATO's survival in cold war post Cold War era is its transformation from a collective 
defense alliance into a comprehensive security organization. Functional and 
geographical expansion is the engine of NATO's overall transformation. 
THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
An examination of NATO enlargement requires the clarification of the 
relationship between the security environment and its effects on NATO. As 
demonstrated by the case studies, NATO's functional expansion is in parallel with the 
major changes in the security environment. NATO adopted its main function in 
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accordance with the major changes in the security environment. The international system 
in the aftermath of WWII had two features. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan led to 
a power vacuum in the heart of Europe and in East Asia. And, second, the "international 
landscape was permissive. No nation existed that could contain Russian expansion."3 
Originally committed to the collective defense of its members in 1949, NATO 
transformed itself into a military alliance which aimed at deterring and containing cold 
war Soviet Union . The new NATO function was the result of Korean War in 1950. 
NATO concluded that Korea was a typical example of a future war in Europe. If not 
checked and deterred, communism would spread to western Europe by force. NATO's 
new function was different from its collective defense commitment in that new functions 
called for a permanent military structure with forces and equipment on the ground. 
The second major change in the international structure occurred after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. NATO's optimism about European security did not last long. By 
1991, the initial signals of violence came from Yugoslavia. The spread of conflict to all 
Yugoslavia threatened European security. If not contained, the conflict would withdraw 
the neighboring countries among which there were Turkey and Greece. More importantly 
the security concerns of the central and eastern European countries were the source of 
instability in the region. NATO had a secondary role initially. The European Community 
and CSCE were promoted as the main platform for European security. However the lack 
of military capabilities undermined any credible policies by these organizations. With the 
intervention in the Bosnia Conflict, NATO became the de facto organization responsible 
for Euro-Atlantic security. 
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In addition to the new functions, NATO added new members along with the 
changes in the security environment. The geographical enlargement is a direct result of 
the functional enlargement. To put it another way, functions determine the members. 
NATO missions define the commitment. Otherwise it would not be a cost effective 
solution to undertake responsibilities without satisfying any institutional interest. 
It is worth mentioning that NATO's functional evolution is in line with the 
choices of member states. NATO's leading powers were opposing an enlargement agenda 
until the Bosnian Conflict. However, the previous argument does not mean that 
individual members drove the enlargement process totally. The decision for enlargement 
was a compromise of intergovernmental bargaining at the highest level. Hence, 
individual choices do not provide a correct picture of NATO's geographical enlargement. 
Although the functional enlargement drives the need for new members, the case 
studies reveal that an important factor combines the two pillars of NATO expansion: 
capabilities. During the enlargement process, commitments are evaluated against the 
new capabilities. As a rational actor, NATO's geographical enlargement is based on the 
outcome of commitments vs. capabilities. On the one hand, every new nation contributes 
new capabilities to the alliance. On the other hand enlargement means the extension of 
NATO's commitments. Therefore, capabilities should be weighed against the 
commitments. New members are accepted only when their contribution exceeds NATO's 
commitment. Moreover, it is important that the new capabilities for the satisfaction of the 
new functions cannot be at the expense of other NATO functions. If the new members 
endanger NATO's existing functions, the enlargement should not take place. 
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Here, one might ask a fair question of whether new functions always result in new 
members or not. As underscored in the second case study, there is not an automatic 
enlargement process. Not all functions lead to geographical enlargement. NATO's open 
door policy is not limitless. Every new member means new commitment and new costs 
for NATO. Every new member has distinct political and military characteristics. Since 
consensus is the essence of decision making, from an organizational standpoint, as 
NATO becomes more heterogenic, the decision making would become more difficult. 
Meanwhile, NATO needs to look for the least costly alternative when performing new 
functions. Not all functions require a geographical expansion. Most of the non-military 
functions, such as Conflict Resolution, Counter Terrorism, Proliferation of WMD and 
Cyber Defense can be met via the changes in doctrine, organization and training. 
However, any function of regional stabilization tends to be achieved by accepting new 
members rather than exporting security. As long as NATO has the capacity to satisfy the 
new functions, the expansion alternative would be more costly. In other words, the 
geographical enlargement should be determined by the institutional functions and the 
associated costs which are the capability requirements in NATO's case. 
The second wave of NATO enlargement highlights an important concern in 
NATO expansion. Russia's position cannot be sidelined totally in an enlargement 
decision. Russia has always been a major player for the Euro-Atlantic security. Contrary 
to the official statements that the decision on enlargement is taken solely by the alliance, 
Russia was accommodated by new privileges before the post Cold War enlargement. As 
Asmus underscores, the allies needed to follow a dual track strategy on the second wave 
of NATO enlargement. Indeed, the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary 
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had to await the result of the Russian elections in 1997.4 Only after Yeltsin secured 
reelection did NATO continue on with the enlargement agenda. If Russian fears and 
security needs are not met, the enlargement will be counterproductive. As the Georgia-
Russia conflict in 2008 demonstrated, Russia can practically block a future NATO 
membership wave. On the one hand, NATO should provide real security guarantees that 
NATO is not a threat to Russia. On the other hand, NATO should avoid extending less 
than full membership to the aspiring countries. Direct confrontation with Russia as a 
declining power would be an invitation for a future conflict if the security environment 
turned in favor of Russia. 
In addition to explaining the phenomenon of NATO enlargement, the findings of 
the case studies can be used to predict the way ahead for NATO. Any future enlargement 
will depend on new capability requirements. 
As stated in the background chapters, the international security environment 
significantly changed in the last decade due to the new unconventional global threats. As 
9/11 terrorist attacks to the US showed, the security of the alliance is under threat not 
from the intra-state threats but rather from hostile group or organizations which have the 
ability to use any non-military asset as a weapon against the high value civilian and 
military assets. These new type of threats can be dealt with through collective action by 
the alliance. The ISAF operation is the indicator of NATO's determination to protect its 
core interests against the new threats. Afghanistan is a laboratory for NATO's 
effectiveness in the new security environment. If the deficiencies are answered in a 
timely manner, NATO will preserve its dominant role in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
4
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Otherwise, the member countries will no longer want to bear a huge cost to maintain the 
alliance. 
NATO needs to transform itself to face the new challenges of terrorism, energy 
and cyber security. The new threats will be in the hybrid form and affect not just the 
geography but also the networks of the alliance. NATO's 2010 strategic concept should 
clearly identify the new functions and the course of the geographical enlargement in the 
coming years. 
THE BENEFITS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
As a result of the first wave of enlargement, Soviet power was first balanced and 
contained in the late 1950s. And NATO maintained its superiority over the Soviets until 
the latter" s demise. With the second wave of enlargement, the security dilemma in the 
Eastern Europe was mostly mitigated. NATO's commitments enabled economic and 
political prosperity in the new members. However, NATO still needs to keep its focus on 
the Balkans. The integration of the Balkan Countries with NATO is essential for 
permanent peace in Europe. 
The most important intrinsic benefit of a security organization such as NATO is 
its value in bringing strategic predictability. One of the implicit reasons behind the 
enlargement decisions has been "What happens if the country in question is not accepted 
as a member. " It was a legitimate factor in Turkey's, Germany's, Spain's and Post Cold 
war enlargements. The alternative cost was so high in most of the enlargement rounds 
that it reinforced the support for enlargement. 
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Besides the direct result of enhancing the European Security, NATO's 
geographical enlargement in Europe led to further institutionalization and integration of 
the region. The European Union enlarged on a similar scale encompassing all former 
communist European countries. Since NATO is one of the iconic institutions of the 
West, NATO membership brings extra economic and political benefits. The new 
members attract foreign direct investments much needed for economic development. In 
fact, economic and political integration in Europe became reality only after NATO's 
security umbrella was established. Therefore, NATO membership is the key factor for the 
issue linkage among economics, politics and security.Moreover, NATO enlargement is 
insurance for internal balance. The existence of a credible threat provides the venue of 
cooperation and makes free riding costly. Cooperation is more efficient and cost saving in 
the existence of a major threat. Exclusion from the club makes punishment effective. 
Therefore, when the outside threat vanishes, the club may lose the glue that holds 
together the members. The allies' cooperation during WWII might be a good example of 
a need for a common threat. After the removal of Hitler, the West and Soviet Union 
began to see each other as a threat rather than allies. As the off-shore balancing of the US 
is fading, the new members contribute to the internal balance among the European states. 
No European country would prefer to increase its military power as long as NATO 
remains as the main security platform. 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENLARGEMENT 
Although enlargement satisfies NATO's new functions, there are some negative 
consequences of the geographical enlargement that NATO should avoid in the future. 
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The first is the risk of over-enlargement. NATO enlargement should not be an open 
ended automatic procedure. Any open ended enlargement is the source of Security 
Dilemma in Euro-Atlantic Region. Like states, international organizations will be worse 
off when overstretched. NATO will be overstretched when it no longer has the required 
assets to meet its commitments. New members mean new threat perceptions. New 
countries might have divergent threat perceptions due to the geographical location and 
neighborhood relations. When NATO does not have the necessary assets to accommodate 
the fears of the aspiring nations, the credibility of the alliance will suffer substantially. 
NATO should avoid accepting new nations unless they can contribute to NATO's 
capability to handle the identified NATO functions. Meanwhile, unlimited accession will 
decrease the essential attributes of centralization, control and flexibility of NATO.5 In 
the same way, an uncalculated enlargement will make the public support problematic. It 
will be difficult to explain why the nations should sacrifice life when the new nation does 
not bring any contribution to the alliance. Any reluctance in the commitment of the 
necessary national assets will jeopardize the alliance's raison d' etre. Without full 
socialization, new members could exploit NATO membership to solve their regional 
problems at the expense of their neighbors. 
The second negative consequence is the establishment of a new dividing line. In 
order to avoid a new black and white division of the security environment, NATO should 
deliberately "blur the lines between members, potential future members, and partners" in 
the future enlargement rounds.6 As Chapter 6 reveals the post cold NATO enlargement 
was a success in terms of eliminating those lines. The second Wave of NATO 
5
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enlargement aimed at achieving a durable European security. NATO enlargement 
eliminated the gray zone of the security in Europe. Aside from Ukraine there is no any 
state left with unsatisfied security concern in continental Europe. Hence, the enlargement 
enhances not only the members' security but also the security of non-members. As 
explained in the previous chapters, the new members of NATO all developed good 
relations with non-member neighbors. It is fair to say that Russia and other non-members 
benefited hugely from the integration of unstable Central and Eastern European 
Countries into NATO. If enlargement policy is pursued without the concerns of the 
regional powers, it could cause new dividing lines. The countries that are not accepted to 
membership could be destabilized. 
Lastly, NATO should take into consideration the increased risk of discomfort and 
disproportion of the vulnerability among members before accepting new members. The 
absence of a common threat and the problems of collective action can result in more 
distress in the alliance. Current threats do not affect each member equally, in contrast to 
o 
the Cold War era threa. Like terrorism, energy security does not pose threat at the same 
level to all NATO countries. While the US and a few allies worry about NATO being a 
two tier alliance, the new countries of NATO worry about NATO's overextension and 
going beyond what it is capable of. Moreover, the new functions can exacerbate the 
existing distress.9 Therefore, the alliance should identify the core functions that it wants 
to achieve instead of a wide array of functions. Meanwhile, the increased operational 
requirements can be opposed by many of the new comers due to the cost burden. 
7
 Wohlfeld, "Eu and NATO Enlargement and Stability in Central-Eastern Europe," 137. 
8
 Stephan M. Walt, "The Precarious Partnership: America and Europe in a New Era," in Atlantic Security : 
Contending Visions, ed. Charles A. Kupchan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 27. 
9
 Ibid., 42. 
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NEW FUNCTIONS AND NEW TERRITORIES 
NATO's strategic concepts are the highest level documents that encompasses the 
organizations" functions. In 2010, NATO will launch its new strategic concept. 
Documents will show how NATO sees threats and opportunities in the future security 
environment. 
NA TO"S CORE FUNCTIONS IN THE NEW CENTURY 
In order to meet the needs of the rising challenges the following functions are 
indispensable for NATO. The effectiveness of the new functions will depend on NATO"s 
ability to develop the required capabilities. 
Deterrence and Collective Defense 
Deterrence and collective defense is the core function of the alliance. In order to 
protect NATO"s security interests effectively, the meaning of collective defense should 
be clarified. Any threats to land, air, sea, space and cyber commons should be considered 
a violation of alliance" s security. As the complexity of the threats increases, NATO needs 
to acquire not just military but also civilian capabilities to deter the potential adversaries. 
Meanwhile NATO needs to balance missions at home and away. NATO faces the 
risk of losing its domestic support as a result of heavy concentration on the home away 
missions. Although it is necessary to operate at the strategic distances, any lack of 
attention to its members' core security needs will deteriorate NATO"s solidarity and 
value. If NATO fails to deliver the core collective defense capability, the members can 
engage in bilateral security engagements which will make NATO a corpse over time. 
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An effective deterrence and defense strategy requires expeditionary capabilities. 
Past experiences demonstrated that every operation is unique in itself. No two operations 
are similar in scope, doctrine, or military technology that is used. NATO should develop 
flexible capabilities instead of a fixed territorial defense forces. 
Transatlantic Link 
NATO should remain the core transatlantic political-military alliance. As long as 
it serves as the main consultation forum between US and Europe, the indivisibility of 
Euro-Atlantic security will have credibility. The consultation mechanism is important to 
form a shared picture of NATO's engagements. Especially before an operation, allies 
should communicate with each other and establish a common understanding of the 
strategic interests and objectives of the mission. 
Partnership 
NATO can contribute to global security by establishing partnership networks. 
NATO's military capabilities are not enough to cope with the new challenges. Instead of 
competition and confrontation, NATO should choose cooperation with the other players 
in the security environment. In some cases, it might be in a supportive role, in others 
NATO can be in a leadership position. 
Specifically, the UN, OSCE, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are critical 
of establishing security in Euro-Atlantic region. The degree of cooperation will affect 
NATO's new capability requirements. 
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NEW TERRITORIES AND THE THIRD WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT 
NATO's third wave enlargement will encompass countries not just located in 
Europe but in a wide Black Sea region as well. Having almost achieved its primary 
function of a Europe wide security, NATO needs to transform itself to cope with the new 
challenges. As explained in Chapter 3, Energy Security will be one item on NATO's 
agenda that was not thought to be a security issue in the past. The stability of the 
suppliers and transit route are important for NATO. Since the Caucasus is one of the 
energy rich regions of the world, NATO should pay special attention to the security of 
the region. 
Although NATO has been a player in Euro-Asia since the Afghanistan operation, 
NATO should be sensitive to major powers in the region. Russia and China should not be 
kept out of any security arrangements in the region. Instead of an individual country 
approach, a regional approach towards Euro-Asia would enhance the NATO's strategic 
interests. NATO could promote regional institutionalization. The countries in the region 
should be granted the same level cooperation with NATO. Instead of a direct 
engagement, NATO should use institutional cooperation to achieve its main goals. 
In regard to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO should keep its promise on the 
integration of these two countries . However, It is a fact that, NATO's involvement in the 
region will further deteriorate the NATO-Russia relations. The latest Russian security 
doctrine already defines NATO's further eastern enlargement as a threat. NATO should 
assess its commitments and benefits from the membership of Ukraine and Georgia. The 
timing and the domestic support of these two countries are critical. Georgia would be the 
next NATO member if the last war had not occurred. The Georgia-Russia War weakened 
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the prospect of Georgian membership. NATO allies already expressed their 
unwillingness to extend security commitments to a country that still has disputes with 
Russia. Therefore, NATO expansion should continue but at a slow pace. 
REGIONAL VS. GLOBAL NATO 
NATO should not be a global watch dog. Its functions should be linked to the 
allies' security. Even humanitarian missions such as Bosnia and Kosovo are conducted 
on the premise that if action is not taken, those conflicts would undermine NATO's 
security. A global NATO would have unintended consequences by changing the 
international structure. Russia and China might form a counter alliance to balance 
NATO.10 
However, NATO should protect its people and territory from any threat in and out 
of its borders. In other words, "Geography is no protection from the spillover effect of 
21st century challenges."11 Global ambitions can be met by a unified alliance. In the 
future NATO will still be "a transatlantic organization with global partners, global 
19 
missions and global capabilities." 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined an untouched area in a mature field. Throughout its 
inception, scholars did valuable studies on NATO enlargement. However, there was a 
missing link between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement that this study 
10
 Ministry of Defense, Government of France, Geostrategic Prospectives for the next thirty years, 
www.defense.gouv/fr/das/content/download (accessed November 13, 2009). 
11
 NATO, "A speech by NATO's Former Secretary General Manfred Worner," 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions.htm (accessed December 3, 2009). 
12
 Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 25. 
195 
aimed to explore. Along with the background chapters, two case studies support the main 
argument that NATO functions drive the geographical enlargement. 
During the initial years of NATO, the organization was not more than a commitment of 
collective defense on paper. The Soviet Union was the biggest concern; however, the US 
nuclear monopoly and limited Soviet military capabilities did not require any major 
commitments by the allies. 
The Korean War was a game changer. The world was divided between the two 
superpowers. The neutrality of a country in Europe, in reality, meant a loss for NATO. 
The deterrence of the west, practically, failed. Instead of a total war with the west, 
Communism could spread through limited wars. Such a domino effect would end the 
democracies in Europe if the Soviets could not be contained and deterred actively. The 
conventional military capabilities became the main requirements for the new function. 
However, the economic burden of the new capabilities forced NATO to develop the 
capabilities through new accessions. 
During the post-Cold War era, NATO's main focus was constructing a durable 
European security system. A Whole and Free Europe became the new motto of the 
alliance. NATO needed niche capabilities and coercive diplomacy to be successful. The 
ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia revealed the fact that partnership was not realistic enough 
to promote democracies in a region which is historically conflict ridden. Moreover, apart 
from the gaining security, NATO could enable the aspiring countries to acquire a new 
1 ^  
western identity and to distance themselves "from the past Soviet modernity." NATO 
is the first threshold to join the global community. Thus, NATO started a new 
13
 loan Oas, "Shifting the Iron Curtain of Kantian Peace: NATO Expansion and the Modern Magyars," in 
The Geography of War and Peace : From Death Camps to Diplomats, ed. Colin Flint (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 396. 
geographical enlargement wave during late 1990s. As a result of the enlargement, NATO 
gained total dominancy in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
As NATO celebrated its 60th birthday, the new security environment looked more 
complex and full of risks. The stability of bipolarity or unipolarity will not be in the new 
international structure. In addition to the states, non-state actors will pose new threats to 
NATO. In such an environment, NATO's first and foremost function needs to be 
safeguarding territory, people and interests. The new environment will necessitate not 
only high end military capabilities but also non-military capabilities. Soft power along 
with hard power should be effectively used against the new challenges. 
NATO should not be considered a military toolbox for any specific mission or 
country. NATO is a success story only because political consultation and coordination 
prevailed instead of coercion and confrontation. Even though the US has been unrivaled 
in the alliance, it did not force the other allies to follow specific policies, as Soviet Union 
did in the Warsaw pact.14 Table 3 summarizes the analysis of the dissertation: 
THE AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As explained before, NATO is a mature field in international studies. However, as 
the alliance transforms itself, new gaps are arising for scholars. This dissertation does not 
explain how new functions are derived from the changing security environment. Hence, 
the dissertation does not answer why NATO adopted a normative function of "Whole and 
Free Europe' in the post Cold War era. Is it due to the NATO's collective identity and 
moral values or due to the interests of NATO allies? This would be a valuable area for 
further research on institutions. 
14
 Craig and Logevall, America's Cold War : The Politics of Insecurity, 358. 
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Furthermore, the study does not cover the institutional decision making processes 
on both functional and geographical evolution. Although 28 nations are sitting in the 
council, the decision making process is much more complex than simple voting 
mechanism. Further investigation of NATO's internal procedures would provide 
significant data on how successful organizations manage change and adaptation. 
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